Distortion of incentives for farm households in KwaZulu. by Lyne, Michael Charles.
DISTORTION OF INCENTIVES FOR FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN KWAZULU 
By 
MICHAEL CHARLES L YNE 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
University of Natal 
Pletermarltzburg 
December 1989 
I hereby certify that, unless specifically indicated 
to the contrary in the text, this qissertation is the 
result of my own original work. 
I' 
( i ) 
KwaZulu is a less developed region of South Africa. Low 
agricultural incomes have contributed to widespread poverty 
in the region. Despite intense population pressure on the 
land, arable resources are underutil ized. Conversely, grazing 
resources are overutil ized. 
Tribal tenure prevents the sale of land and has also 
precluded an active land rental marKet. Population growth has 
reduced farm sizes be~ause households have an incentive to 
retain their rural land rights. At the same time, the 
opportunity cost of household farm labour has increased. As a 
result, the average cost of producing crops has risen 
relative to product prices. Households are generally able to 
procure food and income at lower cost by allocat.ing better 
educated worKers to urban wage employment. Consequently, many 
households have 1 ittle incentive to produce crops and are 
deficit food producers. Arable land is underutil ized because 
these households cannot rent land to others who would farm 
it. . 
A mathematical programming model constructed fr'om models of 
representative households demonstrates that output responses 
to higher food prices and reduced input costs are sma 11 • 
Furthermore, an increase in food prices harms most rura 1 
households and lower input costs do little to improve 
household welfare. However, the mode 1 predicts that a land 
r'ental mar'Ket will have a =.ubstantial i mpac t c.n crop 
( i i ) 
production and could generate significant income 
opportunities i n agriculture and its service 
for arable land would 
i n du s t r i e s • A 
rental marKet require mi nor 
institutional changes and has equity as well as efficiency 
advantages. 
The uncultivated portion of a household's tribal 1 and 
allotment is regarded as common property for " grazing 
purposes. Access to these grazing resources is not restricted 
and an empirical analysis of herd data indicates that 
stocKing rates decl ine when the private cost of Keeping 
cattle increases relative to their perceived benefits. Unl iKe 
most 'solutions ' to the common property problem, 
privatization of grazing land would not only reduce 
overstocKing and its assoc i ated social cost, but would also 
improve incent"ives to upgrade he~d and pasture qual ity. It is 
recommended that privatizat i on of grazing land (even i n the 
1 imited sense that arable land is privately controlled) 
should be encouraged. 
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KwaZulu is a t~ibal homeland in South Af~ica. The homeland 
j -
displays many featu~es typical of a developing count~y. Low 
fa~m incomes and ~apid population g~owth have cont~ibuted to 
widesp~ead pove~ty. This study explo~es the anomaly that 
a~able ~esou~ces a~eunde~util ized despite intense population 
p~essu~e on the land and since~e effo~ts to assist fa~me~s. 
Attention is also focused on the ove~util ization of g~az i ng 
~esou~ces. It is contended that these inefficiencies ~eflect 
disto~ted ag~icultu~al - incentives. The object of this study 
is to identify the disto~tions, to p~edict the effects of 
changing economic incentives on ~esource allocation, and to 
maKe ~ecommendations . aimed at imp~oving agricultural 
efficiency and household welfare in ru~al KwaZulu. 
It is argued that many of KwaZulu/s rural households have 
little incentive to p~oduce crops, and that a~able land is 
underutil ized because the ~ental ma~Ket fo~ ag~icultu~al land 
i sin c omp let e • Overutil ization of grazing ~esou~ces is 
attributed largely to institutional arrangements that reduce 
the private cost of Keeping cattle ~elative to thei~ 
pe~ceived benefits. In pa~~icular, stocKowners enjoy f~ee 
access to land that is al located to, but not cultivated by, 
other households. Pol icy recommendations emphasise efficiency 
and equity aspects of privatizing g~azing land and of 
removing insti tutional ba~riers to land ~ental. 
Chap ter describes important cha~acteristlcs of ru~al 
2 
KwaZulu and its households. Most striKing is that farms are 
uniformly small, arable land is generally underutil ized, farm 
incomes are low relative to off-farm incomes, and the vast 
majority of households are deficit food producers. Evidence 
of an incomplete land rental marKet is reported. Overall, 
the data indicate widespread poverty. 
Chapter 2 reviews models of household resource allocation. It 
is conc 1 uded tha t econom i c and i nst i tu tiona 1 fac tor-s are 
responsible for inefficient use of agricultural land in 
KwaZulu. Given prevail ing circumstances, it is predicted that 
an increase in food prices will stimulate crop production but 
render most rural households worse off. Reduced prices for 
marKet inputs are expected 
_ / 
to Increase crop output and 
household welfare. However, it is contended that supply 
responses to changes in product and input prices will be 
small. Changes in off-farm earnings are expected to have a 
large influence on household welfare but the effects on crop 
production are ambiguous. A rental marKet for arable land is 
expected to raise the welfare of all households participating 
in the marKet and to impact significantly on crop production. 
Cattle statistics are analysed and it is demonstrated that 
stocKing rates in KwaZulu decl ine when the private cost of 
Keeping cattle increases relative to their perceived value. 
Chapter 3 describes an attempt to quantify the effects of 
price and institutional changes on aggregate crop production 
using a mathematical programming model. The model is 
constructed from programming models of representative 
3 
households. Predicted results confirm expectations and draw 
attention to other issues such as complementarity between 
cash and food crops and the creation of income opportunities 
in local agri-business. 
Pol icy impl ications are analysed in Chapter 4. Although 
emphasis is placed on the efficiency and equity advantages of 
a rental market for arable land, discussion is also directed 
at the effects of privatizing grazing land and the future 
prospects of cansol idating farms under freehold tenure. It is 
concluded that minor institutional changes are required to 
facil itate a rental market for arable land and that (partial) 
privatization of grazing land should be encouraged in areas 
where it is more ac~eptable. 
- " , 
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Chapter 1 
A profile of rural KwaZulu and it~ households 
This chapter briefly describes Key features of the study area 
at both aggregate and household levels. The household data 
are essentially a by-product of sample surveys conducted by 
various researchers for specific but mostly different 
purposes. The first of these surveys was undertaKen in 1980 
to test a multi-stage sampling design proposed and documented 
by the author (Lyne, 1981:3-13). This technique was employed 
in subsequent sample surveys conducted by Carr (1981), Rogers 
(1982), and stewart (1986) in conjunction with the author. A 
common feature of these surveys was the accurate measurement 
of individual crop areas and fallow land. Unbiased estimates 
of the population means and proportions presented in this 
chapter were computed using formulae 
multi-stage sampl ing design (Lyne, 
estimates provided by Lyster (1987), 
appropriate to the 
1981:13-39). Sample 
Cairns (1988) and the 
Development Studies Unit (DSU) are also reported. These 
estimates might contain bias as the data were analysed as if 
sampl ing units were drawn randomly even though the selection 
process was not strictly random. The results of five rural 
sample surveys undertaKen by DSU staff (PerKins and May, 
1988) are reported in aggregate as the individual sample 
estimates relate to fairly heterogeneous study popUlations. 
The approximate spatial location of each sample survey is 
depicted in Map 1. 
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Map 1 KwaZulu in the context of Natal. 
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1.1 Location, finance and constitutional status. 
KwaZulu, homeland of the Zulu t~ibes, is located in the 
p~ovince of Natal on the easte~n seaboa~d of South Af~ica 
(Map 1). A Legislative Assembly was establ ished in KwaZulu 
du~ing 1972 and in 1977 the ter~ito~y became ~self-gove~ning~ 
in terms of South Af~ica~s National States Constitution Act, 
No. 21 of 1971 (Lyste~, 1987:30). In 1983 membe~ship of the 
Legislative Assembly was inc~eased to 141 including 72 t~ibal 
chiefs elected by 24 Regional Autho~ities rep~esenting 208 
t~ibes and 8 communities, and 65 members elected in 26 
constituencies (SAIRR, 1984:347 DSSA, 1987). Execu t i ve 
powe~ is vested ina Cabinet comprising the Chief Minister 
(M.G. Suthelezi) and eight ministe~s. Executive functions a~e 
pe~fo~med by 11 depa~tments and two publ ic corporations. 
Given the natu~e of this study the KwaZulu Depa~tment of 
Ag~icultu~e and Forest~y (KDA) and the KwaZulu Finance and 
Investment Co~po~ation (KFC) wa~~ant specific mention. In 
1985/86 KwaZulu gove~nment expenditu~e amounted to R959,0 
mill ion while non-loan ~evenue amounted to R921,9 mill ion 
(DBSA, 1987). Est imates fo~ 1985/86 (SAIRR, 1987:266) 
indicate that only 24 pe~ cent of non-loan ~evenue was ~aised 
within the territo~y (mainly th~ough taxation), the balance 
representing t~ansfe~s f~om cent~al (i .e. South African) 
gove~nment. The KDA~s 1985/86 budget allocation amounted to 
R43,4 mill ion of which one third was targetted for staff 
remuneration and one third for machinery, equipment and 
engineering services (KDA, 1986). During the same period, 
7 
budget allocations for KwaZulu/s departments of Health (and 
welfare), Education (and culture) and WorKs are I isted by 
SAIRR (1987:270) as R303,9, 
respectively. 
R233,3 and R167,0 mill ion 
Amongst those matters over which the Assembly has power to 
legislate are taxation and education of citizens, agriculture 
and forestry, conservation of flora and fauna, land settle-
ment, pub I ic worKs and welfare services. Matters over which 
the Legislative Assembly has no power include customs and 
excise, foreign exchange and banKing (Thorrington-Smith et 
al., 1978:59-60). KwaZulu does not have its own currency and 
is a price-taKer on much larger South African marKets. 
Consequently, pol icies which influence relative prices in 
South Africa bear directly on KwaZulu. 
1.2 Rural characteristics. 
1 .2. 1 Lan d use. 
Whereas farms in KwaZulu are operated by small-scale 
sUbsistence (BlacK) farmers, farms in Natal are operated by 
large-scale commercial (White) faromers. The cropping 
potential of land in KwaZulu is tabulated in Tab I e 1. 1 • 
Important features of the biocl imatic groups <Phill ips, 1973) 
referred to in Table 1 are I isted in Appendix A, Table Al. 
KwaZulu has relatively less arable land than Natal <12,4 
versus 18,4 per cent) but a similar distribution of cropping 
potential (LYster, 1987:26-28). 
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Table 1.1 Estillated land pohntial in ~iZulu •. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Bioclillatic group Crop potent i al Area (Hi) Arable (Hi) Arable (;1,) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1,2,3 and 4 High 1333073 263112 7,9 
6 and 8 t1ediUII 580317 54599 1,6 1 
93910 2,8 
~ 
7,9,10 and 11 LIM 1402710 
Total 3316100 411621 12,4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------7 
Source KDA (1980). 
Land used by househol ds. in KwaZu 1 u for cropp i ng purposes is 
not necessarily part of the region's potential arable land. 
This is primarily a result of high population pressure on 
rural land and the tribal system of land tenure (section 
1.2.2) -. Households may find it expedient or necessary to 
cultivate at least part of their allocated land even though 
the allotment may be classifed as non-arable by agricult~ral 
planners. Table 1.2 summarizes global estimates of 'arable' 
land util ization and rural household numbers in KwaZulu 
during 1985. 
Table 1.2 Estimated ar,as of potential arabI" land used as arable and rurll 
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Note 1 1985 population census estillates adjusted to exclude residents of urban 
areas within ~aZulu that have no local government body ind for undercount. 
Source KOEA (1986) and Tabl.s 1.4 and 1.9. 
9 
Tables 1.3 - 1.5 provide information at aggregate and house-
hold level concerning areas cultivated and yields of major 
crops produced in KwaZulu. Staple food crops, maize in 
particular, account for more than 80 per cent of the areas 
cultivated by households. This proportion reduces to 
approximately 60 per cent in areas of high cropping potential 
closer to Natal'~ sugar mills. 
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1,0118 (dry b.lns) 
24,015 (pOtltO'S) 
53,814' 
Not.s I Ctr.als = mlinly mliz. ; l.gum.s = mlinly dry b.an ; Roots = potato, ~.ttpotltO and madUllbi. 
2 Rogtrs (1982) Itlsur.d I 1.ln Iliz. yield of 0,813 tlHI (n=76) and Cairns (1988) leasured I 
m.an maiz. yi.ld of 1,158 tlHa (n=S9), both in artas of ~aZulu Mith high cropping pot.ntial. 
3 Htlh and Gartaan <1981/82-1986187> Insur.d I Inn yi.ld of 0,359 tlHI for Suglr Bnns grlMn 
in a region of high cropping potential using management practices typical of thoSt employ.d 
in KifIZulu. 
4 This is an und.rntimah of Inn lain yi.ld in Natal during 1982183-1984185 as a hrgt part 
of th. crop is ftd to cattle and th.refore txcludtd from recorded grain yields. 
5 Computtd from Yitlds for Sugar 8.ans r.cord.d at four sit.s in Nltal during 1986187. 
6 Comput.d from dryland sugar-can. production .stimat.s in Natal during 1976177-1979/80. 
Sourc. App.ndix B, llbl. B.12; Chapter 3, l~bles 3.11 - 3.13; li.b.nbtrg Ind Joub.rt (1986187); 
Hliz. BOlrd (1985); Ortmann (1985); Potato Board (1985); • 
Farm sizes are extremel y small in KwaZulu. Although the 
al Jotment size distributions presented in Table 1.5 are 
10 
positively sKewed, the~e is no evidence of ve~y la~ge fa~ms. 
Mo~e than 80 pe~ cent of the sample households have 'a~able' 
allotments smalle~ than 2,0 hecta~es and the I a~gest 
allotment measu~ed only 9,9 hecta~es. In Natal, ave~age fa~m 
size is 670 hecta~es (Di~ecto~ate Ag~icultu~al Economic 
T~ends, 1989). 
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n = 132 
(Ha) (Yo) 
0,24 22,7 
"aiz, & dry btans 0,06 4,4 0,09 8,6 
Ha i Zf &: othu 0,08 5,8 0,60 0,1 
Dry buns 0,10 7,0 0,08 7,2 
Sugar-cane . 0,39 ~7,5 0,33 31,0 
Roots 0,06 4,1 0,09 S,3 
Veg,tablu 0,02 1,5 0,01 0,6 
Other crops 0,02 1,6 0,06 6,0 
Cult i IIIhd 1,1580,2 0,90 84,4 
FaIICM 0,28 19,8 0,17 15,6 
Total 1,43 100 1,06 100 
High crop potential 
out of sugar-can, ar,a 
Carr 1981 






















































Soure, Cairns (19SS); Carr (1981); lyn, (1981); Rog,rs (1982); StNart (1986). 
App~oximately 22 pe~ cent of the a~able land in KwaZulu is 
left fallow (Knight and Lenta, 1980, ~epo~t a compa~able 
estimate of 27 pe~ cent fo~ 1972) and pe~ hecta~e yields of 
staple food c~ops a~e ext~emely low ~elative to those 
reco~ded in Natal. Underutil i zed a~able land is a p~ominent 
featu~e of less developed ~u~al a~eas in Southe~n Af~ica and 
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calls into question the appropriateness of economic models 
that assume crop land to be used intensivelY (Low, 1986:119-
123>. It is not contended that land is not scarce but rather 
that there is I ittle incentive to use arable land intensively 
and that constraints on the land (rental) market are partly 
responsible for this situation (section 4.1.2>. 
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Source Carr (1981); Lynt (1980); St.wart (1985). 
1 .2.2 Ru r a I I an d r i gh t s • 
Under the tribal tenure system operating in KwaZulu, land is 
not owned by individuals but is held in trust by the King who 
distributes it to district chiefs (Thorrington-Smith et al., 
1978:89>. In rural areas, it is usually the district chiefs 
and their headmen (indunas) who allocate land to household 
heads and 
household 
who settle boundary disputes. 




re turn, the 
the district 
chief. The chief therefore has an incentive to consider 
requests for land from households seeKing to establ ish in his 
area of jurisdiction. 
Land allocations provide households with usufruct rights (eg. 
to reside, crop, graze 1 ivestocK and gather natural 
resources) which produce a stream of valuable benefits 
including (a) security during times of unemployment, ill 
health and old age a"nd ' (b) access to building materials, 
grazing, fuel and water for which the private costs are low. 
However, households are not entitled to sell land. These 
features of tribal tenure have been well documented (see Low, 
1986: 1 08-110) • 
Another i mpor tan t aspec t of tr I ba.l 1 and tenure In KwaZu 1 u is 
that land allocated to a household which is not used for 
dwell ings or crop production serves as grazing and is 
available to other households for this purpose only (Stewart, 
1989). In some districts even the cultivated lands are opened 
to stocKowners for grazing during the winter months 
<Naledzani, 1987:82). With few exceptions, grazing is a 
common resource to which households within _ tribal ward have 
unrestricted access (Lyne and Nieuwoudt, 1989). This issue 
and its impact on farmer incentives is discussed in section 
2.2. 
To maintain land rights and their associated benefits, a 
J 
13 
household must demonstrate some use of its allotment and must 
continue to be accepted as. a full member of the community. 
Land rights may be lost through prolonged failure to use the 
land (Low, 1986:108; Lenta, 1982). Lyster (1987) found that 
84 per cent of 326 households sampled in the Usuthu tribal 
-
ward viewed their land allotments as belonging to the chief 
or tribal authority and that 75 percent bel ieved their land 
would be reallocated to other households if they appeared not 
to use ita 
Households have an incentive to retain their rural land 
rights, even if they derive virtually all of their income 
from urban wage employment, because the benefits (a) can be 
procured by members whose opportunity cost of time in 
cultivation is low and (b) are elsewhere unobtainable or 
expensive (Low, 1986:109-110 and 163). As a result, 
population pressure on rural land has worsened over time and 
wage employed household members have become migrant worKers 
or commuters. This situation contrasts with the more 
permanent urbanization of nineteenth century England where 
towns drew their populations from rural famil ies that had no 
land rights (Elkan, 1960:138). 
Although some observers have attributed 'circulating labour 
migration' to legislation that prevented black wage workers 
from relocating with their famil ies to urban job centres in 
South Africa (see Nattrass and May, 1986) the val idity of 
this claim is not clear in KwaZulu which borders the major 
metropol itan areas of Natal. 
14 
The incentive to retain land rights has virtually precluded a 
rental marKet for agricultural land owing to the perception 
that, by openly demonstrating what tribal authorities may 
in terpre t as an i nd i fferen tat t i tude toward 1 and use, 
lessors' may jeopardize their right to land and its economic 
benefits (Lenta, 1982). In addition, rental arrangements tend 
to be resisted by stocKowners whose access to communal 
grazing is reduced when uncultivated land is hired and either 
cultivated or used as a private graztng resource by the 
lessee (Khumalo, 1989). Consequently, underutil ization of 
arable land does not involve high opportunity costs as the 
land marKet is incomplete. The sample data presented in Table 
1.10 give some indication of rental marKet inactivity. Only 
two of 79 households sampled by Lyster (1987:59) rented land 
although 50 indicated a land shortage. 
1.2.3 Demography. 
Important population characterisitcs, including the extent of 
off-farm employment and its contribution to rural household 
incomes, are demonstrated in this and the following section. 
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present aggregate data whilst Tables 1.8 
and 1.9 emphasise the household situation. 
In 1985 the urban popUlation of KwaZulu (including rural 
migrants) was 1,04 mill ion or less than 25 per cent of the 
region's total popUlation (OSSA, 1987). An average annual 
population growth rate of 3,8 per cent is projected for 
KwaZulu during the period 1985-1995 (OSSA, 1988) and de Graaf 
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(1987) predicts that, after accounting for urbanization, the 
rural population will grow at an average annual rate of 
nearly 2,5 per cent between 1980 and the year 2000. 
Tablt 1.6 ~azulu rural population (million). 
1980 1985· 
Of facto rural population 3,116 
plus clostr stttltmtnts ~ith no local govtrnmtnt 0,307 
Ot facto population in rural arta 2,723 3,423 
Note 1985 ctnsus tstilatts adjusted to correct for undercount. 
Source OSSA (1987); KOEA (1986). 
The estlm~tes presented in Table 1.7 suggest an inverse 
relationship between real off-farm remittance earnings and 
per capita food production in rural KwaZulu. 
Tablt 1.7 Estimattd migrant r.mittancts in rural ~aZulu (1985 = 100). 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yo Annual 
1960 1970 1976 gr~th 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Higrlnts lnd ca.luttrs lb.tnt on 
ctnsus day (000) 166 370 460 6,6 
Rtmittance earnings/annum (ROOD)· 44239 133895 361015 14,0 
Shart of ~aZulu GOP attributtd 
to labour txports (Yo) 54 ro 78 2,3 
Shari of KMaZulu clrtal rlquirt-
.tnts productd in KMaZulu (Yo)- 38 30 27 -1,7 
Per capita grain production in 
all homtlands (kg) 60 31 29- -3,7 
------------------------------~--------------------------------------------
Notes 1 Hean cash rtmittancts account for roughly ont third of mtan ~agts 
(Stt~art and Lynt, 1988). 
2 Estimatts ctntred on 1958, 1972 and 1978 resptctiutly. 
3 Estimate relates to the period 1980-84. 
Source Btmbridgt (1986); Buthtltzi CQllission (1982); Ltnta (1982b). 
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It would appear that during the period 1960-1976 (a) real per 
capita wage remittances increased (at a decreasing rate) 
despite high rates of population growth and (b) households 
substituted (at a decreasing rate) imported food for farm 
produced staples. The mechanics of this relationship, which 
has been observed in less developed countries throughout 
Southern Africa (Low, 1986:24-27 and 48-53), are the subject 
of section 2.1.4. 
The household sample data presented in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 
provide very similar estimates of population composition in 
rural KwaZulu. 
Tabl, 1.8 H,a~ catposition of slIpl, hous,holds in rural KwaZulu. 
High crop pot,ntial 




n = 1114 
l~,d crop pot,ntial 
V,ry runl 
St~art 198' lyst,r 1984185 
n = 61 n = 326 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ch Ildr,n 3,5 3,S 3,1 4,0 4,6 
Adul til 
P,nsionabl, D,S 0,4 O,S 0,7 0,5 
On-hi'll 2,6 3,0 2,4 3,2 3,3 
OH-fim work.rs 2,2 1,8 1,6 2,2 1,8 
D. juri Hous,hold 8,8 8,7 7,6 10,1 10,2 
Off-faNt work,rs (Yo) 25,1 20,7 21,1 22,0 17,4 
LFPsl (Yo) 32,0 nla 27,4 27,0 nla 
Unmp 1 oy,d (Yo) 21,6 nla 22,4 18,5 nla 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Noh lFPs = labour forc, participants = unmploy,d plus wagt mloy,d and s.lf mploy,d 
including full-ti~, far~'rs. ' 
Sourct lyst.r (1987); P.rkins and Hay (1988); St,~art (1986). 
Approximately 40 per cent of household members are under the 
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age of 16 and sl ightly more than five per cent are of 
pensionable age. Of the remaining members (adults), nearly 40 
per cent are wage employed (migrants and commuters) although 
this figure appears to be l ower in (very rural) areas more 
distant from job centres. Even so, neither distance from job 
centres nor cropping potential appear to have a major 
influence on the proportion of household members engaging in 
off-farm employment. 
The unemployment rates estimated by Stewart (Table 1.8) are 
almost double the official estimate for KwaZulu at that time 
(OBSA, 1987). Although the official statistic is an aggregate 
estimate for rural and urban KwaZulu, the discrepancy more 
1 iKelY stems from differences in definition. stewart 
(1986:25) defined a~ unemployed any economically active 
person (healthy individuals, 16 - 59 years of age) who 
claimed to be seeKing wage employment whereas the official 
definition requires the same person to have actively sought 
worK during the previous month and to have either worKed less 
than five hours during the previous weeK or to be able to 
accept a job within a weeK. The estimate of 22,4 per cent 
(Table 1.8), an average computed from sample data gathered in 
five rural surveys by the OSU during 1983-1986, compares 
favourably with Stewart/s estimates and is also based on a 
definition less stringent than the official one (PerKins and 
May, 1988:35). Bromberger (1981) estimated an unemployment 
rate of 32 per cent in Vul indlela, a peri-urban district, 
using a definition of unemployment similar to Stewart/so 
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Migrant adults (Table 1.9) account for approximately 19 per 
cent of de jure household members and more than 73 per cent 
of wage workers, the latter estimate increasing with distance 
from job centres. 
Tabl. 1.9 H.an hous.hold ligrants (.xcluding daily conmuttrs) and dt facto calposition of s~pl. houstholds in rural 
"'-aZulu. 
High crop potential Cross-stction L~~td crop pottntial 
Vtry rural V.ry rural 
Lyne 1980 Sttwart 1985 Carr 198t Rog.rs 1982 DSU 1983-86 Sttwart 1985 Lyster 1984185 
n = 140 n = 132 n = 200 n = 80 n = 1114 n =.61 n = 326 
Adult residents: 3,7 4,3 3,8 
Haln 1,1. 0,6 0,5 1,1 
Fmahs 2,3 2,0 2,0 2,2 
Adult ligrants: 1,6 1,8 1,8 
Halts 1,3 1,6 1,2 1,0 
Ftllaln 0,3 0,7 0,4 0,3 
Ch i ldr.n: 
Residents 4,5 3,5 3,9 3,1 2,9 4,0 4,6 
Higrillts 0,3 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,0 
D. facto household 7,9 7,2 6,5 5,6 6,2 8,3 8,4 
D. jure household 9,8 8,8 9,2 7,7 7,6 10,1 10,2 
Ftllale/~ale adult residents (Yo) 2,0 nla 3,2 4,0 2,0 n/a n/a 
Higrant adultS/houslhold (Yo) 16,3 17,8 25,0 
Migrant adults/~ag. ~orkers (Yo) 
20,8 17,1 18,0 17,4 
nla 72,7 n/a 
Hhlds ~ith r.sid.nt h.ad 
nla 81,3 81,8 100,0 
(Yo) 45,0 nla 24,6 44,8 nla nla nla 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sourc. Carr (1981); Lyn. (1981); Lyst.r (1987); P.rkins and Hay (1988); Rogers (1982); Sttwart and Lyne (1988). 
The sample mascul inity ratios reported in Table 1.9 suggest 
that adult female residents outnumber adult male residents 
2: 1 inmost rural areas and by as much as 4: 1 in more remote 
places. In Stewart's (1986:44) combined samples, some 43 per 
cent of the economically active population (752 individuals) 
were regular off-farm wage worKers with an average of 6,2 
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years of formal school ing. Of those remaining, approximately 
80 per cent were female with an average of only 3,6 years of 
forma 1 school ing. An econometric analysis of these data 
reported in section 3.1.3 supports the observation that 
" ••• the propensity to migrate is higher among young adult 
males with above average levels of education" (Nattrass, 
1976:69). 
Th e imp 1 i cat i on is that high rates of out migration have 
reduced the qual ity and quantity of farm labour. Farming 
ac t i v it i es requ i re cons i derabl e effor t and compe te with 
leisure and household worK (eg. gathering water and firewood) 
for time. If leisure is a superior or normal good, rising 
remittance income may result in a substitution of leisure for 
farm worK. It has also been suggested that out migration 
reduces the efficiency of farm labour owing to decl ining 
~complex cooperation" (Low, 19861127) and that timely 
management decisions are constrained by the absence of house-
hold heads (Table 1.9) who usually assume the role of 
decision-maKer (Nattrass and May, 1986; Lenta, 1982). 
1.2.4 Household income, wealth and expenditure. 
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 present information about income 
(poverty) and its distribution in rural KwaZulu. The annual 
household income estimates reported in Table 1.10 provide 
1 The principle of comple x cooperation impl ies that over a 
1 imited range, productivity per worKer increases'as more 
hands become available. 
20 
Tabl. Ll0 H.an annual cash incaI' and faMi .xp.nditur. for slipl. hous.holds in rural KwaZulu (1985 = 100). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
High crop potential High crop pot.ntial Cross-section L~~ed crop potential 
in sugar-cln. ar.a out of sugar-can. ar.a 
--------------------- --------------------------------- ------------- --------------------------
Very rural P.ri-urban Very rural 
Lyne 1980 St~art 1985 Carr 1981 Rog.rs 1982 Lyst.r 1983 DSU 1983-86 St~art 1985 Lyst.r 1984/5 
n = 140 n = 132 n 2 200 n = 80 n = 79 n = 1109 n = 61 n = 326 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Land phnttd (Ha) 1,15 0,90 0,81 0,82 nla nla 0,65 nla 
Far~ inputs: (R) 
Labour hirt 76,1 83,0 7,4 3,3 3,5 nla 2,1 nla 
Fertilizer 42,6 101,1 35,S 38,0 14,6 nla 4,2 9,3 
Slid 38,2 13,1 15,1 7,2 18,6 nla 16,1 19,5 
Land pr'paration 
Services 21,1 48,9 25,0 28,2 nla nla 20,S nla 
Land hirt 0,0 0,0 1,5 0,0 nla nil 0,0 n/a 
Other 7,0 0,0 5,5 1,2 n/a nla 0,0 nla 
Total 185,0 246,1 90,0 77,9 n/a 107,6' 42,9 nla 
Far~ cash incal': (R) 72,3 
Crop salts 352,3 238,9 23,9 2,2 3,0 nla 15,7 8,1 
livutock 63,9 7,9 9,1 0,2 9,9 nla 10,4 31,9 
Labour 7,4 9,1 0,1 0,5 34,2 nla 10,0 nla 
Equ i JIIItnt hi rt 30,4 43,2 0,0 0,7 nil nla 19,6 nla 
Lind rtnt 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 nla nla 0,0 nla 
Handicraft nla 23,1 n/a nla nil 76,5 22,7 nIl 
Off-faMi income: (R) 
Wages 4960,6 3457,2 
Rtlli ttancts2 nil 1565,0 821,7 605,3 1847,6 1676,0 
W.lfare pa~.nts· nil 596,1 nla nla 184,7 717,6 990,8 482,2 
D. facto household 7,9 7,2 6,5 5,6 8,74 6,2 8,3 10,24 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notu 1 Estimate computed frDl a subs.t of the slmpl. (s •• Table 1.12). 
2 Re~ittlnce = migrant work.r cash r~ittances plus cDiluter ~Iges. 
3 The ~ini~UI agt to qUllify for I stat. p'Rsion hiS b.tn r.laxtd and real ~.lfar. paym.nts 
have increas.d significantly during the p.riod 1981-1986. 
4 Estimat. relat.s to d. jure housthold size as wagts ~.r. r.cord.d in pllc. of r~ittanc.s. 
Source Carr (1981); Lyne (1981); Lyster (1987); Perkins and Hay (1988); Rog.rs (1982); Ste~art (1986). 
some indication of the sources of cash income . and expenditur'e 
on market inputs used in farming. Although the definitions of 
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off-farm income vary between studies, it is apparent that 
remittances and welfare benefits (publ ic and private sector 
pensions and welfare grants) account for more than 90 per 
cent of gross cash income accruing to de facto households 
even in years of good rainfall (1980 and 1982 being drought 
years). The overriding importance of off-farm employment as a 
source of income is not unique to peri-urban areas or to 
regions of low cropping potential and has also been observed 
in a sub-sample of 'top' farmers selected from the Vul indlela 
district (Lyster, 1987:88). 
PerKins and May (1988:92-93) computed a Gini coefficient of 
0,51 for household incomes recorded in the DSU sample (Table 
1 .10) and conc 1 uded that incomes may be more unequa 11 y 
d i str i bu ted amongst .81 acKs in KwaZu 1 u than amongst other 
population groups in South Africa. An analysis of Stewart's 
(1986) combined samples, drawn from a region within commuting 
distance of wage employment marKets and covering areas of 
very high and low cropping potential, revealed similar 
inequities; households in the lowest decile of the income 
distribution accounted for only 2,4 per cent of total cash 
income (on-farm cash income plus remittances, pensions and 
grants) whereas the share accruing to the top ten per cent 
amounted to 21,9 per cent. However, it should be noted (a) 
that these statistics portray a biased picture of income 
inequal ity ai household income varies with house~old size and 
(b) that within the White population of South Africa, the 
top five percent of wealth owners account for 50,7 per cent 
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of total wealth (McGrath, 1987). 
No matter what income inequal ities exist in rural KwaZulu, it 
cannot be disputed that even those people with relativelY 
high incomes are poor. The average per capita cash income of 
the top ten per cent of all individuals sampled by Stewart 
(1986:41) during 1985 amounted to R1389 per annum (1985=100). 
In 1980, the per capita income for all White South Africans 
was R9881 , valued at constant 1985 prices (McGrath, 1985). 
The income estimates in Table 1.10 exclude remittances paid 
in Kind and the opportunity cost of non-marKet products and 
services. Average remittances paid in Kind amounted to R248 
per annum (1985=100) for the households sampled by DSU 
(PerKins and May, 1988:82). Rogers (1984) used local retail 
price and yield estimates to compute a value of R230 
(1985=100) for food produced and consumed by households in 
Carr~s (1981) sample. PerKins and May (1988:69) provide a 
comparable estimate of R205 per annum (1985=100). It would 
seem reasonable to conclude that gross income from 
farming activities is much higher than the sales estimates 
tabulated in Table 1.10 suggest. Nevertheless, the share of 
household income generated by agriculture remains small 
(after adding a subsistence value of R230 for farm produced 
food to average crop and 1 ivestocK sales recorded in the 
fertile sugar-cane producing region surveyed by Stewart, 
agriculture's gross contribution to household income is less 
than 18 per cent). 
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Nattrass"'s (1986) analysis of the OSU sample data revealed 
tha t most househol ds in the . four lowest I ncome dec i 1 es were 
more than 15 minutes walK from the nearest school or store 
and that almost one half of these households were more than 
15 minutes walK from water. In addition, nearly 70 per cent 
of this group could not access a hospital in less than an 
hour. In 1985 there were 490 people per hospital bed in 
KwaZulu whereas the corresponding estimate for South Africa 
was 193 (OSSA, 1987; OSSA, 1987b). Krige (1989) presents 1985 
census data showing that only 20 per cent of KwaZulu"'s 
population had more than primary school training and that 40 
per cent had never attended school. The corresponding 
estimates for the White population of Natal are 74 and 13 per 
cent respectively. Sy 1985 a total of 12 technical, 
vocational and industrial sKills training institutions had 
been establist')ed in KwaZulu with a combined enrolment of ·only 
3013 (OSSA, 1987). 
Cattle are generally regarded as a store of wealth in the 
less developed rural areas of Southern Africa (Low, 
1986:111). An analysis of raw sample data gathered by Stewart 
(1985) and Carr (1981) revealed large and highly significant 
positive correlations between household cattle numbers and 
income. 
Table 1.11 shows that some 40 per cent of the households 
sampled outside of areas where sugar-cane is produced do not 
own cattle. Cairns (1988) and Rogers (1982) provide 
comparable estimates of 25 and 48 per cent respectively. 
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Although herd size distributions tend to be positively 
sKewed, even the largest herd observed comprised only 32 
cattle. Average herd size on beef farms in South Africa was 
443 during 1985 (Ell iot (1986:47). Aggregate herd data and 
evidence of high stocKing rates are presented in section 2.2. 
Table 1.11 Cattle ~nership and herd size distributions ~ongst s~ple households in rural ~aZulu. 
Households with 0 cattle (~) 
Households with 1 - 3 cattle (Y.) 
Households with 4 - 6 cattle (~) 
Households with ) 6 cattl, (Y.) 
Largest herd observed 
Cattle per houlehold with cattle 
High crop potential 
in sugar-cane area 
lyn, 1980 St~art 1985 







High crop potential 
out of sugar-can, area 
Carr 1981 


















Source Carr (1981); Lyn, (1981); St~art (1985). 
According to the estimates In Table 1.10, average expenditure 
on marKet inputs appl ied to farming activities by households 
in sugar-cane producing regions is more than double that 
recorded for households in other regions of high cropping 
potential and five times the level observed amongst 
households in the area of low cropping potential surveyed by 
Stewart. More importantly, the data indicate that expenditure 
on marKet inputs constitutes a small fraction of household 
income. The major components of household expenditure are 
recorded in Table 1.12. These estimates reflect mean annual 
expenditure by sample households in three of the five rural 
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areas surveyed by DSU and analysed by PerKins and May (1988). 
Overall mean expendi ture (R2691) compares favourabl y wi th 
mean cash income (R2714) attributed to households in the 
larger DSU sample (Table 1.10). 






Staplt foods Other foods Household Clothing Education Savings Farm inputs 
Study arta siZt ('l.) ('l.) ('l.) ('l.) ('l.) ('l.) ('l.) 
HaplftUlo 211 2290 24,8 23,6 tt,7 9,9 3,5 3,6 5,2 
Hbonga l\fant 210 2535 24,3 21,3 II ,1 . 10,0 6,5 5,7 4,9 
Nqbtu 202 3272 21,3 19,8 16,2 12,3 4,4 7,5 1,9 
Htan 2691 23,5 21,6 13,0 10,7 4,8 5,6 4,0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Noh Household = fUtl, light, toiletry, laundry and chaning mahrials and hounhold durablts. 
Sourct Hay and Ptttrs (1984 and 1984b)j Peters and Hay (1984). 
On average, food products account for more than 40 per cent 
of total expenditure by sample households. This finding is 
consistent with the conclusion reached in section 1.2.3 that 
most households in rural KwaZulu are deficit food producers, 
even in terms of staple food requirements. Some evidence of 
the fact that the proportion of surplus food producers is 
very small is provided in Table 1.13. Nieuwoudt and VinK 
(1988) report claims that only 17 per cent of KwaZulu's rural 
households are self sufficient in grains and that the average 
household produces only 50 per cent of the grain it consumes. 
Gandar and Bromberger (1984) estimated that rural households 
sampled in the (remote) Mahlabatini district produced 41 per 
cent of the total value of food consumed. 
26 
The sample data presented in Table 1.12 suggest that rural 
households might spend more on education than on farm inputs. 
This was certainly the case for households sampled by Stewart 
( 1985) in areas of low cropp i ng potent i al whe-re mean 
expendi ture on education exceeded expenditure on farm inputs 
by 490 per cent (Lyne, 1988). Berry (1970) argued that 
(relatively) high off-farm wages provide both the incentive 
and the means for investment in education and that the 
resulting pattern of investment in education rather than 
farming would, in itself, lead to increasing rural-urban 
mi gra t i on. 
Table 1.13 Proportion of sllple households selling crops in rural ~aZulu. 
High crop potential 
in sugar-cane area 
-----------------------
Lyne 1980 
Crop n = 140 
Haize sellers (Yo) 19,3 
Dry bean sellers (Yo) 25,7 
Root crop sellers (Yo) 36,4 
Stewart 1985 




High crop potential 
















In closing, it is worth noting that the proportion of sample 
households sell ing food crops is not smaller in area~ where 
sugar-cane has been introduced (Table 1.13). Weber et al. 
( 1988) refer to several studies in Africa where the 
produc t i on of non-food crops has resu 1 ted··· i n increased food 
production and conclude that cash cropping is not necessarl iy 
de tr i men ta 1 to food secur i ty. 
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This chapter focuses on variables influencing household 
resource 
reviewed 
allocation. Household economics theories 
in section 2.1 and factors influencing 
are 
the 
util ization of grazing resources are discussed in section 
2.2. Key economic variables influencing household decisions 
relating to crop and 1 ivestock production are summarized in 
section 2.3. 
2.1 A household economics approach to resource allocation. 
Households in rural .KwaZulu are both producers and consumers 
(Tables 1.4 and 1.12). Household economics theory recognises 
that production and consumption decisions are interdependent 
and. raises issues relevant in a study of resource allocation 
on small farms. 
Household economics 1 iterature can be traced bacK to original 
contributions by Chayanov (1966) and Becker (1965). These, 
and contributions by Mellor (1963), Sen (1966), Hymer and 
Resnick (1969), Krishna (1970) and Nakajima (1970), provided 
a basis for the more recent models described by Barnu~ and 
S~uire (1979) and Low (1986:35-44). This section emphasises 
the pol icy impl ications and appl icabil ity of the Barnum-
Squire and Low models in KwaZulu but begins with a brief 
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exposition of the original contributions to household 
economic theory. 
2.1.1 Chayanov: Resource allocation in a peasant household. 
The Chayanov approach assumes (a) that households strive to 
maximize an internally consistent (family) util ity function, 
(b) that farm output may be consumed or sold in the marKet 
and is valued at the marKet price (Py), and (c) that there is 
no labour marKet. The absence of a labour marKet impl ies that 
the value of househo~d labour is a subjective matter. 
Although the farm labour marKet is not very active in KwaZulu 




Chayanov's model ignores off-farm 
which are very important in KwaZulu 
income 
(sec t i on 
The analysis is framed in terms of the amount of labour (L) 
a household will . commit to the production of farm output (Y) 
in order to satisfy its consumption needs. On the one hand 
the household wishes to increase income (m) by allocating 
more labour to farm production (m=YPy where Y=f(L» and on 
the other hand it wishes to avoid the drudgery of farm worK. 
Ut iIi ty is therefore a func t i on of income and lei sure (.1) and 
is maximized subject to the household's production function, 
its maximum number of worKing days and a minimum acceptable 
income 'eve'. Assum i n9 tha tit is the produc t i on func t i on 
which is binding and not one of the other constraints, the 
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solution to this problem occurs where the marginal rate of 
substitution of leisure for income equals the marginal value 
product of labour (i .e. where dm/d!=VMP~). 
A graphical explanation of the subjective equil ibrium is 
presented in Figure 2.1 where gross farm output is measured 
in money terms on the vertical axes, and total household 
labour time is measured on the horizontal axis. Time 
allocated to farm work increases from left to right on the 
horizontal axis (OL). Conversely, time allocated to other 
activities (leisure in this instance) increases from right to 
left (LO). Farm production is described by the production 
function, or TVP curve when all output is valued at its 
marKet prlce, and displays diminishing marginal returns to 
labour. Strictly speaking, Chayanov assumed that households 
enjoyed flexible access to land so that the onset of 
diminishing returns could be deferred. Household consumption 
is represented by indifference curves such as 11 and 12, each 
depicting combinations of leisure and income that provide a 
given level of util ity (U=f(m,!». These indifference curves 
are convex toward the origin at L as leisure is measured from 
right to left on the horizontal axis. Income and leisure 
combinations on 12 provide less util ity than those on 11. The 
slope measured at any point on an indifference curve (dm/d!) 
describes the amount of "income required by the household to 
compensate it for the loss of a unit of leisure and therefore 
represents the subjective wage rate which the household 
attaches to its labour time. Provided that th~ production 
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function is the only 1 imiting constraint, equil ibrium occurs 
at point X. where the slope of the indifference curve (dm/d!) 
giving the highest level of util ity attainable is equal to 
the slope of the TVP curve (VMP ... >. I n other words, the 
household maximizes its util ity by allocating OLe labour days 
to farm worK and LLe days to other activities (leisure). 
I 1 12 
Income Income 
o Le L 
Labour -> <----- Leisure 
Figure 2.1 The Chayanov model of a small farm household. 
Sou r c eEl 1 i s (1 988: 1 07) • 
Ell i s ( 1988: 110) ou t 1 i n e s the f 0 11 ow i n g pol icy imp 1 i cat i on s 
of Chayanov's model: 
(a) The subjective equil ibrium is influenced by the size and 
composition of the household. These demographic variables 
deter-mine minimum and maximum levels of output for the 
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household as well as the slope and position of . its 
indiffe~ence cu~ves. Fo~ example, an increase in child~en 
~elative to wo~Ke~s might ~aise m~ in Figu~e 2.1 (minimum 
acceptable income) to a level whe~e it becomes the most 
1 imiting const~aint on util ity maximization and could 
also flatten the indiffe~ence cu~ves as wo~Ke~s may be 
p~epa~ed 
loss of 
to accept a smalle~ inc~ease in income fo~ the 
a unit of 1eisu~e in o~de~ to meet inc~eased 
household consumption ~equi~ements. The impl ication is 
that households of diffe~ent size and composition will 
attach diffe~ent subjective values to thei~ labou~ time 
and wi 11 the~efo~e use 1 abou~ at d i ffe~en t 1 eve 1 s of 
intensity. 
(b) The subjective equil ib~ium is influenced by changes in 
TVP caused by changes in fa~m technology o~ output p~ice 
p~ovided that minimum acceptable income ~equi~ements a~e 
satisfied. In this case, a p~ice o~ tecnology change that 
i nc~eases TVP wi 11 i mp~ove househol d we 1 fa~e bu tits 
effect on household labou~ allocation is indete~minate 
unless l.isu~e is ~ega~ded as an infe~io~ good. 
that leisu~e is a no~mal o~ supe~io~ good and 
Assumi ng 
tha t the 
minimum acceptable income level is satisfied, an inc~eas. 
in income not only p~ovides an incentive to substitute 
wo~K fo~ leisu~e (substitution effect) but also inc~eases 
the demand fo~ leisu~e (income effect). When the income 
effect of increased ea~nings exceeds the substitution 
effect, household labou~ supply decl ines. A bacKward 
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sloping supply curve for labour is therefore a possible 
outcome in terms of Chayanov"'s model. 
(c) The subjective 
proportion of 
equil ibrium is not influenced by the 
farm output retained for household 
consumption because the util ity function excludes non-
farm consumption goods purchased from farm income. It is 
also impl icitly assumed that old, young, male and female 
worKers are perfect substitutes in production. 
Owing to the ambiguity of household responses to changes in 
TVP, strategies that raise minimum income requirements (eg. 
taxation) or which increase the marginal util ity of income 
relative to the marginal util ity of leisure (eg. by providing 
a wider range of consumer goods in rural areas) may seem 
appropriate. However, such pol icies do not imply improvements 
in the welfare of rural households and, as Ellis <1988:"114) 
points out "pander to the purported leisure preference of the 
household rather than creating active conditions in favour of 
ouput growth". 
The subjective equilbrium in Chayanov"'s model exists only in 
the absence of a labour marKet. When a competitive labour 
market is introduced, household production levels are 
determined by profit maximization with respect to the market 
wage. In this case demographic variables do not influence the 
level of 
predictable 
farm output and responses to changes in TVP 
(an upwar-d shift in TVP will increase 




2.1.2 Becker: Allocation of time by households. 
Contemporary farm household models which permit labour hiring 
and sell ing util ize elements of Chayanov's analysis and 
Becker's (1965) theory of time allocation - the basis of 'new 
home economics'. New home economics views households as 
, small factories' that convert market inputs (X) and 
household resources (member's time, T) into a set of ultimate 
non-market uses. Util ity is derived from these ultimate us.s 
(called Z goods) rather than from the range of goods and 
services. One such Z good is "the seeing of a play, which 
depends on the input of actors, script, theatre and the 




and the utility 
therefore 
function, 
takes the form 
U=f(Z) where 
Z=(Z1,Z2, ••• ,Zn). The household maximizes util ity subject to 
its production function, a total time constraint and a money 
income constraint. Total time (T) is the sum of time spent at 
(wage) work (Tw) and time spent producing Z goods for 
consumption (Tc), i.e. T=Tw+Tc. The money income constraint 
(H) is the product of time spent in wage work and the marKet 
wage (W), i.e. M=WTw. In equilibrium, money income equals 
expenditure on market inputs used to produce Z goods, i.e. 
WTw=M=XPx where Px represents prices of the purchased 
inputs. 
The time and money constraints are not independent. They can 
be colla p sed i n to a sin 9 1 e ... f u 1 1 inc om e'" c on s t raj nt (S, w her e 
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S=WT=WTc+XPx) by valuing all household time at the marKet 
wage. 
where 
The expression WTc+XPx can be rewritten as (Pxb+Wt)Z 
band t are the inputs of X and Tc per unit of Z 
respectively. Assuming a 1 inear production function, the 
equil ibrium condition obtained by maximizing U=f(Z) subject 
to (Pxb+Wt)Z and the production function is dU/dZ=Y(Pxb+Wt) 
where Y measures the marginal util ity of money income and 
(Pxb+Wt) represents the full price or marginal cost of 
producing a unit of Z. If the production function is not 
1 inear the marginal cost of producing a unit of Z is 
(W/MPL)+(Px/MPx .) where MP=marginal product. 
2.1.3 The- Barnum-Squire model of a farm household. 
Barnum and Squjre's (1979) model of a farm household follows 
the new home economics approach and has provided a basis for 
numerous empirical studies and more elaborate models (see Ahn 
et al., 1981; HardaKer et al., 1985; Singh et al., 1986). 
Ell is (1988:128) summarizes the assumptions of the Barnum-
Squire model as (a) farm size is fixed in the short-term, (b) 
a competitive labour marKet exists and households may hire 
and sell labour at a given marKet wage, (c) leisure and time 
used in the production of non-marKet Z goods constitute a 
single consumption item in the household util ity function, 
(d) there is no uncertainty or risK aversion, and (e) 
households consume part of their farm output, the balance 
being sold on competitive marKets to finance purchases of 
marKet goods consumed. The latter assumption is not 
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appropriate in KwaZulu where the majority of rural households 
are deficLt producers (section 1.2.4). Nevertheless, the 
Barnum-Squire model raises issues that could become relevant 
in KwaZulu. 
Since the model relates to a farm household, the production 
function comprises farm output (Y), a marKeted Z good. The 
household utility function i s written as U=f(Tc,C,N/D) where 
Tc is leisure plus t ime spent producing non-marKet Z goods, C 
is the share of farm output consumed, N represents non-farm 
. goods purchased for consumption and D reflects fixed 
household demographics. The production function is written as 
Y=f(L,X/A) where L is total farm labour (household plus 
hired), X represents purchased variable inputs and A is the 
fixed land area. 
Following BecKer"s approach, household util ity is maximized 
subject to the production function and time and income 
constraints. The time constraint i s g j ven by T=Tc+L-Tw where 
Tw is time sold. For convenience, the household"s own farm 
labour time is defined as Tf and hired labour as Th, i.e. 
L=Tf+Th. The income constraint requires that net money income 
should equal expenditure on purchased consumption goods and 
~ ,,-
is written as Py(Y-C)+WTw-WTh-XPx=NPn where py is the marKet 
output price, ( t -C) the share of ouput sold, W the marKet 
wage, Px the prices of purchased variable j " pu ts and Pn the 
prices of purchased consumption goods. 
Again, the time and income constraints may be collapsed into 
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a si ngl e full income constrai nt, S=WTc+PyC+NPn=1(+W(Tc+Tf) 
where WTc is the opportunity cost of leisure and time spent 
producing non-market Z goods, PyC the market value of own 
farm output consumed, NPn the value of purchased consumption 
goods, 1( the net farm income and W(Tc+Tf) is the value of 
total household time. An important feature of the Barnum-
Squire model is that full income comprises the value of total 
household time (BecKer"s concept of full income) and net farm 
income (1(=PyY-WL-XPx). 
If there is perfect substitution between household and hired 
labour in production and between farm produced and market 
purchased goods in consumption, factor demand equations 
derived from the profit function can be expressed in terms of 
input and product prices, i . e., 
d1(/dL = Py(dY/dL)-W = 0 at maximum =) L = f(W,PYIA) (1) 
d1(/dX = Py(dY/dX)-Px = 0 at maximum =) X = f(Px,PYIA), (2) 
implying that production decisions are independent of 
consump t i on dec i s ions. For th i s reason the mode 1 is sa i d to 
be separable or recursive. However, consumption choices are 
not independent of production decisions because net farm 
income is par t of fu 11 Income. 
Equations 1 and 2 are the profit maximizing conditions for 
the allocation of labour (VMP~=W) and other variable inputs 
VMPx=Px). Assuming that households strive to maximize farm 
prof its, fu 11 income becomes S*=1(*+W(Tc+Tf) where 1(* denotes 
maximized profits (1(*=PyY*-WL*-X*Px where Y*, L* and X* 
represent profit maximizing levels of output, labour and 
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market inputs respectively). At the second stage of decision 
maKing, households are assumed to maximize util ity subject to 
their production function and the modified full income 
constr"aint WTc+PyC+NPn=-(*+W(Tc+Tf). This yields the following 
equilibrium conditions: 
dN/dC = Py/Pn (3) 
dN/dTc = W/Pn. (4) 
Equations 3 and 4 are the traditional first-order conditions 
of welfare economics. That is, the marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption must equal the marginal rate of 
transformation in production. 
Empirical estimation of the Barnum-Squire model fr"om farm 
household sample data is facil itated by its recursive nature. 
First, the production or profit function is estimated. 
Equations 1 and 2 are used to determine the profit maximizing 
levels of labour and other inputs and, since land is fixed, 
the economic optimum level of output. From this information 
an · estimate of ~* is computed. In some studies 1 inear 
programming (LP) has been used to estimate ~* (for example, 
Ah net a 1 ., 1 981 ) • 
Second, demand equations expressing the consumption choices 
(Tc,C and N) as functions of wage rate, price and household 
demographic variables are estimated using a demand system 
that includes the modified full income constraint. This 
procedure allows profits generated in farm production to 
influence consumption. Delforce (1987) provides a concise 
summary of systems approaches (eg the 1 inear expenditure 
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system) commonly used in est imating the demand equations. 
Pol icy impl ications of the Barnum-Squire model are analysed 
in ~wo stages. To begin with, total response elasticities, 
measuring the percentage change in an endogenous variable 
(eg. food consumption=Y) resulting from a one per cent change 
in an exogenous variable (eg. food price=P) when all other 
exogenous variables are held constant, can be computed for 
the average sample household using the estimated demand 
parameters. These household response elasticities (0*) will 
differ from conventional response elasticities (0) owing to 
the inclusion of farm profits in the household budget 
constraint. For example: 
( 5) 
where n",. represents the own price elasticity of food 
consumption obtained when farm profits are held constant and 
comprises the usual income and sUbstitution effects of a 
price change, O*v,. is the own price elasticity of food 
consumption when far'm profits are allowed to vary, nv. the 
elasticity of household food consumption with respect to 
household expenditure (E), OE~ the elasticity of household 
expenditure w.r.t. farm profit (U), and O~,. the elasticity of 





clear from equation 5 that 10*v"l is liKely to be 
than /Ovp/. In fact, estimates of O*vp computed for 
rice (Y) farmers sampled in Malaysia (Barnum and 
1979) and in Korea (Ahn et al., 1981) were positive. 
Th e imp 1 i cat i on i s t hat, i n these households, an increase in 
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paddy price bolsters farm profit and hence the real budget 
constraint by an amount sufficient to raise rice consumption. 
This phenomenon has been termed the ~profit effect~ (Singh et 
al., 1986:7). In Barnum and Squire~s (1979) study, the profit 
effect caused a decl ine in household labour supply (leisure 
be .ing a normal good) and dramatically increased the demand 
for hired labour. Similar studies conducted in other Asian 
countries have also predicted negative household labour 
supply responses with respect to product price (Singh, et 
al., 1986:25). Such an outcome is unl iKely in KwaZulu where 
many household worKers are employed in urban jobs. If farm 
earnings increase in KwaZulu, more household worKers will 
star in ~griculture. The total household labour inp~t in 
agriculture may therefore increase even if individual effort 
decreases. In short, the Barnum~Squire model does not draw a 
distinction between individual effort and the combined effort 
of all members of the household (Nieuwoudt and VinK, 1988). 
A second stage of the Barnum-Squire pol icy analysis involves 
extrapolation of the estimated household response 
elasticities to marKet level. In their Malaysian study, 
Barnum and Squire (1979) estimated that a ten per cent 
increase in paddy price would raise wages by 13,4 per cent 
and that this would convert the positive paddy output 
response predicted at household level to a negative supply 
response at marKet level. However, Timmer and Falcon (1975) 
found close ranK correlation between paddy prices and yi~lds 
among Asian countries. This observation lends support to 
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Nieuwoudt and VinK's (1988) contention that Barnum and Squire 
do not consider the effects of rising wages on the 
opportunity cost of leisure, and might also reflect a 
tendency of the Barnum-Squire model to overstate the effect 
of product price increases on demand for hired farm labour. 
In KwaZulu, it is not anticipated that farm wages will 
respond significantly to changes in product prices as 
inputs in agriculture have close substitutes and the 
labour 
marKet 
supply of farm labour is expected to be price elastic owing 
to high rates of unemployment (section 1.2.3) and the high 
proportion of migrant wage worKers. As a result, rents 
arising from increased crop income are more 1 iKely to be 
captured in the fixed resource, crop land. 
Although the predictive powers of Barnum and Squire's model 
exceed that of Chayanov's model, the improvement stems 
largely from the different assumptions which they employ. 
Whereas Chayanov assumes away the existence of a labour 
marKet, the Barnum-Squire model requires a competitve labour 
marKet. If hired labour is not a perfect substitute for 
household labour (which embodies a management input) the 
recursive property of Barnum and Squire's model falls away. A 
similar situation arises if there are differences between 
marKet buying and sell ing prices or if uncertainty and risK 




Roe eta I • 
and has been attempted by few 
(1986) incorporated the effects of 
risK aversion and Lopez (1986) the effects of labour marKet 
imperfections in separate appl ications of 
Barnum-Squire type models. 
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non-separable 
The Barnum-Squire model is not generally appl icable in 
KwaZulu as very few rural households produce marKetable 
surpluses. Consumption responses measured using the recursive 
approach (0*) would most liKelY be very similar to 
conventional response estimates (n). For example, Nieuwoudt 
and VinK (1988) estimate the own price elasticity of demand 
for food staples in KwaZulu as -0,53 for deficit producers 
and as -0,43 (0) for all producers. This indicates that the 
impact of profit effects in surplus producing households · on n 
is small. 
On the production siqe, Barnum and Squire/s model maximizes 
farm profit in the usual way but omits the effects of minimum 
consumption requirements, risK and leisure preferenc.s on 
household profit maximizing behaviour. In effect, the 
production side of their model is only relevant in that it 
generates a profit effect to be included in the full income 
available for household consumption (Delforce et al., 1987). 
Details of how this profit is obtained are of little concern 
in a model intended primarily for use in studies of household 
consumption. Consequently, the Barnum-Squire approach is not 
suitable for a study (such as this one) aimed at 
investigating farm production because "it is probably 
unreasonable to assume that production decisions are not 
influenced by consumption requirements and other non-profit 
considerations" (Delforce, 1987:27). 
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2.1.4 The Low model of a rural household in Southern Africa. 
The assumptions underpinning Low's (1986:32-44) model of a 
'traditional' rural household in Southern Africa can be 
summarized as follows; (a) household members strive to 
maximize a family util ity function, (b) farm-gate and retail 
prices of farm products are not equal, and (c) labour can be 
sold and household members have different wage earning 
potentials. The latter assumption and its impl ication that 
households may be deficit food producers is consistent with 
circumstances in KwaZulu. The assumption that buying and 
sell ing prices differ is perhaps less appl icable as farm-gate 
and retail prices of surplus produce do not differ markedly 
in KwaZu 1 u. However, -purchase pr ices of commod it i es produced 
by commercial farmers in South Africa are usually higher than 
local farm-gate prices owing largely to transport costs and 
physical differences between the imported and local products. 
This is certainly true of maize as imported grain is highly 
refined (Appendix B, Table B.12). 
In Low's model, household util ity is expressed as a function 
of BecKer's (1965) Z goods defined to include farm output 
produced for home consumption. Maximizing util ity subject to 
a full income constr-ai ntimpl i es cost minimization in the 
production of Z goods. Assuming, for convenience saKe, that 
the production functiQn is linear, the full price or marginal 
cost of producing a unit of Z is written as 
Cz = Px b i + Wit i 
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where Cz is the marginal cost, Px represents prices of 
purcha~ed variable inputs X, bi the amount of X required by 
household worKer i to produce a unit of Z, Wi the wage rate 
of household worKer i and ti is the amount of time required 
by worKer i to produce a unit of Z. 
A cost minimizing household will turn to the cheape~t of its 
worKers for its supply of Z goods. This will depend upon each 
worKers wage rate and his or her marginal productivity (l/bi 
and l/ti when the production function is 1 inear). In 
addition, Z goods 1 iKe . subsistence crops can be purchased at 
retail prices. Assuming that the time required to buy such a 
Z good is negl igible relative to growing it, the purchase 
op t i on involves retail marKet prices (pz) and savings 
incurred by not growing it. Hence, when 
pz < Px b i + Wit i 
the subsistence requirement will be purchased rather than 
grown by household worKer i. Rearranging the terms in this 
inequal ity yields 
(pz - [Pxbi])/ti < Wi (6) 
The left-hand-side of inequal ity 6, which Low (1986:37) 
refers to as the ~opportunity cost of purchase~ for worKer i, 
reflects the net money cost of not applying a unit of worKer 
i~s time to own food production. Inequal ity 6 states that if 
the i~th worKer can, with a unit vf his time, earn wages in 
excess of his or her opportunity cost of purchase, he or she 
will acquire the sUbsistence Z good more cheaply by engaging 
in wage employment and purchasing it than by growing it. 
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Low (1986:40-44) extends his analysis to include marKet crop 
production in a simpl ified geometric version of the model. In 
addition to the facil itative assumption of a 1 i near 
production function and the impl icit assumption of no 
uncertainty or risK aversion, Low assumes that household 
worKers with different wage earning potentials are equally 
efficient in the production of Z goods and that input 
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Figure 2.2 Deficit and surplus producers in the Low model. 
Source Low (1986:43) 
In Figure 2 2 . , OL measures the total amount of household 
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labour. Labour units (worKers) are arranged in increasing 
order of c.ompa.rative advantage in wage employment along the 
OL axis. WH is the corollary of OLe WorKers~ potential wage 
rates are given by the slope of the wage 1 ine W~W. Labour 
units on the left of OL have low wage earning potential 
whereas those on the right have high earning potential. OM 
represents commercial returns (at farm-gate prices) to crop 
produc t i on net of purchased input costs and OP the 
opportunity cost of purhase (inequal ity 6). 
·The assumption of a linear production function with constant 
input propor t ions impl ies that household subsistence 
requirements can be measured in terms of the labour units 
needed to grow it. A family with OL labour units and a high 
consumer:worKer ratio may have subsistence needs equal to OAr 
in Figure 2.2. For the labour unit at Ar, wage rate exceeds 
opportunity cost of purchase (i .e. slope of W~W > slope of 
OP) and this labour unit will be allocated to wage employment 
rather than to sUbsistence production. In fact, only labour 
units to the left of Ag will be allocated to subsistence 
production (slope of W~W > slope of OP right of point c) 
maKing this household a deficit producer purchasing OAr-OAg 
of its sUbsistence requirement. 
A second household with fewer consumers per worKer may have 
sUbsistence requirements equal to OBr in Figure 2.2. This 
household will produce a surplus of OBg-OBr. Beyond 8g, wage 
employment offers higher returns than sell ing farm output (as 
slope of W~W > slope OM to the right of point d). Although it 
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is a surplus producer, this household might allocate more 
labour to wage employment than a deficit producer <if 
which is consistent with Low/s (1986:35) 
observation that larger households tend to produce greater 
surpluses. This observation contradicts the Barnum-Squire 
model which predicts that an increase in household size will 
necessarily reduce marKetable surpluses as consumption 
requirements vary with household size but quantities of 
labour allocated to farm activities do not <labour allocation 
is determined by the profit maximizing rule VMPL=W in the 
Barnum-Squire model). 
The way Low/s model allocates household labour between 
enterprises <on and off the farm) is no different from what 
microeconomic theory would predict in the given circumstan-
ces. The critical assumption employed by Low is that 
household worKers do not have free choice regarding the 
enterprise in which they worK. Although Low assumes the 
existence of a household util ity function, the mechanics of 
his model require only that employment decisions made by 
individual worK.rs be consistent with the wishes of other 
household members. This less stringent assumption suggests 
that the share of wage income remitted by off-farm worKers is 
determined by c~nsensus. Of 296 migrant workers sub-sampled 
by Stewart <1986:49) only 15 per cent did not remit cash to 
their famil ies. Furthermore, many of the worKers that did not 
remit wages were acting with their family/s consent as they 
were saving for /bride wealth/ or other approved reasons. A 
regression analysis performed on these data revealed 




earnings (W). This result contradicts the notion of a 
household util ity function (in this case, direct commuting 
costs (0) would be independent of wage earnings, i.e Ri=Wi-O 
i=I,2, •• ,n migrant worKers) but is compatible with the 
assumption of consistency in decision maKing. InvoKing the 
latter assumption impl ies that remittance rates should be 
substituted for wage rates in Low's model and that household 
subsistence requirements would decl ine if off-farm worKers 
finance some of their own subsistence needs out of 'after 
remittance income'. These modifications might alter the 
predicted farm:off-farm worKer ratio within a particular 
household but WOUld . not change the wider impl ications of 
Low's analysis. 
According to Low (1986:50-53), population growth in the less 
developed rural areas of Southern Africa has effectively 
reduced average farm size and qual ity because rural 
households have an incentive to retain their land rights. At 
the same time, improvements in expected off-farm wage rates, 
education and transport raised the opportunity cost of 
household labour in farm activities. As a result, the full 
cost of producing a unit of Z goods increased relative to its 
purchase price. Low concludes that the net outcome has been 
(a) real growth in the number of wage worKers, (b) 
underutil ization of arable land despite high population 
pressure, and (c) increased ' food importation. Although these 
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trends are also evident in rural KwaZulu (sections 1.2.1-
1.2.4, Table 1.7 in particular) the underutilization of 
arable land is not fully explained by Low~s analysis. His 
model merely draws attention to the fact that many rural 
households do not have an incentive to farm their arable land 
intensively. Arable land is underutillzed because these 
households cannot rent land to others who would farm it 
(section 1.2.2). 
Apart from the possibil ity of independent decision making by 
household workers, Lo~'s model omits several other factors 
that could influence its predictions regarding labour 
allocation and crop output. Firstly, while it is assumed that 
household labour can be sold at different rates in off-farm 
wage markets, the possibil ity of hiring farm labour is not 
considered. In the presence of a competitive market for farm 
labour; certain of Low~s deficit households might produce all 
of their food requirements (and a marketable surplus) if the 
purchase price of farm labour was sufficiently low. To 
preserve the model~s explanatory power it could be assumed 
that there is no farm labour market because households have 
similar land and labour resources. This assumption is 
plausible as the land tenure system has not encouraged a 
class of landless labourers. Surveys conducted in Swaziland 
and Malawi indicate that only three per cent of total farm 
labour is hired (Low, 1986:183). Data gathered in rural 
KwaZuJu also point to an inactive farm labour market. Stewart 
(1986:39) estimated the proportion of sample households using 
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hired farm labour to be seven per cent in an area of low 
cropping potential and 30 per cent in an area of high 
cropping potential where sugar-cane is grown. Predicted 
deficits would tend to be smaller, and surpluses larger, if 
farm labour is hired. 
Secondly, Low's graphical analysis does not permit input 
substitution. Labour used in crop production has close 
substitutes (eg. machines, draught animals, herbicides and 
pesticides) and the cost of labour is high relative to the 
total value of output in Southern Africa. These factors make 
the derived input demand for labour elastic (Friedman, 1962). 
Consequently, an increase in wage rates that induces a 
transfer of household work time from farm to off-farm 
employment does not necessarily imply reduced farm output. An 
increase in bff-farm income could also alleviate liquidity 
constraints inhibiting crop production. Positive 
relationships between off-farm earnings and the production of 
surpluses have been measured amongst sample households in 
rural KwaZulu using mUltivariate discriminant analysis 
(Lyster, 1987:135, Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1988). However, the 
apparent complementarity between remittance earnings and 
surplus production observed in these studies might only 
reflect differences in consumer:worker ratios between 
households. 
Thirdly, household food consumption is fixed at a SUbsistence 
level and does not vary with changes in income or food 
prices. For low i"ncome households 1 ike those in rural 
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KwaZulu, changes in real income may have a significant effect 
on food ~onsumption, and demand for food produced and 
consumed by households is expected to be more price elastic 
for deficit producers than for surplus producers (a price 
change generates a profit effect in surplus producing 
households). Nieuwoudt and VinK (1988) estimate the price 
elasticity of demand for staple foods as -0,53 and -0,14 
respectively for deficit and surplus producers in KwaZulu. 
Fourthly, leisure and risK are not treated expl icitly. Low 
(1986:44) argues that the proportions of time allocated by a 
household to farm and wage employment are unl iKely to be 
influenced by a reduction in worK effort because leisure is 
shared by household members. Nevertheless, changes in leisure 
consumption do infiuence levels of output, and their 
anticipated causes, size and direction warrant attention in 
stUdies of farm production. A relative increase in the price 
of food may induce a transfer of time from non-farm to farm 
worK in all rural households but the effect of the price 
change on leisure consumption will most I iKely differ between 
deficit and surplus producers. 
households are expected to 
Members of deficit producing 
taKe less leisure owing to 
decl ining real income (negative income effect) and the rising 
opportunity cost of leisure (substi tution effect). In surplus 
producing households, a relative increase in product prices 
impl ies a positive income effect and members are expected to 
consume more leisure if the income effect exceeds the 
substitution effect. 
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Low (1986:41) recognises that wages, yields and prices are 
not Known wi th certainty . but maintains that risK 
considerations would compl i cate the model "without 
significantly changing the nature of the conclusions 
reached". This conclusion is acceptable when the object of 
the analysis is to explain trends in labour allocation, but 
risK and risK aversion are important if the object is to 
analyse farm production. 
Lastly, Low's analysis ignores the effects of capital and 
land constraints, seasonal production, lumpy labour inputs 
and variations in soil fertil ity and biocl imate on resource 
a 1 '1 oc a t i on • 
2.2 Factors i nf 1 uenc i ng the uti 1 i za t i on of grazing 
resources. 
Whereas arable land is underutil ized in KwaZulu, natural 
grazing is heavily util ized. One reason for this situation is 
that grazing land, unl iKe arable land, is a common resource 
(section 1.2.2). 
Natural grazing covers 76 per cent of the land area in rural 
KwaZulu. From the estimates presented in Table 2.1 it is 
obvious that grazing is heavily util ized. The average 
stocKing rate is almost double that in Natal where range land 
is privately owned and where herds are very much larger 
(section 1.2.4) • High stocKing rates have resulted in poor 
calving and high herd mortal ity rates (Table 2.1). Tapson 
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( 1986) ma i n t a in $ t hat cat t 1 e mor tal i tie s (Tab 1 e 2.2) ar e 
under-reported in KwaZulu as stocK may be slaughtered prior 
to an impending death. In this case, net offtaKe 
(slaughterings plus exports) might be less than five per cent 
(Table 2.1) • The object of this sect i on is to i den t i fy 
factors responsible for the relatively high stocKing rates 
and poor herd performance observed in KwaZulu. 
Table 2.1 Conparison of kty cattlt statistics in KwaZulu and Natal. 
Grazing land (Ha) 
Herd sin <1987> 
Herd lIor ta Ii ty 
Calving rate 
Slaughter + export rate (1987) 
Notts 1 Excludts dairy c~s. 
KwaZulu Natal 
(callunal grazing) (privat. land ttnure) 





3,4 lIiIl ion 




2 Estillate relatls to South Africa. 
Sourci Colvin (1983); KDA (1980); KDA (1989); Ltnta (1978); Lyst.r (1987:); 
Htat Board (1989). 
2.2.1 The common property problem. 
Gordon~s (1954) classic paper analysed the common property 
problem under circumstances which permit unrestricted access 
to the common resource. This situation is illustrated in 
Figure 2.3. 
Given the value product curves in Figure 2.3, if cows and 
grazing land are privately owne,d, five cows would be stocKed 
as the fifth cow reduces the marginal value product of stocK 
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(VMPc ) to Pc, the cost of Keeping an additional cow on the 
~ange. Rents, indicated by the shaded a~ea, a~e maximized at 
this point (VMPc=Pc). Assuming stocKowne~s discount future 
returns at a ~ate consistent with the time p~eferences of 
society as a whole, private tenure prevents degradation of 
g~azing resou~ce~ as the long te~m sustainable stocKing rate 





4 Cowl e 2 10 
-1 
-2 
Figu~e 2.3 Total, average and marginal value p~oduct cu~ves. 
Conversely, if several stocKowners have unrestricted access 
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to (communal) grazing land, the 'equil ibrium' stocKing rate 
occurs where Pc, the cost of Keeping a cowan the common, 
equals the value of average product (VAPc ). In the example 
(Figure 2.3), VAPc=Pc when 10 cows are stocKed. This 
equil ibrium arises in open access si tuat ions because 
stocKowners only consider the i r own private costs and returns 
when deciding whether or not to maKe use of the common. Land 
is not privately owned and rents are zero. There is no 
incentive for a stocKowner to 'stint on the common' as rents 
would accrue to others - the free-riders. 
If Pc is sufficiently low (as in Figure 2.3), the equil ibrium 
stocKing rate (VAPe=Pc) exceeds the maximum sustainable 
stocKing rate. StocKing in excess of the maximum sustainable 
rate is therefore not a necessary outcome of unrestricted 
access to common grazing and will be tempered by increases in 
Pc caused by rising mortal ity rates. Even if Pc is low enough 
to result in stocKing beyond the maximum sustainable rate, 
the equil ibrium rate will decl ine systematically with the 
reduced qual ity of grazing only if the input-output price 
ratio (Pc/Py) remains unchanged. 
Critics of Gordon's model often overlooK the fact that it 
compares two extremes, viz. private tenure on the one hand 
and common property character,ized by open access on the 
other, and that between these two extremes exists a range of 
stocK i ng ra tes correspond i ng to more r'ea list i c common 
property situations including tacit cooperation by 
individual users. VinK and Kassier (1987) claim that open 
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Tablt 2.2 Hun annual cattlt populations (000), pritts and rainfall in K\IIaZulu. 
Yur 77nS 78/79 79/S0 80/81 81182 8V83 83/84 84185 85/86 86/87 87/88 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cattlt 1424,2 1429,3 1467,5 1357,1 1350,6 1447,3 1351,9 1343,6 1416,6 1483,1 1515,5 
Duths 98,3 HO,7 97,5 154,8 72,S 67,2 145,9 63,9 70,S 67,2 77,1 
SI augh hr i ngs 57,8 70,9 71,8 68,1 64,6 69,7 75,8 57,8 59,8 58,3 64,6 
Exports nla nla nla 8,6 15,6 6,5 14,5 8,0 8,5 7,5 9,9 
lraports nla nla nla 13,2 2,5 H ,4 12,1 20,7 22,6 15,7 12,8 
Ncninal auction 
prict on hook (c/kg) 93,S 96,9 119,0 202,4 212,2 211,4 222,9 228,4 257,3 353,4 451,6 
Ncninal inttr.st rat. 12,5 12,3 10,3 9,5 13,8 19,3 16,5 22,3 23,0 14,5 12,5 
Lag rainfall (rara) 1220 960 1064 752 743 907 720 839 1130 1073 863 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Noh 1 Rainfall dati gathtrtd at 224 stations in and around K\IIaZulu. 
Souru CCWR (1989); Directorate Agricultural Econcnic Trtnds (1989); KDA (1978-1988); Reserve Bank (1977-1987). 
access is not prevalent in Southern Africa yet their data 
only show that a substantial proportion of rural households 
do not invest in cattle. Even if access is restricted to a 
group of stocKowners it does not necessarily follow that 
individual members cannot increase their stocKing rates. In 
an attempt to strengthen their claim that Gordon's model is 
not appropriate in Southern Africa, VinK and Kassier (1987) 
argue that there is insufficient ~vidence of overgrazing, low 
productivity or increasing herd sizes on · the commons. The 
latter argument is certainly not consistent with Gordon's 
analysis, nor is overgrazing (in the biological sense) a 
necessary outcome. The notion that cattle populations tend to 
gravitate toward the maximum number which the commons will 
bear when access is unrestricted (Lenta, 1978) is false. A 
positive relationship between cattle numbers and maximum 
grazing capacity does not imply that price variables (py 




demonstrate the effects of relative price changes on herd 
si ze, the following ordinary least squares regression 
equation was estimated from annual observations (Table 2.2): 
Herd size_= 3578 + 4,79(Py/Pc)~+ 0,25(Rain)~_1- 1,25(Trend)~ 
t values (2,46)- (3,30)- (-0,25) 
R2 = 0,69 F = 5,15- DW = 2,06 
where: 
Herd size = cattle in thousands. 
Py = auction price of cattle in cents per Kg (i .e. an 
estimate of the value of cattle). 
Pc = prime overdra~t interest rate (i .e. the opportunity 
cost of holding cattle). This variable was used as a 
proxy for the cost of Keeping cattle on the 
assumption that other private costs are relatively 
low. 
Rain = average annual rainfall (mm) measured at more than 
224 stations in Natal/KwaZulu. Rain~_l was used 
as a proxy for maximum grazing capacity. 
Tr end = time (t) i n ye ar s (t = 1977, • • , 1987) • 
The lagged rainfall and price ratio coefficients are both 
statistically significant at the five per cent level of 
probabil ity. The trend coefficient is not significantly 
d iff ere n t from z e r 0 i n die at i n g 1 itt 1 e or no (1 i near) de eli n €I 
in veld qual ity over the period considered. Of relevance is 
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that after accounting for changes in time and rainfall (which 
reflect veld qual ity), th. input:output price ratio has been 
an important determinant of herd size in KwaZulu. These 
findings are entirely consistent with Gordon's model and 
suggest that herd size could be reduced by increasing the 
cost of holding cattle relative to their perceived value. 
It must be emphasised that the auction price (Py) i~ only a 
proxy for the value which stocKowners attach to cattle. Data 
from Swaziland (Low, 1986:112) indicate that · the value 
attached to cattle as a store of wealth that can be readily 
1 iquidated (at or near auction prices) to meet specific cash 
needs, constitutes an important part of their perceived value. 
2.2.2 Solutions to the common property problem. 
In the case of communal grazing land with open access, the 
following solutions have been suggested for the overstocKing 
problem; (a) privatizing the land, (b) Introducing cattle 
taxes as a partial substitute for other taxes (Figure 2.3 
illustrates an optimum cattle tax) and (c) quota restrictions 
on the number of cattle permitted on the common. Although 
grazing rights can be privatized by issuing saleable quota, 
this method of privatization should not be confused with the 
privatization of grazing land. 
Runge (1981) contends that under conditions of open access 
and strict individual dominance (i.e. where individuals maKe 
stocKing decisions on the basis of their own private costs 
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and returns) taxes and quotas do not provide a stable 
solution to overgrazing as there are strong incentives for 
users to ~breaK the rules~. The impl ication is that taxes and 
quotas would have to be imposed and enforced from outside and 
that privatization of grazing land represents the only stable 
solution to overstocKing (assuming individual owners will 
conserve their private ranges at a rate consistent with the 






proposals have been 
(a) stocK 1 imitation 
legislation introduced in 1967 is now disregarded (WGBP, 
1988), (b) Crotty~s attempts to introduce cattle taxes were 
rejected by the Legislative Assembly, and (c) a 
recommendation of the proposed 1988 KwaZulu Land Bill maKes 
allowance for grazing to "remain as communal land for the 
common benefit of the tribe". Clearly, these ~orthodox~ 
solutions to overgrazing are considered to be unacceptable by 
pol icy maKers. 
Runge (1981) views common property as a resource to which 
access is not open but is restricted to a particular group of 
users. He argues that under these conditions the assumption 
of strict individual dominance is not plausible as 
stocKowners will most 1 ikely consider the expected behaviour 
of others in the group when deciding how many cattle to graze 
on the common. Accordingly, Runge rejects the principle of 
independent decision making and redefines the common property 
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problem as decision maKing under uncertainty - the 
uncertainty arising from interdependence of choice. 
In this case, solutions to the ov~rstocKing problem include 
privatization of grazing land and institutional rules which 
provide assurance regarding the actions of others in the 
group. The rules are expected to be stable if the short term 
advantages of free-riding do not exceed its costs (in terms 
of reduced potential benefits, lost reputation, the 
opportunity costs of innovating new rules and pecuniary fines 
imposed by the group). Assuming that there is 1 ittle 
incentive for individual group members to defect, the 
institutional approach would minimise the need for outside 
enforcement. 
However, there is some doubt as to whether land tenure 
arrangements in rural KwaZulu facil itate restricted access. 
Firstly, in most areas where the tribal tenure system has not 
been modified by ~betterment planning~ (section 4.1.3), land 
allocated to a household which is not used for dwell ings or 
crop production serves as grazing and is available to other 
households for this purpose only. In some instances even the 
arable portions of allotments are opened for grazing during 
the winter months (section 1.2.2). Secondly, in other tribal 
wards and areas subject to betterment planning, land set 




open to all households residing in the ward. There 
evidence of penalties imposed for overstocKing 
1989; Keating, 1989) and grazing has been degraded 
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~athe~ than ~ehabil itated (WGBP, 1988). 
In defining st~ategies fo~ communal g~azing a~eas in Southe~n 
Af~ica, Vink and van Zyl (1989) highl ight an 'ideal' scena~io 
and a 'most p~evalent' scena~io. The fo~me~ occu~s whe~e 
membe~s of a g~oup adhe~e to inte~nal ~ules gove~ning 
stocking ~ates and ove~g~azing is not a p~oblem. In this 
instance, thei~ pol icy ~ecommendation is to do nothing if the 
situation is expected to persist. The latte~ scena~io is 
close~ to the open access situation and occu~s whe~e g~oup 
cohesion is weak and ove~g~azing is evident. In this case, 
they suggest st~ategies aimed at shifting the demand fo~ and 
supply of institutional ~ules. Fo~ example, they ~ecommend 
that the qual ity of the veld and he~d be imp~oved (although 
the ~elationship between this st~ategy and the demand fo~ and 
supply of institutional ~ules is not specified) and herein 
li •• the real tragedy of the common •. 
Rega~dless of whethe~ overg~azing is p~evented by means of 
inte~nally o~ exte~nally enfo~ced ~est~ictions on cattle 
numbe~s, cattle taxes o~ grazing ~ights, an individual would 
have I ittle incentive to invest time and money imp~oving the 
g~azing o~ the qual ity of his he~d because land ~emains a 
common ~esou~ce and othe~ stockowne~s (the f~ee-~ide~s) stand 
to benefit f~om his effo~ts. Whe~eas ~eductions in stocKing 
~ate a~e achieved by inte~nal izing the cost of ~esou~ce 
deg~adation (~educed futu~e income), imp~ovements in 
incentive a~e achieved by inte~nal izing benefits. Only 
p~ivatization of grazing land (even in the simplest sense of 
removing free acceS5 to land that is allocated to, but 




overstocking and low incentive problems but is 1 ikely to meet 
wi th 
rura 1 
resistance from stockowners. 
households in KwaZulu do 
Since some 40 per cent of 
not own cattle (section 
1.2.4), unrestricted access to communal grazing provides, at 
no extra private cost, the additional ranching resources 
(land and watering points) needed by ·stockowners to maintain 
their herds. Rental arrangements for grazing land which would 
raise the private cost of keeping cattle and generate revenue 




areas there are no property rights to grazing 
unplanned areas land rental arrangements 




rent sufficient grazing for commercial beef production are 
usually opposed by other stocKowners who stand to lose a 
source of communal grazi-ng (Khumalo, 1989). 
Although a cohesive group of stocKowners with restricted 
access to grazing land might invest in better breeds and 
pastures, the level of investment will be constrained by 
members who are either unwill ing or unable to contribute to 
the programme. Despite high levels of subsidy afforded to 
stocK improvement, herd composition in KwaZulu is poor. A 
sample survey conducted in Mabedlana and Ogwini, two of the 
KDA~s four administrative regions, revealed that only one per 
cent of stocKowners made use of the bull breeding scheme and 
that bulls comprised more than 20 per cent of herds surveyed 
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(Tapson, 1985). Only three groups producing improved bulls 
have been identified, all ih Ogwini (Keating, 1989; Le Roux, 
1989). Khumalo (1989) cites several instances of groups 
purchasing improved bulls in Mabedlana but emphasised the 
tendency for individual group members to purchase their own 
bu 11. There is very 1 itt 1 e ev i dence of improved pasture or 
fodder crop production on common grazing land in KwaZulu 
despite relatively high 1 ivestock mortal ity and low calving 
rates. However, a meeting held for 1 ivestock farmers in the 
Umzansi administrative region during December 1988 attracted 
a significant number of dairy, stud and beef producers 
growing fodder crops on their own and hired land allotments. 
Of eight farmers who volunteered information about their 
operations, six expr~ssed difficulties obtaining additional 
land. A similar situation exists in Ogwini where attempts to 
improve pastures are confined to stockowners' own land 
allotments (Keating, 1989). 
These observations suggest that few productivity improvements 
have occured on Kwazulu's commons and that existing 
stocKowner institutions have not been able to treat all 
aspects of the common property problem possibly because 
group cohesion is 1 imited by a high degree of access to 
grazing resources. 
2.3 A summary of important economic variables influencing 
crop and 1 ivestocK production in rural KwaZulu. 
This section summarizes (a) economic variables expected to 
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impact significantly on household resource allocation in 
rural KwaZulu, and (b) anticipated directions of responses to 
changes in these variables. 
The following economic variables are considered to be 
important determinants of household resource allocation in 
respect of cropping activities in rural KwaZulu~ 
(a) Off-farm wage rates. A c.t.rls paribus increase in 
expected net wage (remittance) rates will raise the 
opportunity cost of time spent in crop production and is 
-
likely to attract marginal household farm workers into 
wage employment. Average household welfare is expected to 
increase. The impact on crop production is not clearcut. 
On the one hand, .crop output is expected to ·fall as farm 
labour is diverted to wage employment <unless the 
marginal product of time in crop production fs close to 
zero). A reduction in on-farm labour could also influence 
the technical efficiency of household workers engaged in 
farm work and management in an adverse way (section 
1.2.3>. Lyster (1987:134) found that surplus production 
was negatively associated with wage employment of key 
decision makers in rural ' households sampled in the 
Vul indlela district of KwaZulu. Furthermore, household 
workers may take more leisure if the income effect of 
higher wage earnings is sufficiently large. On the other 
hand, crop production need hot decl ine following an 
increase in remittance rates. Land and marKet inputs may 
be substituted for household labour in crop production, 
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households may adopt farming techniques that require 
less labour per unit output, and household 1 iquidity will 
improve. 
A c.t.ri. paribu. decrease in expected off-farm net wage 
rates should produce opposite effects, i.e. reduced 
household welfare and a probable increase in the level 
and intensity of labour used in crop production. ' Changes 
in expected real net wage rates could result from changes 
in off-farm wage rates, commuting costs (defined as all 
'after remittance income'), unemployment levels or job 
skills. 
(b) Produc~ prices. For deficit food producers, a c.t.ris 
paribus increase in the farm-gate and retail price of 
food will reduce real household income and welfare. The 
price increase is expected to induce a transfer of 
marginal household management and labour time from non-
farm to farm work, and to encourage deficit producers to 
substitute own production for purchased food. However, 
the outcome could be influenced by (1) reduced 
consumption of the food in question, (2) the supply of 
other resources (eg. land and capital), (3) substitution 
of market inputs (including hired farm labour) for 
household time, (4) · the adoption of new technology (eg. 
high-yielding varieties), and (5) changes in the amount 
of leisure consumed by household worKers. Leisure 
consumption is expected to fall as the price increase 
raises the opportunity cost of leisure (SUbstitution 
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effect) and lowers real household income (negative income 
effect). 
Surplus producers benefit from the price increase. A 
transfer of marginal household time from non-crop 
activities to crop production is expected but the outcome 
will be influenced by considerations 1 ike those 1 isted 
in the previous paragraph. In this case, household 
1 i qu i di ty wi 11 improve and food consumpt i on coul d 
increase if the profit effect is sufficiently large. The 
own price elasticity of demand for agricultural 
commodities was estimated to be positive for households 
sampled in Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea and northern Nigeria 
(Singh, et al., 1986:26). In KwaZulu, where farm profits 
constitute a relatively small part of full income, the 
own price elasticity of demand for food staples in 
surplus producing households is estimated to be negative 
(Nieuwoudt and Vink, 1988). In the former studies, and in 
studies conducted in Japan, Thailand and Sierra Leone 
(S i ngh , et a1., 1986:25), the profit effect also 
increased household leisure consumption. The impl ication 
is that, unless the market supply of hired farm labour is 
price elastic, farm wages will rise and dampen the price 
elasticity of product supply. In KwaZulu, farm wages are 
not 1 ikely to rise significantly following an increase in 
product prices because (1) derived input demand for farm 
labour is expected to be elastic (section 2.1.4), (2) 
total household labour input in farming is expected to 
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increase with increased agricultural earnings (section 
2.1.3), (3) the market supply of farm labour is expected 
to be price elastic (section 2.1.3), and (4) households 
are not expected to consume more leisure during peaK 
production periods. Extra leisure demanded may be 
consumed during slack periods (Upton, 1987:72) and the 
substitution effect of a product price change will most 
1 iKe 1 y exceed the comb i ned prof it and rea 1 income effec t 
as the income elasticity of demand for money savings and 
consumer goods (eg. clothing and durables) is very high 
"i n rura 1 KwaZu 1 u (N i euwoudt and Vi nK, 1988). 
The notion that farm wages are unresponsive to changes in 
product price does not imply that product supply in 
KwaZulu will be price elastic. On the contrary, supply 
is expected to be price inelastic. Farm sizes are so 
small that even a subs tan t i ali ncrease in produc t pro ices 
is unl iKely to raise farm profits (or the value of 
subsistence production) by an amount large enough to 
attract the interest of more skilled household worKers 
engaged in wage emploment. In Scandizzo and Bruce's 
(1980) survey of supply elasticity estimates for major 
food staples in 103 developing countries, 62 per cent of 
the long-run elasticities were less than 0,5 and 27 per 
cent were negative. Rel iable econometric evidence on 
supply response for food staples is scant for most 
Af ric an c ou n t r i e s (We be ret a 1 • , 1988) , bu t Mar tin's 
(1988) simulation analysis shows that even a 100 per cent 
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increase in cereal prices would only Increase the degree 
of (cereal) self-sufficiency by eight percentage points, 
from 47 to 55 per cent in Senegal. 
In summary, a c.t.rl. parlbu. increase (decrease) in the 
price of food is expected to lower (raise) average 
household welfare as most households in rural KwaZulu are 
. 
deficit food producers, but is not expected to have a 
SUbstantial impact on food production. 
Retail and farm-gate food prices could move in different 
directions. For example, an increase in the South African 
bread subsidy would benefit both deficit and surplus 
wheat producers in rural KwaZulu insofar as it lowers 
local retail pric~s and raises local farm-gate prices. A 
reduction in transport costs could have a similar effect. 
Changes in marKet forces and marKet intervention in South 
Africa, and changes in factors contributing to real 
marKeting costs in rural KwaZulu (eg. road infrastruc-
ture) are perhaps the most important sources of change in 
local food prices. 
(c) Prices of marKet inputs used in crop production. A 
cet.ri. p&ribus decrease in marKet input prices would 
benefit all households producing crops for own 
consumption or marKet purposes. A transfer of marginal 
household labour and management time from non-crop 
activities to crop production is expected but marKet 
inputs will most 1 iKely be substituted for household 
68 
labour in crop production. Unless arable land is already 
fully utilized, crop deficits should diminish and 
quantities marKeted should increase. Singh, • tal. 
(1986:28) report empirical predictions that a decrease in 
fert i 1 i zer pI' ices wi 11 increase farm output in vari ous 
Asian countries. However, large supply responses are not 
anticipated in KwaZulu (see point b). The response 
estimates reported by S i ngh, et al.(1986:28) also suggest 
that household labour supply will diminish when 
fer til i zer pI' ices decrease. Aga in, th i s ou tcome is not 
-
expected in KwaZulu and it is unl iKely that farm wages 
will increase significantly (see point b). A c.t.rls 
paribus increase in marKet input prices is expected to 
produce opposite ~ffects, i.e. diminished welfare for al ~ 
households, increased food deficits and reduced crop 
sales. Sources of change in marKet input pri~es would be 
similar to those influencing product prices in KwaZulu, 
but would include changes in local credit, tractor hire, 
extension, irrigation, fencing and contouring programmes. 
(d) Technology. It was noted in section 2.1.4 that many rural 
households in the less developed regions of Southern 
Africa have 1 ittle incentive to produce crops as they can 
acquire food and income at lower cost by diverting 
household labour into wage employment. In the absence of 
a land rental marKet, large areas of arable land 1 ie 
fa 11 ow and land is seldom cropped intensively. A 
preference for on-farm technology that reduces the 
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average cost of producing subsistence goods primarily 
through savings in time and effort is consistent with 
these circumstances. It is well Known that households in 
these regions consider the provision of domestic water 
and fencing for grazing lands to be important priorities 
in development projects (Gibbs, 1988:34 ; Low, 1986:150). 
Knight and Lenta (1980) provide evidence suggesting that 
subsistence farmers in South Africa have substituted 
ploughs, cultivators, planters and tractors "for labour. 
Households will only adopt technology if they expect it 
to improve their welfare. Given prevail ing incentives in 
rural KwaZulu, households are more 1 iKely to adopt farm 
technology that reduces the full cost of procuring food 
and income than technology which only increases output 
per hectare. Sample surveys conducted in KwaZulu indicate 
that less than 13 per cent of households in rural areas 
close to urban employment centres plant high-yielding 
maize varieties (Lyne, 1981:127; Lyster, 1987:72). In 
rural areas more distant from job centres, the proportion 
of households using improved maize seed is higher. Lyster 
(1987:105), reports an estimate of 39 per cent for 
households in the Usuthu ward. Returns to household time 
invested in sugar-cane and timber production are " 
relatively high and these crops have been well received 
by farmers in KwaZulu. The overall impact of technology 
adoption on crop production ought to be similar to that 
anticipated for a real decrease in marKet input prices. 
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Food deficits are expected to diminish and sales should 
increase. Unfortunately, typical time-saving farm 
innovations available in South Africa usuallY involve a 
scale bias and cannot be employed effectivelY on small 
farms. 
(e) Land rental marKet. If unutil ized arable land could be 
rented (by residents of KwaZulu) households short of land 
could reduce their average crop production costs by 
purchasing variable inputs in bulK and by spreading fixed 
costs associated with management, labour and information 
inputs over much larger volumes of output. In this case, 
levels of resources used in crop production and total 
farm output are expected to increase. Should arable land 
become limiting, preferences may shi.ft from from time-
saving to land-augmenting technology. The welfare of all 
households participating in the rental marKet is expected 
to increase as participation is voluntary . (section 
4.1.3). In circumstances where the economic benefits 
conferred by rural land rights are elsewhere more 
expenive or unobtainable, minimizing the risK that 
potent i al I essors bear of I osi ng the i r I and right is 
essential for an active land rental marKet. 
Not mentioned in points a - e a~e the effects of lumpy labour 
inputs, seasona.l production, multiple farm products, income 
risK and variations in demographic and agronomic variables 
on household resource allocation. Chapter 3 describes an 
attempt to quantify household and aggregate responses to 
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changes in Key economic variables when some measure of these 
effects is taKen into account. 
With regard to the util ization of grazing land, an increase 
in the cost of Keeping cattle relative to their perceived 
value is expected to reduce overstocKing (section 2.2.1). The 
private costs of Keeping cattle are low primarily because the 
opportunity cost of grazing land is low and because the cost 
of resource degradation (reduced future income) is largely 
external ized. In some parts of KwaZulu, the introduction of 
sugar-cane and timber has raised the opportunity cost of 
land used for grazing and reduced stocKing rates (Tapson, 
1985:Table 29; Stewart, 1989). Privatization of grazing land 
would improve incentives to invest in long-term improvements 
and would internal ize the cost of resource degradation (to a 
greater or lesser extent depending upon the degree of 
privatization) on land controlled by stocKowners. The private 
-
costs of Keeping cattle would also increase if stocKowners 
compete to rent grazing land controlled by non-stocKowners. 
In this case, income would be transferred from (wealthier) 
stocKowners to other (less fortunate) households. A reduction 
in the perceived value of cattle relative to the cost of 
Keeping them will also reduce stocKing rates. Doran et al. 
(1979:45) argue that herd sizes decreased after the KiKuyu 
obtained indivdual ownership rights to agricultural land 
because land "replaced cattle as the desired symbol and store 
of wealth". As noted in section 2.2.2, other methods of 
reducing overstocKing may be appropriate depending on whether 
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or not access to grazing i s restricted to specific groups of 
stocKowners. Discussion of pol icy options and their effect on 
farmer incentive is deferred to section 4.2 .• 
Chapter 3 
Pr.dlct.d r •• pon ••• to changing .conomlc 
inc.ntiv.. in rural KwaZulu 
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This chapter describes an attempt to predict resource 
allocation, crop production and household welfare responses 
to changes in economic incentives using a mathematical 
proQramming model. The model aggregates enterprise levels 
predicted for four representative households of which two are 
located in areas of high cropping potential and two in areas 
of low cropp i ng poten t i a 1. ProJ ec ted r'esponses to changes in 
product and input prices, off-farm employment levels and 
certain institutional variables are discussed in section 3.3 • 
. 
Section 3.1 focuses on the representative household models 
and section 3.2 describes the aggregate or regional model. 
3.1 The household programming models. 
3.1.1 Modell ing approach. 
In section 2.1.3 it was noted that the Barnum-Squire model 
of a farm household is not suited to stUdies where interest 
centres on the details of production. The empirical models 
presented in this chapter have more in common with Low~s 
household economics theory and are solved using mathematical 
programming. This technique, 1 ike Low~s model, has the 
allocation of resources between competing activities as its 
central theme. 
To some extent, 
lumpy 1 abour 
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the effects of risK and leisure preferences, 
inputs, resource constraints, factor 
substitution, seasonal production and regional differences in 
agronomic conditions on household profit maximizing resource 
allocation are accounted for in the programming models. It is 
assumed that employment decisions made by individual worKers 
are consistent with the wishes of other household members 
(section 2.1.4). Consequently, remittances, rather than 
wages, are used as the criterion for allocating household 
worKers with different wage earning potentials to off-farm 
employment activities (including wage worK on the farm labour 
marKet). Household food consumption requirem.nts are 
specified as minimum constraints, but the minimum 
requ i remen ts "are allowed to vary with the number of worKers 
allocated to off-farm employment. The effects of income 
changes on household food and leisure consumption are 
ignored. Although it is pos~ible to express food and leisure 
consumption as functions of household income in a programming 
mode 1 , Haze 11 and Nor ton (1986: 65-71) show tha t th i s 
procedure invoKes the restrictive assumptions normally 
associated with separable models (eg. perfect substitution 
between household and hired farm labour, perfect substitution 
between farm produced and marKet purchased goods, and the 
absence of risK or risK aversion). The omission of profit 
effects resulting from an increase in farm product prices is 
not expected to have a sign i f i cant influence on predicted 
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(aggregate) levels of leisure and food consumption as the 
majority o~ KwaZulu's rural households are deficit producers. 
For surp 1 us producers, it is un 1 iKe 1 y that rea 1 income and 
profit effects caused by a relative Increase in product 
prices will significantly dampen the incentive to substitute 
worK for leisu~e during peaK production periods as leisure 
may be deferred to slacK periods and the income elasticity of 
demand for cash savings and consumer durables is high 
(section 2.3, point b). liKewise, real income and profit 
effects resulting from a decrease in marKet input . prices are 
not expected to have a significant influence on farm labour 
supply in surplu~ or deficit producing households. 
3.1.2 Household data source. ~~(N('I\)...,.; 
Al though the results of several household surveys are 
presented in Chapter 1, observations on all the demographic 
variables used in this analysis were recorded only in the 
study undertaKen by Stewart and the author between November 
1985 and February 1986 (Stewart and lyne, 1988). A total of 
193 households were sampled, 132 in an area of high cropping 
potential and 61 in an area of low cr'opp i ng poten t i a 1 • 
Household members were sub-sampled in full at each selected 
household. In this way observ~tions were recorded for 1169 
. --
individuals in the high potential area and 616 in the low 
potential area (a copy of the questionnaire is presented in 
Appendix E). Despite their agronomic differences, the study 
areas are contiguous and worKers in each have similar access 
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to off-farm wage employment. 
3.1.3 Household types. ~P 
Two hous~hold types (Type 1 and Type 2) were identified in 
the area of high cropping potential (Region 1) using cluster 




of their members and worKers (healthy individuals 
capable of earning 'high' off-farm wages were 
as Type 1. Conversely, households with a 
relatively small proportion of their members and worKers 
capable of earning 'high' off-farm wages were classified as 
Type 2. These ratios were selected as criteria for clustering 
as they are expec~ed to influence household resource 
allocation through their effect on both the 'consumer:worKer' 
ratio and the shape of the 'wage (or remittance) line' 
(Section 2.1.4). The - same procedure was used to identify 
household types (Type 3 and Type 4) in the area of low 
cropping potential (Region 2). Statistical results of the 
cluster analyses are presented in Table 3.1. 
Mean resource characteristics of the four household types are 
listed in Table 3.2. Although the observed mean number of 
off-farm wage worKers does not vary between the four 
household types identified, it is clear that the first 
household type in each region (Type 1 and 3) has greater wage 
earning potential, fewer dependents (children), and sl ightly 
more arable land than its counterpart. 
~ 0j 
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Table 3.1 Results of clust.r analys.s p.rfor~ed on hous.hold sampl. data r.corded in tMo regions of 
Kwa2ulu. 
C ~ 0 f./fY' £.}:o . ______________________________________ LJ ________________ --------------------------------------------
Region 1 R'gion 2 
------------------------------------ -------------------------------------
Standardiz.d cluster centres Standardized cluster c.ntr.s 
Housthold Type 1 Typ. 2 
(n = 66) (n = 6 
------------------------~~----------
'High' incaI' ~ork.rs 
per household ~e~ber 
0,734 -0,731 
Type 3 Type 4 
F value (n = 25) ~ (n .= 36) F value 
--------------.-------~ - -----------------------
150,6-- 0,903 -0,621 77,9--
'High' incale workers 0,772 
p.r household work.r 
-0,844 239,9-· 0,978 -0,709 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not. II l~pli.s significanc. at the one p.r c.nt l.v.l of probability. 
Table 3.2 Mean ~esou~ce cha~acte~istics of fou~ household 
types identified in two ~egions of Kwa-Zulu. 
Household 
Region 1 
Type 1 Type 2 
(n=66) (n=66) 
Region 2 
Type 3 Type 4 
< n=2~) ( n:;:36) 
-------------------------------------- 7bS-----;7~----------
Child~en «16 y~s) v 3,9L 4,7 4,2 5,0 0 
Pensione~s <)59 y~s) v 1/ II , ~ } I ') 3 6 I ) b-~ 
anc;t disabled pe~sons 1 ,2 1 , 1 1 ,4 1 ,5 
Wo~l<e~s with ~ 1 ow~ wage 1,":>3 '2/'1"1 I 2$ -:s I ... '1' 
ea~ning potential l 1 ,5 3,0 2~0 3,5 
Wo~l<e~s with ~high~ wage 1,C6'i!> (),l4-7 ~)Ib 0/5"' S 
ea~ning potent i all 2,0 0,5 2,0 0,5 
Obse~ved wage wo~l<e~sl 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 
Obse~ved a~able land <m 2 ) 10~13,0 9905,0 7380,0 7131,0 
---------------~---------------------------------------------
Note 1 Wo~l<e~s ~ounded to nea~est 0,5 as these individuals 
we~e modelled using intege~ activities. 
In o~de~ to cluste~ the households, wage ea~ning potentials 
(~offe~~ wage ~ates) had to be p~edicted fo~ household 
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workers not wage employed. In offer wage models (Mincer, 
1974) where some members of the workforce do not engage in 
wage employment, the dependent variable (wage) is observed 
only in a 1 imited range (wage> 0) with the result that 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates of the 
model may not be unbiased and consistent. The model can be 
written as: 
Wi = aXi + Il i 
where: 
Wi = offer wage of the ith wage employee. 
Xi = a vector of personal attributes (eg. education and work 
experience) of the ith wage employee. 
Ili = a random variable, N.D.~(0,~2). 
It is usually assumed that wage employees participate in the 
wage market because their offer wages exceed their 
reservation wages. Contrariwise, the offer wages of non-
participants are assumed to fall short of their reservation 
wages. The reservation wage depends upon an individual~s 
opportunity cost of engaging in wage employment and his or 
her preference for leisure and the type of work involved 
(Ryan and Wallace, 1985). That is: 
RWi = bYI + vi 
where: 
RWi = reservation wage of the ith wage employee. 
Yi = a vector of attributes affecting the opportunity cost 
and preferences (eg. age, education, farm size and 
number of dependents) of the ith individual. 
vi = a random var-iable, N.D.~(0,~2). 
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In this case the probabil ity of engaging in wage employment 
is determined by the probabil ity that Wi > RWi or: 
Pr «aXi - bYi)/~ > z) 
where ~ is the standard deviation of (~i - vi) and z is a 
standardized normal deviate. If ~i and vi are jointly normal, 
participation 
probit model 
in wage employment may be analysed using a 
with the dependent variable set to one for 
participants and zero otherwise, and explanatory variables 
drawn from both Xi and Yi (Ryan and Wallace, 1995). 
To avoid sample selectivity bias which may arise when the 
offer wage model is estimated using OLS, Heckman (1979) 
recommends inclusion of the intensity ratio (Gumbel, 1958) as 
an additional explanatory variable. The intensity ratio (~) 
is computed as: 
~ = 0(Z)/2~Z) 
where 0 and 2 are the density and cumulative distribution of 
a standard normal variable and Z is an index calculated from 
the probit function (Heckman, 1979) so that ~ is a monotone 
decreasing function of the probabil ity that a worker is 
selected into the sample of wage employees. If sample 
selectivity bias exists, the OLS regression coefficient 
estimated for ~ will be statistically significant and the 
coefficients estimated for the other explanatory variables in 
the model will be consistent. If selectivity bias is not 
present, ~ will not be statistically significant and may 
therefore be excluded from the model. Results of probit and 
semi-log offer wage equations estimated from the sample data 
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are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. The data 
were poole~ as no significant slope or intercept differences 
were detected between regions. 
Variables included in the models are self explanatory with 
the exception of PDEP, a measure of dependency, used in the 
probit functions. For females, PDEP represents the number of 
children under 16 years of age expressed as a fraction of all 
household members. For males, the numerator of the ratio was 
increased by one to account for a houseKeeper. It was 
expected that beyond some critical level of PDEP, reservation 
wages would exceed offer wages (particularly for women) owing 
to increasing child care needs at home. Results of the probit 
analysis appear to su~port this argument. Participation in 
the wage marKet also follows a quadratic age pattern, peaKing 
at 36 years for women and 59 years for men. This finding is 
Tabl. 3.3 Probit analysis oi the off-farm wag • .mploym.nt dtcision by mal. and f.mll. 
work.rs sampl.d in two r'gions of ~IZulu. 














































consistent with the contention that as migrant worKers age, 
their comparative advantage in wage employment decreases 
relative to that of younger household members (Low, 
1986:126). 
The OLS estimates (' being statisticallY insignificant in 
both HecKman equations) presented in Table 3.4 were used to 
predict offer wages for worKers that were not wage employed 
and as substitutes for missing wage observations. High R2 
values were not con~idered essential as predicted wages were 
only used to assign non-wage employed worKers and worKers 
with missing wage observations to either a ~high~ or ~low~ 
Table 3.4 Offer wage equations for employed males and females 
sampled in ~wo regions of KwaZulu. 
Explanatory 
variable" 




HecKman OLS HecKman OLS 
-----------------------~-------------------------------------
Intercept 3,4829 3,7975 3,5382 3,2541 
(8,65)·· (14,33)·· (4,72)-- (12,37)--
EDU 0,0934 0,0788 ° , 1002 ° , 1138 
(4,34)-- (4,82)-- (2,61)-- (6,15) .... 
EXPERIENCE .... 0,0936 0,0849 0,0415 0,0483 
(4,50)-- (4,46)"- ( 1 ,47) (2,13)" 
(EXPERIENCE)2 -0,0014 -0,0014 -0,0006 -0,0007 
(-3,88)·" (-3,75) .... (-1,07) (-1,49) , 0,2979 -0,0572 
(1,04) (-0,41) 
R2 0,30 0,29 0,38 0,38 
F value 9,40·" 12,16 .... 9,41 .... 12,66"· 
Val id cases 94 94 66 66 
----------------------------- --------------------------------
Notes + t-statistics given in parentheses. 
++ EXPERIENCE = AGE - EDUCATION - 6. 
** Implies significance at the one per cent level of probabi 1 i ty. 
* Imp 1 i es significance at the five per cent level of probabi 1 i ty. 
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wage group. The R2 values nevertheless compare favourably 
with values reported in similar studies by Rosenzwieg (1984), 
Chernicovsky et al. (1985) and Sumner (1982). 
According to the OLS results, an extra year of school ing adds 
approximately eight per cent to the monthly wage of men and 
11 per cent to the monthly wage of women. These 'returns to 
education' are similar to estimates of 9,6 and 8,7 per cent 
computed for a sample of men and women on farms in 
Saskatchewan (Furtan et al., 1985). ChernicovskY et al. 
(1985) measured returns of approximately 17 and 16 per cent 
for men and women residing in rural Botswana but their 
estimates may contain sample selectivity bias. 
The wage rate separ~ting 'high' and 'low' wage earners was 
set at the median value of predicted and observed monthly 
wage rates, viz. R160 in Region 1 and R165 in Region 2 
(1985=100). As was hypothesized, the vast majority (more than 
90 .per cent) of workers not wage employed had predicted offer 
wage ratesles5 than the median value in each region. In 
Region 1 the mean 'high' and 'low' off-farm wage rates were 
compu ted as R276 and R91 per mon th r'espec t i ve 1 y. The 
corresponding estimates for Region 2 were computed as R251 
and R87 respectively. It was anticipated that the mean offer 
wage rates in Region 2 would be lower than those in Region 1 
because the opportunity cost of wage employment is lower for 
members of households located in areas of poor cropping 
potential. 
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For the programming models, it was assumed that (a) cash 
income accruing to a household derives from cropping 
activities, welfare payments and 'net' wage remittances 
(i .e., remittances net of food and travel expenses incurred 
by wag. workers at their rural homes), and (b) off-farm wage 
workers provide for all of their own consumption requirement~ 
out of non-remitted wage income. A double-log OLS net 
remittance equation was estimated from observations on 
migrant workers to predict 'high' and 'low' net remittances 
corresponding to the mean 'high' and 'low' wage rates 
computed for each region. The net remittance equation is 





OLS rem!ttance equation estimated for migrant 
workers sampled in two regions of KwaZulu. 
Dependent variable = In(monthly -remittance) 
0,6168 
In(monthly wage) 










Notes + t-statistics given in parentheses. 
** Impl ies significance at the one per cent level of 
probabil ity. 
In Region 1 the 'high' and 'low' monthly net remittances were 
estimated to be R86 and R41 respectively, and in Region 2, 
R8t and R39. 
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3.1.4 Structure of the household programming mod~ls. 
3.1.4.1 Representative households. 
Four household programming models were formulated, one 
representing each household type (cluster). Households within 
a cluster were expected to have resource levels roughly 
proportional to their group mean because the criteria 
selected for clustering reflect human resource endowment 
ratios (section 3.1.3). In less developed Southern Africa, 
farm sizes tend to be positively correlated with household 
size (Low, 1986:32). Since resource proportional ity reduces 
aggregation bias (Day, 1963), representative households were 
synthesized from the group means (Table 3.2). Minimization of 
aggregation bias 
group (cluster) 
also requires that households within a 
exhibit 'technical homogeneity' and 
, pecun i ous propor tiona I i ty' (BucKwe 11 and Haze 11, 1972) • 
These requirements are best met by initially sorting farm 
households according to agrocl imate and which 
approach was adopted in this study (Regions 1 and 2). 1 V ov<j-I'- I' 
3.1.4.2 WorK and leisure preference activities. 
Hazell and Norton (1986:65-66) suggest that leisure time 
sacrificed for work be costed in the objective function with 
the cost per unit time increasing as more leisure is 
sacrificed. In their I inear programming example they achieve 
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worK and leisure jnto segments bearing successivelY higher 
-~~ 
uni t charge.s O,40W; ~~~W~ ( tc. where W is the cost of hired 
labour) for time allocated to worK. /1\'1> ;arm 
9(~ ».~ 
~ ~~ A similar approach was adopted in this study except that the 
~J- household~s stocK of on-farm worK~ 
~~ 
and leisure time was 
"'-- allowed to __ v __
vary inversely with the number of ------ migrant wage \ II worKers. Leisure preferences of migrant worKers were not 
considered. It was assumed that the estimated wage 
remittances employed in the models would reflect these 
.preferences. The plan~ing period (one year) was separated 
into four production periods of equal length (Appendix B, 
Table B.1.3). 
WorKers were assumed to be equally efficient in crop 
production. The observed hourly hire rate (W) for farm labour 
in the survey area was RO,375 (buying price), of which RO,21 
(sell ing price) was remitted to the labourer~s family. On-
farm time available for worK and leisure (in each production 
period) was divided into four equal segments. Time appl ied to 
household cropping activities (or sold on the local farm 
labour marKet) was charged at an increasing rate, starting at 
RO,1S (O,40W) for each hour of worK drawn from the first 
. segment and rising to RO,30 (O,80W) for each hour of worK 
drawn from the fourth segment. W.ork time drawn from the first 
two segments was charged at a rate lower than the sell ing 
price of farm labour as some households do sell labour on the 
local market (section 2.1.4). 
I 
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Table 3.6 illustrates these issues and highl ights the 
inclusion of integer activities (representing worKers and 
'half' worKers) to ensure a unique choice between migrant and 
farm related occupations. A mixed linear and integer 
programming algorithm was used to solve the programming 
problems (FMPS 1981). 
3.1.4.3 Cropping and food consumption activities. 
Four crops were considered in Region 1, viz. t cereals (mainly 
maize), legumes (mainly dry beans), roots (potato, 
sweetpotato and madumbi) and sugar-cane. In Region 2, only 
cereals and legumes were considered. Factor sUbstitution was 
made possible by mod~ll ing all crops, excluding sugar-cane, 
at two levels of technology, 'traditional' and ' 'potential'. 
Relative to traditional crops, potential crops (high-yielding 
varieties) yield mor-e output per unit land, combine labour 
and marKet inputs in different proportions and generally 




in Appendix B, 
seasonal labour 
Tables B.1.1 
sources are indicated in section 3.1.4.4. 
requirements are 
- B.11.3. The data 
Crop rotation constraints ensured that no field would 
produce a root crop more than once in three consecutive 
years, or a legume crop in succesive years. LivestocK 
production activities were excluded from the models as they 
were not expected to have a significant influence on 
Table 3.6 A mini-tableau for labour activities. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_ ... ---------------------
" " " Ifoustbold flnl hbDUr -'7 , 5 Hii-ilg hi'll Stllilg hi'll 
'nhgtr IttlVltltS supply (II",) , stbold work tilt stgunts [ '~boIr (brs) hbDur (IIrs) Off-hi'll 
for ~ worktr wit. ---------------- -----------_____________ Total boustbold --------- ----------- ..,Io~tnt 
'lilli' lI~gtS PtriDd PtriDd 4 IIDrk (brs) Ptriod Ptriod witb Ctrul 
;=;~--;;=;:; Child ~~;~~---------;---; I -;;--;~; ;;-~;--;;-~; -;;---;;----;;---;;1 ;--;-;;;;; \ ;--;--;;;;;- '~:: gr~!~g RHS . 





FInI I~bour - ptriad 3 
F~M1 Iibour - ptriod 4 
Ptr i od 3 - St9ltll t I 
Ptriod 3 - st!JItnt 2 
PtriDd 3 - st~lIt 3 
Ptriad 3 - H!JIlnt 4 
PtriDd 4 - st!JIlnt I 
Ptr i ad 4 - upn t 2 
Ptriod 4 - st!Jltllt .3 
Ptriod 4 - st!JIlnt 4 
Crap hbaur rtStr~int-plriod 3 
Crap hbaur rt5tr~int_plriad 4 
~t 1 - taulwort" 
Stgalat 2 - tatil work 
St!Jlfnt 3 - tatil work 
S!.9!!!II t 4 - toti I work 
Hirtd f~M1 hbour 
Sold f~1'II l~bDUr 
Clrtil rtquirtatllts - SUlttr 
Clrul rtquirflltnts - ~utlIIn 
Ctrtll rtquirflltDts - lIillttr 
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household decisions regarding the use of labour and arable 
land. Observed mean herd sizes are small (ranging from 1,8 
for household Type 2 to 4,8 for household Type 3), herding 
duties are generally performed by children and households 
have access to communal grazing. 
Household food consumption requirements were specified as 
seasonal minimum constraints but the minimum subsistence 
requirement in each season was allowed to vary inversely with 
the number of off-farm wage worKers. Table 3.7 lists the 
estimated subsistence _needs of household members and the 
periods during which farm produced food crops are available 
for consumption purposes. 
Table 3.7 Estimated consumption requirements and periods of 
home grown food availabil ity. 
---------------------------------------------~~~----------




Pensioners and the disabled 
Ch i 1 dren 









@'5 = t~r~~} F' 
51 , 75 1--4 ~ 5,52 9,20 
37,95 5,52 8,05 














Notes 1 Average age and sex distributions observed within 
Gcumisa sample households were employed in 
computing the f~od requirements. 
2 Acco~ding to Mel is (1988). Root crops were not 
considered in Region 2. 
Source Gopalan et a1. (1985). 
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3.1.4.4 Risk preferences and the objective function. 
Evidence suggests that farmers behave in a risk averse manner ~ 
(Young, 1979). Neglect of risk in programming models can lead 
to considerable overstatements of the size of risKy 
enterprises, special ized cropping patterns, biased estimates 
of commodity supply elasticities, overestimation of the value 
of resources and the incorrect prediction of technology 
choices (Hazell, 1982). Consequently, an attempt was made to 
account for the effects of income risk resulting from 
-/ 1---
unstable crop yields and prices. Four measures of income risK 
were tested in the model representing Type 1 households; (a) 
a 1. inear «pproximation of the expected gain-confidence limit V . 
(E,L) criterion sugg~sted by Baumol (1963) which produces a 
subset of the solutions generated by MOTAD/s (E,V) criterion 
V 
(Hazell and Norton, 1986:86-91), 
/ 
(b) the Wald maximin (E,M) 
criterion (McInerny, 1969), (c) the Savage regret or minimax 
(E,R) criterion (Hazell, 1970) and (d) a linear approximation 
of the /sumex/ util ity function criterion (Patten and 
Hardaker, 1987). Target MOTAD, Focus-loss and other Safety-
first criteria which would have entailed imposing a 
subjective target or minimum income for the household were 
not considered. 
Programming models wi th obj ec t I ve func t ions that include 
measures of farm Income risK require time series revenue 
observations as input data. Local sugar-cane yield and price 
information for the ten year period 1974-1983 was obtained 
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from the South African Sugar Association (Bates, 1988). 
Unfor tuna te.l y, c omparabl e da ta for food crops were not 
available and had to be estimated. 
Yields of representative crops (maize, dry beans and 
potatoes) were predicted from OLS regression equations 
expressing per hectare yield as a quadratic function of 
rainfall measured over the crop~s growing period (Appendix C, 
Table C.l). The regression equations were estimated from 
observations recorded at crop trials conducted under 
. commercial (i.e. potential) and traditional management 
practices. Rainfall amounts measured over growing periods 
during the years 1974-1983 at stations close to the sample 
survey areas were substituted into the estimated equations to 
predict annual per hectare food crop yields. No significant 
trends were detected in the estimated yield series. 
Local farm gate and reta i l prices of food crops were computed 
for the years 1974-1983 from prices paid to commercial 
farmers in Natal (Directorate Agricultural Economic trends, 
1989). It was assumed that local :Natal price ratios observed 
at the time of the survey (1985) reflected price 
relationships during the period 1974-1983. Prices 
deflated using the South African consumer price 
(Directorate Agricultural ECQnomic Trends, 1989) 





prices. Yields, prices and raw data sources are listed in 
Appendix B. 
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Maximin solution$ to the household programming model were 
obtained by maximizing M+ (A - B) subject to a paramaterized 
expected net income (E) constraint where: 
M = largest total net crop income (excluding family labour 
costs) in the worst of the ten years considered. 
A = off-farm income. 
B = familY labour costs plus other costs not accounted for in 
calculating net crop incomes (eg. maize mill ing and food 
purchasing costs). 
Minimax solutions were obtained by maximizing (A - B) - R 
subject to a parameterized expected net income (E) constraint 
where: 
R = regret (i .e. the largest deviation from deterministic 
I inear programming solutions for farm net crop income, 
excluding labour costs, over the ten years), and A and B 
are as defined for the maximin criterion. 
In contrast to these game theory approaches, Baumol~s E,L 
criterion involves maximization of expected crop income (E) 
for given levels of L = E - <$& where <$ (=,.[Q) is the standard 
deviation of E, and & is a risK aversion parameter. A 
popular adaptation of the E,L criterion, and the approach 
used in th i s investigation, is to assume that the household 
maximizes L for given levels of & (Hazell and Norton, 
1986:92-93). LiKe the E,V ~r:t~rlon, E,L impl ies that 
household util ity (U) is a quadratic function of income or· 
that crop incomes are normally distributed. 
These assumptions are not invoKed if the 
maximizing a 1 inear approximation of the 
function (Patten and HardaKer, 1987): 
mode 1 is 
'sumex' 
U = 1 - e-a • + S(1 - e-bE ) with a,b and S > O. 
Where: 




a = anticipated upper limit of household absolute risK 
aversion. 
b = anticipated lower 1 imit of household absolute risK 
aversion. 
S = a non-negative parameter. 
For the purpose of this investigation, solutions were 
generated for different values of household absolute risK 
aversion (r.) by maxtmizing approximate U at various levels 
of S (when S = O,r.= a and when S approaches infinity, 
r. approaches b). 
A comparison of the predicted and actual solutions revealed 
that Baumol's E,L criterion provided the best results (Lyne 
et al., 1989) and it was decided to use this measure of risK 
in the other household programming models. Although quadratic 
utility implies positive marginal utility only within a 
bounded range (Hanoch and Levy, 1970) and increasing absolute 
risK aversion (Arrow, 1965:35), Tsiang (1972) has argued that 
the E,~ criterion (and hence the closely related E,V and E,L 
criteria) is a good approximation to more desired decision 
criteria if the risK taKen is small relative to the total 
wealth of the farmer. This condition is not unreasonable in 
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KwaZulu where farm income usually comprises less than ten per 
cent of de facto household income (section 1.2.4>. 
prices, Y a diagonal matrix of per hectare yields, 
X a vector of hectares and 2 a diagonal matrix of 
own consumption. 
off-farm income, I being a vector of welfare 
~ 
payments and net remittances per recipient and 0 a 
vector of off-farm worKers and welfare recipients. 
[C"Xl = total marKet production costs, where C is a vector 
of per hectare production costs excluding family 
labour. 
[W"Hl = family labour costs, H being a vector 'of hours 
worKed and W a vector of (rising) hourly time 
charges. 
purchased food costs, F being a vector of unit 
food prices and N a vector of food purchases. 
= is an aggregate "r i sK aversion" coefficient for 
all households in homogenous group (Type) i. 
= is a variance-covariance matrix of per hectare 
crop incomes, so that [X"nXl represents variance 
in crop income. 
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Variance-covariance matrices were approximated for each 
region using the (1 inear) Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) 
approach described by Hazell (1971) and Hazell and Scandizzo 
(1974) • The term [X/OXJQ·~ was replaced with its MAD 
estimator, 
where n = T~/2(T-1) is a correction factor that converts the 
square of the mean absolute deviation to an estimate of the 
population variance assuming the population is normally 
distributed (Simmons and Pomareda, 1975). The term T 
represents the number of periods considered, (gJ' - §J) the 
dev i at i ons- from mean gross revenue for crop j and time per i od 
t, and ~ the mathematical constant. 
3.1.4.5 MarKet assumptions for representative households. 
The (marKet) demand for food crops produced in excess of own 
consumption requirements was assumed to be perfectly price 
elastic at /urban/ farm-gate prices (Appendix B, Table B.12). 
The supply of marKet inputs and purchased food was also 
assumed to be perfectly price elastic. However, areas of 
sugar-cane produced by household types 1 and 2 were 
constrained to be less than or equal to observed levels 
because production is restricted by quotas Known locally as 
small grower entitlements (Bates, 19~9). Demand for off-farm 
labour was treated as price elastic in both the /high/ and 
-'low/ wage mar-kets but the supply of off-farm worKers was not 
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permitted to exceed the mean levels presented in Table 3.2. 
Land rental and local sales of farm labour were not 
considered as these markets are inactive (sections 1.2.2 and 
2.1.4). 
3.1.5 Results of the household programming models. 
Solutions to the household programming models were generated 
for a range of risk aversion (e) values. Table 3.8 presents 
predicted levels of key activities. These .part i cul ar 
solutions were selected as they provided the closest fit, 
measured in terms of percentage absolute deviation (PAD), 
between predicted and actual crop areas. 
Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) measured a mean e value of 0,9 
for a sample of farmers in northeast Brazil using /mind 
experiments/, and Brandao et al, (1984) report e values of 
0,9 and 1,2 for landlords and tenant farmers in Brazil. It 
would, however, be incorrect to compare these estimates with 
the optimum e, presented in Table 3.8 as the latter are 
simply fine-tuning devices which not only capture the effects 
of risk but also the effects of model misspecifications (eg. 
the exclusion of fixed management and information costs, and 
the omission of capital constraints), data errors, and risk 
sharing (Hazell, 1982; Young, 1979). 
Haze 11 and Norton (1986:271) regard a PAD~of below five per 
cent as exceptional, below ten per cent as good and below 15 
per cent as acceptable. In terms of these measures, the 
predicted crop mixes appear to simulate actual crop 
reasonably well. 
Tlblt 3.8 Solution ltvtls for kty Ictivitits in tht housthold progrllling modtls. 
Region 1 Rtgion 2 
Housthold Typt 1 Housthold Typt 2 Housthold Typt 3 Housthold Type 4 
Activity ACtUil Prtdicttd Actull Prtdicttd Actull Prtdicttd Actull Prtdicttd 
Opt imlll • 
Ctruls: (HI) 
Traditionl) 










Traditionll 0,12 0,14 
Potentiil 0,00 0,00 






































Notts 1 Excludts other minor crops. 
2 Obstrvtd nlllbtrs roundtd to ntarest 0,5. 
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levels 
A regional model constructed from the household programming 
models is described and val idated in section 3.2. Aggregate 
responses to changing economic incentives projected · by the 
regional model are presented in section 3.3. 
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3.2 The regional programming model. 
3.2.1 Aggregation. 
It was assumed (1) that all households in parts of KwaZulu 
similar to the (two) areas sampled could be grouped into the 
household types defined in section 3.1.3 without altering 
mean resource levels in the original groups (Table 3.2), and 
(2) that within each homogeneous region, the distribution of 
households across household types approximated the 
distribution observed in the samples. The northern districts 
of KwaZulu (Ubombo, S imdlangentsha and Ingwavuma) were 
excluded from the model as they . differ significantly from 
the areas sampled in ~espect of population density and access 
to marKets (Appendix D, Map Dl). Districts included in the 
model account for almost 90 per cent of KwaZulu~s arable land 
(pym Goldby, 1988) and 92 per cent of its rural households 
<Table 3.9). 
Tabl, 3.9 Esti~at,d hous,hold populations in ,ach r,asonably h~o9fn'ous 
ar,a and in ,ach hous,hold typ' (1985). 
Hous,hold 
Ar,a mod,ll,d Ar,a KwaZulu 
---------------------------------------- ,xclud,d 
High crop potential 
(Region 1)1 
------------------_. 
low crop potential 
(Regi on 2) 




i n smp It (Yo) 50 
108700 65700 
50 41 
94600 34844 412544 
59 
Not, j Region 1 = bioclimatic groups 1-4. Region 2 = bioclimatic groups 6-11. 
Source KDEA (1986); Tabl, 1.2 of chapter 1, and Table 3.2. 
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The representative household programming models were arranged 
in blocK diagonal form in the regional model (Table 3.10). 
Interfarm and interregional resource trade wis effected by 
means of transfer rows (not shown in Table 3.10). Aggregate 
resource levels in each household type (D,) were computed 
as the product of the representative (mean) household 
resource levels and the estimated number of households in the 
group. In total, the model comprised more than 500 rows and 
600 columns including 43 integer activities. 
R'giOil 1 - - - - - - - - - - - :. - - - R'giOil 2 
Hon.hold Typ. 1 - - - - - - - - - - - Houstllold Typ. 4 
ProGict i 011 Product i 01 ColI SIIIP t i 01 
DIIII buy Mlts 
x. 8. local Irllla s.. ~ 84 local IrbID s... 
RntraiDts 1 A. 
ea.odi ty blhlets 1 -VI -I 
ObjtCtivt 1 -c .. -f .. p .. p •• -I 
Rntraints 4 A. 
Ca.odlty bllllen 4 -V. -1 




Obj.ctiv. fUDCtiOI a. a. ------
R'giolll 





!D. 1. .. 
1D4 




Optimum e, values estimated for the representative households 
(Table 3.8) were substituted into the - regional model and 
solutions generated by maximizing the objective function: 
N 
Max L = l:a l 
where: 
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{[P" (YX-Z)] I + [l "0] I - [C"X] I - [W"H] I - [F"N] I 
- e I [X" OX] I 0 • I!I } 
N is the number of homogeneous household types (four in this 
mode 1 ) , a I is a weight to neutral ize size differences 
between populations in each household type, and the other 
terms are as defined for the (E,L) objective function 
presented in section 3.1.4.4. 
3.2.2 MarKet assumptions for the region. 
Suppl ies of marKet inputs and purchased food were assumed to 
be . perfectly price elastic at local prices as KwaZulu is a 
price-taKer on South African marKets. MarKet demand for food 
crops that fetch higher prices on local marKets than on urban 
marKets (Appendix B, Table B.12) was treated as a single-step 
function. Quantities of these crops sold locally were 
restricted to a level less than or equal to local purchases 
(Table 3.10). For other crops, marKet demand was assumed to 
be perfectly price elastic. Quantities of sugar-cane produced 
by Type 1 and Type 2 households in Region 1 (region of high 
cropping potential) were constrained to levels summing to an 
amount less than or equal to total output as production is 
restricted by quotas andmill location. Demand for off-farm 
labour was treated as price elastic in both the "high" and 
"low" wage marKets but the supply of off-farm wor-Ker-s from 
each repr-esentative household was not permitted to exceed the 
mean levels presented in Table 3.2. Labour transfer rows 
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ensured that quantities of farm labour hired locally would 
equal qua~tities sold. Any farm labour hired in excess of 
this level was charg.d at a rate equivalent to the hourlY 
earnings of off-farm workers in the 'lowest' wage category. 
Land rental was not considered in the initial or 'base' model 
as the prevail ing tenure system precludes a land market 
(section 1.2.2>. Section 3.3.5 reports the predicted effects 
of a restricted land rental market. 
3.2.3 Val idation of the model. 
To val idate a model it is necessary to have a set of base 
data against which the predicted results can be compared. 
Unfortunately there ls neither a complete nor a rel iable set 
of agricultural base data for KwaZulu. Nevertheless, 
comparisons were drawn where possible. 
The base production data presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.14 
reflect mean crop areas and yields computed from annual 
agricultural estimates reported during the period 1982-1985 
(Maduna, 1986>. Mean base data were used in making the 
comparisons as the model employed mean yield coefficients and 
mean prices with 1985=100. Some of the census figures were 
clearly unrel iable and were excluded from the calculations. 
Table 3.11 presents average crop areas computed from 
(reasonable> census estimates reported for each of KDA's four 
administrative regions. 
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Cereals Legumes Roots Sugar- Other Total 
cane 
Umzansi 45198 10185 4637 11902 7420 79342 
(82/83-84/85) 
Ogwini 64972 5719 5013 31042 1963 108709 
(81/82-84/85) 
Mpandleni 42840 851 616 o 137 44444 
(81/82-83/84) 
Mabedlana 61590 4752 2363 652 4005 73362 
(81/82-84/85) 
KwaZulu 214600 21507 12629 43596 13525 305857 
Less: 
Districts 
excluded' 24636 1901 945 o 2873 30355 




Includes the districts of Ubombo, 
and Ingwavum~, or approximately 40 
Mabedlana's ~otal arable area. 
Maduna (1986). 
Simdlangentsha 
per cent of 
The annual census estimates taKe no account of fallow land or 
mixed cropping. Household surveys (section 1.2.1, Table 1.4) 
indicate that many 'mai ze 1 and$.' are inter-cr-opped, 
particularly in areas of lower agricultural potential. Using 
Stewart's (1986:28) sample survey findings as a guide, the 
aggregate area data (Table 3.11) were adjusted to account for 
mixed cropping. Crop areas predicted by the model are 
compared with the adjusted base areas in Table 3.12. It 
should be noted that the crop rotation constraints employed 
in the model (section 3.1.4.3) were not binding in the 
sCll uti on . 
Table 3.12 Base (adj us ted for mixed 
in the 
Land use 
predicted crop areas 


















cropp i ng) and 











Notes 1 The percentage absolute deviation (PAD) for areas of 
crops included in the model is 16,3. 
2 Repr-esen ts area under crops excl uded from the mode 1 . 
Predicted fallow land (76908 Ha) constitutes some 22,6 per 
cent of the estimated area util ized. This estimate compares 
favourably with Knight and Lenta~s (1980) aggregate estimate 
of 27 per cent. Although the PAD computed for crop areas is 
sl ightly higher than the 15 per cent acceptance level 
recommended by Hazell and Norton (1986:271) it should not be 
regarded as an accurate measure of the model~s performance as 
the base data are unrel iable (Butler et al., 1977:183; Lenta, 
1978). Owing to time and staff 1 imitations, the agricultural 
~census~ does not entail enumeration of rural households. 
Instead, extension officers are expected to maKe visual 
appraisals of crop Yields and areas (on highly fragmented and 
often inaccessible fields) before harvesting commences. 
Census yield data reported for each administrative region 
are presented in Table 3.13 and compared with predicted 
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yields in Table 3.14. The PAD computed for crop yield is 6,4. 
Table 3.13 Mean production of selected crops computed from 
KwaZulu census estimates (tons). 







































Notes 1 Maduna does not present figures for the 1981/82 
season in Umzansi region. 
2 Includes the- districts of Ubombo, Inogwavuma and 
Simdlangentsha, or approximately 40 per cent of crop 
yields in Mabedlana. 
Source Maduna (1986). 
Table 3.14 Base and predicted output levels in the area of 
KwaZulu modelled (tons)'. 
-------------------------------------------------------------















Notes 1 The PAD for crop output is 6,4. 
The predicted level of off-farm employment reduced to a 
1 inear extrapolation of the input data as the upper 1 imi ts 
imposed on the number of wage worKers were binding in the 
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solution. Consequently, comparing the population statistics 
projected ·by the model (Tabl e 3.15) wi th census est imates 
only serves as a check on the demographic input data and 
aggregation w~ights used in the model. 
Table 3.15 'Predicted' demographic statistics for the area 
of KwaZulu modelled (1985). 
-------------------------------------------------------------
De jure rural population: 
< 16 yrs 
16 - 59 yrs 
>59 or disabled 
o Wage workers: 
De facto rural population (De jure 







Notes 1 Migrants estimated as 41,3 per cent of wage workers 
( OBSA , 1987).0 
According to population census estimates, 3137750 people 
resided in the area modelled during 1985 (OBSA, 1987; KOEA, 
1986). This estimate falls short of the model estimate 
(3251933) by 3,5 per cent. The model 'predicts' that 21,2 per 
cent of the de jure population were wage employed and the 
corresponding census estimate (OBSA, 1987) is 23,9 per cent. 
The Statistical Abstracts (OBSA, 1987) indicate that there 
were 1122645 wage employed KwaZulu citizens in 1985. Of 
these, 362645 are classified as 'locally employed'. Assuming 
that the term 'locally employed' refers to urban wage 
workers, the total number of (rural) migrant worKers 
approximated 760000 in 1985. Given that the districts 
excluded from the model account for roughly eight per cent of 
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KwaZulu~s ~u~al population, this figu~e compa~es favou~ably 
with the estimate of 755210 mig~ant wo~Ke~s ~p~edicted~ by 
the mode 1 • 
Independent household income estimates a~e available but 
difficult to compa~e owing to diffe~ences in the way income 
is measu~ed. In this study, cash income is defined as the sum 
of pension and disabil ity payments, net wage ~emittances 
(section 3.1.3) and c~op sales, less the cost of ma~Ket 
inputs used in c~op p~oduction and the cost of essential 
food pu~chases. Annual income estimates gene~ated by the 
model a~e 1 isted in Table 3.16. 
Tabl e 3.16 Income estimates p~edicted by the 
<1985:::;100) • 
model 






Essential food pu~chases and 
mill i n 9 cos t s 





















Total annual income p~edicted by the model fo~ the ave~age 
household (R2856) compar-es r-easonably we 11 wi th 
co~~esponding estimates of R2400, R2683 and R2638 computed 
fr-om the sample data att~ibuted to Stewa~t (1988) and Per-Kins 
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and May (1988) in Table 1.10. Aggregate net remittances 
/predicted~ for the area modelled (R602,1 mill ion) are 
compatible with the 1976 estimate of R361,0 mill ion 
(1985=100) for rural KwaZulu but the predicted value impl ies 
reduced growth in real aggregate remittance earnings since 
1976 (Tab 1 e 1. 7) • 
Whereas the model predicts that households (excluding migrant 
workers) purchase 650 kilograms of cereals per annum, 
(1987:126-127) estimates that rural households in 
Lyster 
KwaZulu 
(including wage commuters) purchase approximately 900 
kilograms o~ cereal per annum. No interhousehold farm labour 
transactions enter the solution. This result is consistent 
with the observation that the on-farm labour market is very 
inactive (section 2.1.4). 
A summary of solution levels for key activities is presented 
in Table 3.17. 
3.3 Predicted responses to changing economic incentives. 
This section examines aggregate responses predicted by the 
regional model to changes in key economic and i'nstitutional 
variables. All outcomes reflect static equil ibrium solutions 
(1985=100) and therefore imply complete adjustment to the 
change. Land transactions are excluded in all but the last 
scenario. 
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Table 3.17 Solution levels for key activities in the 
reg i on a 1 mode 1 (1 985= 1 00) • 
Particulars 
1 No. of households 





Net wage remittances 
mean 
range 





3 Area under crops: 
Cereals - traditional 
Cereals - potential 
Legumes - traditional 
Legumes - potential 
Roots - traditional 
Roots - potential 
Sugar-cane 
Fallow land 




5 Sales between rural households: 
Roots 
6 Value of own crops consumed 





7 Total crop production costs, 
excluding household labour 
8 Net value of crop production 
(4+5+6-7) 





R mill ion 
R mill ion 
Ha 
R mill ion 
R mill ion 
R mill ion 
R mill ion 
377600 
1967 
1552 - 2524 
1776 




























Uti1 ity is assumed to equal L. 
High income wage workers = 450372 
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3.3.1 Scenario 1: Cereal price increased by ten per cent. 
Changes in the price of maize are expected to have some 
influence on rural household welfare and resource allocation 
as mai ze is the most important food staple produced in \ 
KwaZulu. Predicted responses to a ten per cent c.t.ri~ 
paribu~ increase in the retail and producer prices of cereals 
are summarized in Table 3.18. 
Mean household income decl ines by 1,4 per cent but mean 
household welfare (~L) falls by two per cent owing to greater 
risk bearing and reduced leisure time. 
Total are~ planted to cereals increases by 15 per cent, but 
total output only increases by 8,6 per cent as some of the 
expansion occurs in Region 2 where per hectare yields are low 
(and the model does not predict a switch to more land 
intensive methods of production). The long-run supply 
response elasticity for cereals is therefore estimated to be 
0,86. Although less than unity, this estimate is still higher 
than comparable estimates computed for most less developed 
countries (section 2.3, point b). However, it must be 
emphasised that the estimate is not necessarily a true 
reflection of the predicted supply elasticity as it relates 
to a single point on a stepped supply function for cereals. A 
larger price change could generate the same solution in which 
case the computed elasticity wou h i be lower than 0,86. 
Despite the relatively large supply response, cereal imports 
decl ine by less than three per cent (in quantity terms) and 
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Table 3.18 Effects of a ten per cent increase in the price 
of cereals (scenario 1). 
------------------------------------~------------------------
Particulars 
1 Household cash mean 
income (R) : range 




Wage workers 2 
Net wage remittances (R mill ion) 





3 Area under crops (Ha): 
Cereals - traditional 
Cereals - potential 
Legumes - traditional 
Legumes - potential 
Roots - trad~tional 





1552 - 2524 
1776 



















5 Sales between households (R mill ion): 
Roots 
6 Value of own crops consumed, at 





7 Total crop production costs, ~xcluding 
household labour (R mill ion) 












1522 - 2497 
1741 




























Household util ity is assumed to equal L. 
High income wage workers = 450372 
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the degree of self-sufficiency in cereals increases by only 
2,1 percentage points. This is similar to Martin/s (1988) 
estimate for Senegal. Experiments with the model indicated 
that cereals would not be produced for market purposes by any 
of the representative households unless producer prices 
increase by more than 50 per cent. 
Large areas of arable land remain uncultivated and there is 
no change in quantities of other crops produced (sugar-cane 
production is restricted by quotas). Crop sales do not 
increase and expend i ture- on marke t i npu ts is vir tua 11 y 
unchanged. This impl ies few additional income opportunities 
in agricultural service industries. To summarize, it is 
predicted that a ten per cent c.t.ris paribus increase in 
re ta i 1 and producer cereal pr ices will reduce average 
household welfare in rural KwaZulu and will do 1 ittle to 
raise the cereal ouput or self-sufficiency. Furthermore, 
1 eve 1 s of nu tr it i on will dec 1 i ne if the pr i ce increase 
reduces total household food consumption. 
3.3.2 Scenario 2: Input subsidies equal to a ten per cent 
reduction in non-labour crop production costs. 
Subsidization of farm inputs has been proposed as an 
instrument to stimulate agriculture in less developed regions 
(eg. Feder et a1., 1981). In this scenario, non-labour crop 
production costs are reduced by ten per cent in an attempt to 
simulate the effects of input subsidies. Predicted levels of 
Key activities are presented in Table 3.19. 
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Table 3.19 Effects of input subsidies equal to a ten per cent 
reduction in non-labour crop production costs 
(scenario 2). 
Particulars 
1 Household cash mean 
income (R) : range 





Net wage remittances (R mill ion) 





3 Area under crops (Ha): 
Cereals - traditional 
Cereals - potential 
Legumes - traditional 
Legumes - pote~tial 
Roots - traditional 





1552 - 2524 
1776 




















5 Sales between households (R mill ion): 
Roots 
6 Value of own crops consumed, at 





7 Total crop production costs, excluding 













1583 - 2554 
1796 

























8 Net value of crop production 




Household util ity is assumed to equal L. 
High income wage workers = 450372 
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It is predicted that the input subsidY would cost R8,1 
mill ion. Mean household income and welfare increase by 1,7 
and · one per cent respectively. Estimates reported by Singh 
et al. (1986:31) for four Asian countries suggest that a ten 
per cent reduction in fertil izer prices would raise real 
household income by amounts ranging from 0,3 to 1,1 per cent. 
The increase in mean household welfare is smaller than the 
corresponding increase in income as the money gains are 
partially offset by greater risk bearing and reduced leisure. 
Production of root · crops is unchanged but areas planted to 
cereals and legumes increase by 12,5 and 6,8 per cent 
respectively. These area changes translate into yield 
increases of 7,1 per cent for cereals and 16,4 per cent for 
legumes (there is a partial switch to more land intensive 
legume production). Sugar-cane production is unaf~ected owing 
to quota restrictions. Again, the estimated supply response 
elasticities for roots, cereals and legumes with respect to 
the cost of non-labour market inputs (0,00, 0,71 and 1,64 
respectively) should be interpreted with caution. Expenditure 
on food imports decl ines by 1,2 per cent and the degree of 
self-sufficiency in food increases by less than 1,5 
percentage points. 
Few income opportunities would be generated in agricultural 
service industries as quantities of crops and inputs 
marketed do not increase significantly. A large · area of 
arable land remains uncultivated. To summarize, it is 
predicted that a ten per cent ceteris paribus reduction in 
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d t · n costs wl·ll hav a vary 1 imited non-labour crop pro uc 10 q ~ 
effects on household welfare and crop production in rural 
KwaZulu. 
3.3.3 Scenario 3: Increased unemployment equal to a 13,5 per 
cent reduction in the number of wage worKers. 
To simulate the effects of increased off-farm unemployment 
(i .e. a decrease in expected net remittances), the number of 
on-farm worKers was increased by one half person in Type 2 
and Type 4 households. These households were selected as 
rising unemployment is expected to impact primarily on 
worKers in the 'low' wage category. The aggregate number of 
wage workers is estimated to decl ine by 13,5 per cent (Table 
3.20). 
Although mean household income and welfare only decl ine by 
8,7 and 9,8 per cent respectively, households worst affected 
by unemployment (approximately 30 per cent of all households 
considered) suffer corresponding income and welfare losses of 
20,0 and 24,4 per cent. Rising unemployment is therefore 
expected to result in considerable hardship for a large 
number of households in rural KwaZulu. Welfare losses exceed 
income losses owing to increased risK bearing. In households 
affec ted by unemp 1 oymen.t, the stock of on-farm labour 
expands, raising de facto consumption requirements and 
lowering the cost of family farm labour. As a result, there 
is a small increase i n total areas p 1 an ted to a 11 food crops 
and fallow land dec1 ines by 5,5 per cent in aggregate. 
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Table 3.20 Effects of a 13,5 per cent reduction in wage 
worKers (scenario 3). 
Particulars 
1 Household cash mean 






Net wage remittances (R mill ion) 





3 Area under crops (Ha): 
Cereals - traditional 
Cereals - potential 
Legumes - traditional 
Legumes - potential 
Roots - tradltional 





1552 - 2524 
1776 



















5 Sales between households (R mill ion): 
Roots 
6 Value of own crops consumed, at 





7 Total crop production costs, excluding 
household labour (R mi 11 ion) 












1241 - 2524 
1602 
























(4+5+6-7) (R mill ion) 59 2 60 . , , 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Notes 1 Househoid util ity is assumed to equal L. 
2 High income wage worKers = 450372 
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Despite a one per cent increase in the quantity of food 
produced, the degree of food s~lf-sufficiency decl ines as the 
volume of imported food rises by almost seven per cent. This 
outcome is not ent i reI y consi stent wi th the concl usi ons wh i ch 
Low draws from his analysis (section 2.1.4) as it suggests 
that food imports may also increase during periods of 
rising unemployment. Quantities of food marKeted In urban 
areas diminish but sales within rural areas increase by six 
per cent. Levels of marKet inputs used in crop production are 
virtually unchanged. 
In conclusion, it is predicted that a 13,5 per cent c.t.ri. 
p&ribu. reduction in the number of (low income) wage worKers 
will have a small positive impact on crop production and 
is liKely to have a significant adverse effect on the welfare 
(and possibly the nutritional status) of many households in 
rural KwaZulu. 
3.3.4 Scenario 4: 
production. 
Proposed deregulation of sugar-cane 
Recent proposals to deregulate the sugar-cane industry will 
increase the area available for sugar-cane production in 
KwaZulu by 30000 hectares (Bates, 1989; Le Roux, 1989). 
Deregulation is not expected to depress local cane prices 
owi ng to growth in marKet demand and the intended 
establ ishment of an ethanol-from-cane plant in South Africa 
(Bates, 1989). To test the impact of deregulation on rural 
households, the regional programming model was solved for an 
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additional 30000 hectares of sugar-cane. Predicted results 
are compared with the base solution in Table 3.21. 
Mean household income increases by 1,7 per cent but the 
income benefits accrue only to households in Region 1 where 
sugar-cane can be produced. At househol d 1 evel, the 
increase in farm income is not large enough to attract 
worKers from wage employment and the increase in crop 
production does not raise the cost of family labour by an 
amount sufficient to induce labour hiring. In Region 1, mean 
household income increases by nearly three per cent. Welfare 
gains are smaller owing to greater risK bearing and reduced 
leisure. 
Al though sugar-cane _product i on expands to its 1 imi t 1 evel , 
food production is hardly affected as the additional sugar-
cane is produced almost exclusively on land that was 
previously fallow. The area of fallow land decreases by 31,2 
per· cent in aggregate. Cereal output decl ines by 12,8 per 
cent but legume production is unaltered. Quantities of root 
crops produced and sold increase by 22,3 and 25,4 per cent 
respectively. Complementarity in the production of food crops 
(eg. roots) and non-food crops (eg. sugar-cane), has been 
observed in several African countries. Weber et al. (1988) 
conclude that this trend might be the result of increased 
access to i nfrastruc ture and i C'piJ ts accompany i ng the adop t i on 
of cash crops while the results of this exercise suggest that 
risK aversion may also encourage diversification into food 
crops. In sum, expenditure on food imports rises by 2,3 per 
117 
Table 3.21 The effects of deregulating sugar-cane production 
(scenario 4). 
Par ti cu I ar~ 
1 Household cash mean 
income (R) : range 





Net wage remittances (R mill ion) 





3 Area under crops (Ha): 
Cereals - traditional 
Cereals - potential 
Legumes - traditional 
Legumes - potential 
Roots - tradltional 





1552 - 2524 
1776 



















5 Sales between households (R mill ion): 
Root~ 
6 Value of own crops consumed, at 





7 Total crop production costs, excluding 












1552 - 2618 
1777 
























8 Net value of crop production 




Household uti1 ity is assumed to equal L. 
High income wage workers = 450372 
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cent and the degree of self-sufficiency in food falls by 2,4 
percentage points. 
Sugar-cane has been readily adopted by farm households in 
KwaZulu. It is generally recognised that owing to small farm 
sizes, the income benefits accruing to adopters are not 
sufficient to maKe full-time farming a viable proposition. 
However, few observers would doubt the success · of the 
industry in KwaZulu as its growth has generated significant 
employment and income opportunities in agricultural service 
industries (especially transport and land preparation). The 
results presented in Table 3.21 suggest that deregulation 
would create many additional income opportunities in local 
agri-business as the estimated increases in crop sales and 
expenditure on marKet inputs are 53,4 and 25,7 
respectively. -
per cent 
In conclusion, it is predicted that a 30000 hectare c.t.rls 
p~ribus increase in the area available for sugar-cane 
production will have a positive but small direct impact on 
average household welfare in rural KwaZulu, a negative but 
small impact on food self-sufficiency, and a large positive 
impact on sales, 
industries. 
input usage and employment in local service 
3.3.5 Scenario 5: A resticted land rental marKet. 
The model is not ~uited to predicting the effects of a land 
marKet as (a) fixed costs such as those associated with 
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information and management inputs, and potential marKet 
economies to be gained from the bulK purchase of variable 
inputs are captured by the optimum e., (b) potential 
diseconomies of size are not accounted for in the model, and 
(c) only two representative households are considered in each 
region. Furthermore, fodder crop activities that would most 
I iKely accompany farm growth in Region 2 are excluded from 
the model. In Region 1 the effects of a land marKet can be 
demonstrated to a I imited extent if it is assumed that rental 
arrangements are restricted to pairs of 





transactions because size economies are captured by the 
e. values. Table 3.22 summar·izes activi ty levels predicted 
for Region 1, with anQ without a restricted marKet for arable 
land, under conditions of increased unemployment (scenario 3) 
and increased sugar-cane production (scenario 4). 
Given these circumstances, it is pred i c ted that Type 2 
households would each rent 0,158 hectares from Type 1 
households. Mean household income is similar with and 
without a restricted land marKet as the cost of renting land 
borne by the lessee represents income to the lessor. The 
average welfare of both parties improves. Although lessors 
experience a decl ine in cash income (from R2612 to R2601 per 
annum), their welfare increases as the reduction in income is 
more than offset by reduced risK bearing .nd lower household 
time inputs in farming. 
The value of cereals produced for home consumption increases 
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Table 3.22 Effects of a restricted land rental marKet in 
Region 1 (scenario 5). 
Scenario 3 + Scenario 4 
Particulars without marKet with marKe t 
-------------------------------------------------------------









Net wage remittances (R mill ion) 





3 Area under crops (Ha): 
Cereals - traditional 
Cereals - potential 
Legumes - tradltional 
Legumes - potential 
Roots - traditional 




1344 - 2612 
1643 



















5 Value of own crops consumed, at 





6 Total crop production costs, excluding 










1395 - 2601 
1644 























7 Net value of crop production 





Household util ity is assumed to equal L. 
High income wage worKers = 271680 
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by 21,8 per cent and expenditure on cereal imports decl ines 
by 11,1 per cent. All fallow land is cultivated when land 
transac t ions are permitted. The degree of food self-
sufficiency in Region 1 rises by 5,6 percentage points. These 
changes are much larger than those predicted in previous 
scenarios and 
subsidies) or 
do not entai 1 treasury costs (eg. 
a reduction in household welfare (eg. 
input 
food 
price increases and rising unemployment). Sales of root crops 
increase by 4,7 per cent. By restricting land transactions to 
pairs of participants, the possibilty of individual farming 
operations expanding to a level where farm labour would be 
hired or household labour reallocated from off-farm to on-
farm worK was effectivelY precluded. Furthermore, the results 
understate the beneficial effects that a land marKet could 
have on service industries. 
In summary, the 1 and marKet consi dered benef its all types of 
households, vastly improves efficiency in crop production and 
promotes food self-sufficiency. 
122 
Policy r.comm.ndations to improv. agricultural inc.ntiv.s 
and hous.hold incom.s in rural KwaZulu 
In this chapter it is contended that distorted agricultural 
incentives are largely responsible for low levels of farm 
output and income observed in KwaZulu. Factors contributing 
to poor agr i cu I tura I i ncen t i ves are summar i zed and cer ta in 
pol icy measures deemed essential to improve the current 
situation are suggested. 
4.1 Crop production. 
Despite broad-based attempts by government and non-government 
organ i za t ions (NGO~s) to increase agricultural output 
(through extension services and farmer training, establ ishing 
and assisting farmer cooperatives and associations, 
facil itating access to marKet inputs, supplying improved 
seed, mobil izing rural savings and providing cheap credit, 
tractor services, roads, fencing and contouring), arable land 
is generally underuti I ized i'n rural KwaZulu (section 1.2.1>. 
It is evident that the mere availabil ity of new forms of 
capital (roads, irrigation etc.) and superior seeds, 
fer til i z e r s , pes tic i de s , information etc. is not sufficient 
to achieve large increases in food production. Farmers are 
calculating economic agents and will only employ resou~ces in 
a way that increases agricultural production if they have an 
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incentive to do so. Schultz (1978) defines the incentive to 
which fa~me~s ~espond as the economic info~mation that they 
use in calculating thei~ expected costs,including ~isKs, 
against the ~etu~ns they expect to ~eceive. 
4.1.1 P~oduct p~ices. 
The question has been asKed whethe~ it is ~eally necessa~y to 
develop ag~icultu~e in the South Af~ican homelands 
(B~ombe~ge~, 1988). The conventional a~gument holds that 
g~owth in pe~ capita food supply is a p~e~equisite fo~ 
economic development in less developed count~ies (LOC's). As 
- indust~ial- ization and u~banization p~oc.ed, the ~ate of 
inc~ease in u~ban dem~nd fo~ food tends to exceed the ~ate of 
u~ban employment because the income elasticity of demand fo~ 
food is ~elatively high in LOC's and the ~eal ea~nings of 
indust~ial wo~Ke~s a~e usually highe~ than those of 
ag~icultu~al wo~Ke~s. Consequently, if food suppl ies do not 
expand ~apidly, food p~ices a~e expected to ~ise and, since 
expenditu~e on food comp~ises a la~ge pa~t of total household 
expenditu~e in LOC's, employe~s will be fo~ced to concede 
wage inc~eases that a~e not ~elated to p~oductivity. The net 
outcome is a decl ine in the ~ate of indust~ial development as 
p~oflts and ~einvestment -fall (GhataK and Inge~sent, 1984). 
Of cou~se, food impo~ts could substitute fo~ domestic 
p~oduction. Fo~ a typical LOC, food impo~tation is conside~ed 
unwise as the ma~ginal oppo~tunity costs of domestic foo~ 
suppl ies are 'low' (because labou~ and land a~e the p~incipal 
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, 
farm inputs and agricultural workers have few alternative 
employment opportunities) whereas the opportunity costs of 
food imports are ~high~ (because they are consumed and 
therefore do not augment limited capital stocks). However, 
industrial growth in Natal and the rest of South Africa has 
created alternative employment opportunities for workers in 
rural KwaZulu and, historically, per capita food production 
in the Republ ic has increased primarily as a 'result of 
growth in the volume of food produced by commercial (White) 
agriculture (Nieuwoudt, 1983) . . Nevertheless, this does not 
imply that per capita consumption is necessarily increasing 
or that that food security will not be a problem in the 
future. Per capita consumption of luxury food Items such as 
beef, mutton, pork, . and fresh milk has decl ined since 1950 
(Nieuwoudt, 1986). Sen (1985) has argued convincingly that 
food entitlements are not only a function of per capita 
output but also of affordabil ity. like so many first world 
countries, government intervention in South African food 
markets has resulted in the overvaluation of certain food 
products on domestic markets. For example supplies of red 
meat and sugar-cane are restricted by quotas (Nieuwoudt, 
1986; Ortmann, 1985:49) and maize exports are subsidized 
( Brand Commission, 1988). Given the current set of 
circumstances prevailing in rural KwaZulu, a lower'ing of real 
food prices will benefit most households. A ceteris paribus 
, reduc t i on in the pr i ce of cerea 1 s wou 1 d tend to -produce 
effects opposite to those predicted in scenario 1 (section 
3.3.1>, i.e. an increase in mean household income and 
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welfare, a small decl ine in cereal production (the long-run 
'frictionless' supply response elasticity for cereals is 
estimated to b. 0,86) and a sl ight reduction in cereal self-
sufficiency. However, quantities of cereals consumed are 
expected to increase (Nieuwoudt and Vink estimate the overall 
own price elasticity of demand for maize for deficit and 
surplus producers to be -0,43) thereby improving levels of 
nutrition. In the less developed regions of Southern Africa, 
observed increases in agricultural output do not necessarily 
imply that development efforts have been successful as the 
increase could reflect rising food prices or worsening 
unemployment. In either case, many households would be left 
worse off in terms of income, risk bearing and possibly 
nutritional status. Food self-sufficiency may well decl ine in 
the event of rising off-farm unemployment (scenario 3, 
section 3.3). 
It has been suggested that removal of commodity price 
protection in South Africa might be detrimental to long term 
food production in the region (Pringle, 1987). Unfortunately, 
many of the current programmes cannot be justified on this 
basis. Whereas the bread subsidy encourages domestic wheat 
production and consumption, quotas effectively restrict 
production and export subsidies discourage local marketing. 
In South Africa, the bread subsidy can be justified on equity 
grounds as it involves a redistribution of income from 
/ 
(wealthier) taxpayers to consumers (including deficit 
producers), many of whom are poor. However, the latter 
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programmes penal ize local consumers in the sense that they 
must pay more for less and benefit a relativelY small number 
of commercial (White) farmers. Existing restrictions on 
fertil izer imports increase local production costs and 
therefore act as a disincentive to farmers. If future food 
secur i ty has motivated intervention in South Africa ... s 
agricultural marKets it is hard to reconcile recent cuts in 
the bread subsidY with the continued appl ication of quota 
schemes. 
Increased agricultural 9utput in KwaZulu and the other South 
African homelands could contribute to long-term food 
security in the country (by increasing household incomes and 
their food supply). To accompl ish this, appropriate producer 
Incentives are required. Higher producer prices are not 
expected to have a significant impact on product supply or 
household incomes in KwaZulu. It is estimated that producer 
prices for cereals would have to be increased by more than 50 
per cent to induce even a modest output response (scenario 1, 
section 3.3). Furthermore, raising farm-gate prices in 
KwaZulu above current levels would require subsidization as 
local buyers have ready access to (cheaper) food produced in 
South Africa. Apart from their cost impl ications, product 
subsi di es might prove to be i mprac tical from an 
administrative angle as it would be extremely difficult to 
pol ice rent seeKing on the part of commercial (White) 
farmers. Instead, it might be more instructive to consider 
the costs of crop production in rural KwaZulu. 
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4.1.2 Production costs. 
In section 2.1.4 it was noted that many households in rural 
KwaZulu have 1 ittle incentive to produce crops because they 
are able to procure food and income at lower cost by 
allocating better educated worKers to off-farm employment. 
Even for marginal wage worKers, the scope for part-time farm 
worK and management is 1 imited by inflexible worKing hours in 
wage employment and distance from job centres • . However, this 
alone does not explain why arable land is underutil ized in 
KwaZulu. It is contended that arable land is underutil ized 
because these households cannot rent land to others who would 
farm it. The results of scenario 5 (section 3.3) demonstrate 
that fallow land would be brought into production if it could 
be hired by households short of land, and that crop 
production would increase substantiallY. This analysis did 
not account for size economies that would be gained by 
spreading fixed costs associated with management, labour and 
information inputs over larger volumes of output, or by 
purchasing variable inputs in bulK. Consequently, a rental 
marKet for land would not only bring unutil ized land into 
production but would also improve incentives to crop the land 
more intensively. Empirical studies based on sample survey 
data gathered in various parts of KwaZulu indicate that both 
the adoption of farm technology and production of s~rpluses 
are positively correlated with farm size relative to family 
size and the renting or' borrowing of land (Kleynhans, 
Lyne, 1985; Nieuwoudt and VinK, 1988). 
1983; 
128 
4.1.3 Reducing average production costs in KwaZulu. 
Although the virtual absence of a land market has received 
scant attention in past years, publ ic funds intended for 
agricultural development in KwaZulu (the bulk of which are 
obtained from South African tax payers outside the region) 
have invariably been directed at reducing production costs on 
farms. For example, a significant share of government 
expenditure is directed at providing information services and 
infrastructure. It is interesting that the construction and 
upgrading of access roads not only lowers the cost of 
transporting market inputs and products but also serves to 
reduce the cost of purchasing food and of commuting to job 
centres and may therefore discourage farming. Either way, 
households stand to benefit from improvements to the 
transportation and communication systems. Although most 
programmes are broad-crased, irrigation schemes have been 
establ ished in some areas. Users benefit from subsidized 
irrigation water as establ ishment costs are at best only 
partially recovered. A 1 imited amount of subsidized credit is 
made available to farmers by the KFC. The usual criticism 
that the ben_fits of cheap credit accrue mainly to farmers 
with large land holdings may not be that relevant in KwaZulu 
as the range of farm sizes is small. Nieuwoudt and Vink 
(1988) emphasise the point that poorer households in KwaZulu 
often lack collateral to borrow (partly because there are 
titles to land) and may underinvest in agriculture due 
no 
to 
1 iquidity constraints. Their conclusion that subidized credit 
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is unl iKely to have an adverse effect on equity is supported 
by the resu 1 ts of scenar i 0 2 (sec t ion 3.3.2). However, these 
results also demonstrate that household incomes and crop 
production are not very responsive to changes in production 
costs. The long-run ' frictionless' supply response for 
cereals with respect to the cost of non-labour inputs is 
estimated to be 0,71. A one per cent change in production 
costs is estimated to change mean household income by only 
0,10 per cent. 
The obvious conclusion to be dr~wn from the foregoing 
paragraphs is that an expansion of farm sizes could improve 
the incentive to farm by reducing average production costs 
and by raising potential returns to innovation, information, 
infrastructure and subsidized credit (Welch, 1978). The 
question is whether farm sizes can be increased without 
detracting from equity. Although a land marKet would enable 
consol idation of farms it is argued that "the poor have a 
desperate and immedi ate need for money, and sur"v i val's 
urgency can drive them to sellout for cash even against 
their own better judgement and to their future regret" 
(Cross, 1987:431). In other words, a minori ty of el i te 
famil ies able to mobilize cash are 1 iKely to capture the 
benefits of a land marKet wh i 1 e poorer households could be 
forced into tenancy or urban poverty. This is a val id 
argument if permanent usufruct rights are traded on the land 
marKet. However, the ' 1 andl ess class' problem does not ar" i se 
in a rental marKet. In fact, a case for land rental can be 
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argued not only in terms of improved efficiency but also in 
terms of improved equity. Since rental arrangements are 
voluntary, all participants benefit. Lessors would gain 
income and households short of land for subsistence or 
commercial cropping purposes (particularly those with 1 imited 
off-farm wage earning capacity) would be able to access 
additional land without diver t i ng worK i ng cap i tal into 1 and 
purchase. Furthermore, employment opportunities would be 
created in agriculture and its service industries owing to 
increased derived demand for inputs and greater sales. 
Although stocKowners could lose if the marKet raises the 
opportun I ty cost of arable land used for grazing, 
overstocKing and . its associated social cost will diminish. 
A ren ta 1 mark. t for agr i cu 1 tura 1 1 and will not requ i re 1 and 
survey and registration of title as recommended by Barnes 
(1988:285-287). In this regard, a sufficient condition is 
that households acKnowledge the boundaries of existing 
allotments. In areas where the tribal tenure system has not 
been modified by betterment planning, most households can 
identify the boundaries of their total land allotment. This 
has been clearly demonstrated in areas where households have 
establ ished sugar-cane and timber on land that previously 
constituted communal grazing. In areas that were betterment 
planned, households are only able to identify the boundaries 
of their arable land. Betterment planning involved the 
consol idation of tribal land allotments, and a redistribution 
of sites considered suitable for residential and arable 
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purpose with the balance of the tribal ward zoned as communal 
grazing. In effect betterment planning, which was implemented 
in 69 of KwaZulu's 246 rural tribal wards (Cunningham, 1989), 
removed existing property rights to grazing land. As a 
result, households in these wards are not in a position to 
establ ish timber on non-arable land (Stewart, 1989) and a 
rental marKet for this land would first require that the 
commonage be reallocated. 
Where farm boundaries are acKnowledged, land rental for 
cropping purposes could be encouraged by minimizing the risK 
that potential lessors bear of losing their right to land and 
the economic benefits conferred by this right. This would 
require institutional change. For example, written contracts 
between lessees and lessors (specifying the land to be rented 
and the contractual period) endorsed by the local chief . and 
held in trust by an independent arbitrator (LIMA Rural 
Development Foundation) have facil itated rental transactions 
on irrigated land in the Umzumbe district of KwaZulu 
(Stewart, 1989). Contracts of this nature are supported by 
the KwaZulu Land Bill proposed in 1988. Existing govern~ent 
institutions could assume responsibil ity for holding and 
enforcing land rental contracts and should taKe a more active 
role in disseminating information about procedures. 
Furthermore, local authorities could be encouraged to endorse 
rental contracts between residents by allowing them to tax 
land rentals to fund publ ic services and infrastructure 
required within the tribal ward. Successful appl icants 
132 
granted farms /released/ to KwaZulu from Natal should be 
allowed to sublet portions or all of their land for farming 
purposes as there is no guarantee that individuals who are 
allocated land will always want to farm it. The same argument 
can be appl ied to plots of irrigat.d land allocated to 
succ.ssful applicants. Zoning of land for agricultural and 
residential purposes may be desirable regardless of whether 
these recommendations are accepted or not. Although the land 
marKet transactions considered in this study are confined to 
arrangements between households within KwaZulu, there are no 
economic or equity arguments to support legislation which 
prevents Black farmers from renting or purchasing title to 
agricultural land in ,South Africa. 
4.2 LivestocK production. 
In section 2.2 it was emphasised that possible solutions to 
the overstocKing problem depend upon whether or not access 
to communal grazing resources is open or restricted. If 
access is unrestricted, solutions include privatization of 
grazing land, a restructuring of the tax base and the 
imposition of fixed or transferable quotas. Where it is 
establ ished that access is restricted to a specific group of 
graziers (the evidence provided in section 2.2.2 suggests 
that cases of restricted access are rare), institutional 
solutions may be feasl· ble. If " t overgrazing IS no a problem 
intervention may be unnecessary. Otherwise, strategies which 
reduce the cost of group participation (eg. administrative 
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assistance) and which increase the flow of information 
relating range qual ity to animal production may foster the 
level of group cooperation needed to induce stocK reduction. 
However, only privatization of grazing land offers economic 
solutions to both the overstocKing and low incentive problems 
(sectipn 2.2.2). In its simplest form, privatization would 
merely remove free access to land allocated to, but not 
cultivated by, other households. To some extent this would 
internal ize the cost of resource degradation (reduced future 
stocKing rates) on land controlled by stocKowners. The 
private costs of Keeping cattle will also increase if 
stocKowners compete to rent grazing land controlled by non-
stocKowner~. In this case, income would be transferred from 
(wealthier) stocKowne~s to other (less fortunate) households. 
Empirical results presented in section 2.2.1 support the 
economic argument that an increase in the private costs of 
Keeping 1 ivestocK relative to their perceived benefits will 
reduce stocKing rates. If privatization involved freehold 
titles that could be sold or inherited, the cost of resource 
degradation would be internal ized more fully and It is 
possible that land might replace cattle as the desired store 
of wealth (i .e. a reduction in the value attached to cattle). 
LiKewise, the introduction of profitable farm enterprises 
such as sugarcane and timber has not only raised the 
opportunity 
provided 
cost of land used for grazing but has also 
stocKowners with alternative investment 
opportunities. The pol icy approach should be to encourage 
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privatization in those areas where it is more acceptable to 
households. There is a definite need for information about 
the degree of acc~ss to grazing resources and attitudes to 
privatization and rental arrangements. It is interesting that 
the concept of privatizing grazing land was favourably 
received by almost one half of rural households sampled in 
KwaZulu's Hlanganani district (Naledzani et al., 1989). 
4.3 Urbanization. 
Ultimately, it is desirable that will ing farmers in KwaZulu 
should be allowed to acquire freehold title to rented land as 
owners tend to have longer planning horizons than tenants 
wi th short-term 1. eases on agricultural resources. 
Consequently, freehold farmers have more incentive to invest 
in long-term improvements and are less incl ined 
over uti liz e 
land rental 
their land and grazing than tenant 






opportunity to establ ish themselves as farmers or non-farmers 
without exposing themselves to the possible dangers of 
freehold title and is therefore a necessary step toward 
freehold title. Rental arrangements will also ~ssist in the 
formal ization of farm boundaries. However it is unl ikely that 
lessors will be inclined to Qispose of their rural land 
rights while certain benefits of ownership conferred by 
tribal tenure are essential to their wellbeing and are either 
more expensive or unobta i nable elsewhere. 
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Rural households that are essentially displaced urban 
entities may be more wi1l Ing to part with their allotments if 
they could acquire property rights In closer settlements 
where other (time-saving) incentives to relocate such as 
reticulated water, electricity and improved roads could be 
provided at much lower per capita cost than in rural areas. 
It is recommended that households should be allowed to 
exchange their residential rights in rural areas for freehold 
residential rights in closer settlements (eg. rural service 
centres). After relocating, these households could continue 
to lease 
entrepreneurs 
their agricultural land to 
within and outside the region 
farmers. If 
could purchase 
property rights in rural service centres, a major constraint 
to private sector Investment in rural KwaZulu would be 
removed. Local business growth would reduce income leakages 
out of the region, create employment opportunities and 
generate revenue for -publ ic services and infrastructure. 
Concentrating serviies and infrastructure (eg. electricity, 
rural schools and cl inics) at service centres rather than 
attempting to meet the needs of a widely dispersed population 
would not only be cheaper but would also serve to encourage 
rather than discourage households from relocating and 
ultimately surrendering their rural land rights. 
A c.t.rls paribus increase in off-farm employment (or welfare 
transfers) is expected to produce results opposite to those 
predicted in scenario 3, section 3.3, i.e. improved household 
incomes but reduced agr· icultural output. However, ar. increase 
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in off-farm incomes coupled with urbanization incentives and 
a land marKet will reduce non-farmer dependence on rural land 
rights, facil itate farm consol idation, and improve both 
farm~r .nd non-farmer Incomes. Results of research conducted 
by ,Fairlamb and Nleuwoudt (1989) show that family sizes are 
significantly smaller in KwaZulu's urban settlements than In 
the rural areas. Their econometric analysis Indicates that 
family size is inversely related to the opportunity cost of 
the wife's time in child rearing (which increases with her 
education and access to wage employment opportunities) and 
positively correlated with the need for child help in 
performing household chores such as collecting firewood and 
water (this need is greater in rural areas). The effect of 
husband's income (~easured in terms of his level of 
education) on family size was found to be non-significant. 
Pol icy recommendations aimed at reducing rapid population 
growth (section 1.2.3) and its negative effects on 
development are therefore consistent with those required for 
farm consol idation; viz., increased access to employment 
opportunities through greater investment in human capital 
(eg. the inclusion of vocat i onal training options in school 
curricula and sKills training for adults),job creation and 
the provision of time-saving technologies 1 iKe electricity 
and reticulated water. 
The commercial (White) agriculture, domestic servant and 
informal sectors of South Africa's economy are important 
sources of employment for women in KwaZulu (Krige, 1988; 
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Nattrass and May, 1986; Stewart, 1986:44). Consequently, it 
is of concern that BlacK employment levels in commercial 
agriculture sector have diminished by almost one half mill ion 
worKers between 1971 and 1985. Van Zyl and VinK (1988) 
attribute part of this decl ine to tax concessions on farm 
machinery purchases and to subsidized interest rates. If 
commercial farmers are to be afforded tax concessions, the 
emphasis ought to be shifted from capital to labour (eg. 
larger tax deductions for housing and training farm labour). 
Additional employment opportunities for domestic workers 
would probably be created if some part of the tax cuts 
recently proposed in South Africa were achieved through tax 
concessions on servants~ wages. Revision of cumbersome 
procedures to obtatn hawKers 1 icences and · legislation 
controll ing the sale of produce by BlacKs in ;White areas; 
(Lyster, 1987:36 and 173) could lower transactions costs and 
promote employment in the informal sector. In closing, it 
should be noted that comprehensive financial incentives were 
introduced by the South African government in 1982 to 
stimulate industrial development in and around its homelands. 
However, i t is estimated that unti 1 1985 when 
Environmental Planning Act of 1987 was repealed, 
the 
this 
decentral ization programme had only created some 100000 
employment opportunities on the ~periphery' whereas the Act 
had effectively prevented the creation of approximately 
220000 new jobs in metropol itan centres. Furthermore, it is 
claimed that the opportunity costs of this transfer of jobs 
were so high that the expenses for each job created 
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decentrally could have f i nanced two to five times more 
employment opportunities in metropol itan centres (Halbach, 
1988). 
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This section summarizes the (two) main conclusions drawn from 
the study. Pol icy impl ications and recommendations are 
detailed in Chapter 4. 
Firstly, it is concluded that arable land would be farmed 
more efficiently in KwaZulu if land could be rented. Many 
households have 1 ittle incentive to produce crops as farms 
are small and the opportunity cost of their labour is high. 
Small farm sizes~it potential returns to innovation, 
to higher product prices, and to programmes aimed at reducing 
crop production costs. Long-run food supply is estimated to 
be inelastic with respect to changes in product and input 
prices. It is anticipated that higher food prices will harm 
the vast majority of rural households and that lower input 
prices will do 1 ittle to improve household welfare. 
Conversely, it is expected that a rental marKet for arable 
land will have a substantial impact on crop production and 
could generate significant income opportunities in 
agriculture and its service industries. A land rental marKet 
also has equity advantages and avoids the ~landless class~ 
problem. Minor institutional changes are required to 
facil itate land rental arrangements. 
Secondly, it is concluded that stocKowners would be less 
incl ined to overutil ize grazing and more incl ined to improve 
pasture and herd qual ity if grazing land were privately owned 
(even in the limited sense that arable land is privately 
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controlled). It is estimated that an increase in the private 
cost of Keeping cattle relative to their perceived benefits 
would reduce stocking rates in KwaZulu. Other 'solutions' to 
the common property problem could reduce overstocKing and its 
associated social cost, but are unl ikely to result in 
improved pasture and herd qual ity. From an equity point of 
view, privatization of grazing land is expected to penal ize 
stockowners (unless land replaces cattle as the desired store 
of wealth) but other (less fortunate) households stand to 
benefit if grazing resources are rented. Institutional 
changes are required to effect privatization. These changes 
may be more acceptable in areas where the tribal land tenure 
system was not modified by betterment planning. 
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Summary 
KwaZulu is a less developed region of South Africa. The 
problem of widespread rural poverty is compounded 
population growth and low agricultural incomes. 




to assist farm.rs, arable land is underutil ized. Conversely 
grazing land is overutil ized. It is contended that these 
inefficiencies reflect distorted agricultural incentives. The 
object of the study is to identify the distortions, to 
predict the effects of changing incentives on resource 
allocation, and to maKe recomendations aimed at improving 
household welfare in KwaZulu. 
Although the KwaZulu Government has legislative powers over 
taxation within the territory, approximately 75 per cent of 
its revenue is obtained as transfers from the South African 
central government • . Almost two thirds of KwaZulu~s arable 
land is classified as having high cropping potential yet more 
than 20 per cent is left fallow. Crop yields are considerably 
lower than those observed on neighbouring commercial (White) 
farms and food staples account for the bulK of the area 
cultivated. Farm sizes are uniformly small. Sample survey 
data indicate that some 80 per cent of rural households have 
holdings less than two hectares in extent. 
Households do not have freehold title to their farms. Tenure 
is secured by demonstrating some use of the land. Land rights 
afforded by tribal tenure are important to rural households 
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a5 they produce a stream of benefits, security in particular, 
that are often unobtainable or more expensive to acquire 
elsewhere. Households 
their allotment which 
have private access to those parts of 
they cultivate but uncultivated 
port ions are regarded as common property for grazing 
purposes. Tribal land tenure prevents the sale of land and 
has also precluded an active rental marKet for agricultural 
land owing to resistance from stocKowners and, more 
importantly, the perception that land rights may be 
jeopardized by leasing land. 
Approximately 75 per cent of KwaZulu's de facto population 
res ide in rural areas. It is proj ec ted that the rura 1 
population will grow at an average rate of nearly 2,5 per 
cent per annum during the next decade. A striKing feature of 
rural households is the outmigration of worKers, particularly 
better educated males, to off-farm wage employment. Sample 
surveys conducted in rural areas indicate that approximately 
40 per cent of all household adults are engaged in off-farm 
wage employment and that levels of unemployment reported by 
households are high. 
Poverty is widespread as evidenced by poor access to health 
services, low levels of education and very low household 
incomes. Farm income generally accounts for less than ten per 
cent of household income and, at an aggregate level, there 
appears to be an inverse relationship between off-farm 
remittance earnings and per capita food production. The vast 
majority of rural households are deficit food producers. 
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Sample ~stimates suggest that the average household imports 
one half of its staple food requirements and that food 
purchases account for roughly 40 per cent of its total 
expenditure. 
It is estimated that some 40 per cent of rural households do 
not own cattle (often regarded as a store of wealth). The 
mean herd size is 3,6 head in areas better suited to cropping 
and 7,6 head in areas more suited to ranching. StocKing and 
herd mortal ity rates are nearly double those recorded on 
privately owned farms in Natal. Herd offtaKe in Natal is five 
times higher than in KwaZulu. 
The under-ut i 1 i zat i on of arabl eland in KwaZul u can be 
attributed largely to economic and institutional factors. 
From a household economics perspective it is predicted that 
households will allocate worKers to wage employment if 
expected net returns in wage worK exceed those in farm worK. 
Over time, popul at i on growth has r'educed farm si zes in 
KwaZulu because households have an incentive to retain their 
rural land rights. On the other hand, expected off-farm 
earnings have increased. As a result, the average cost of -
producing crops has increased relative to purchase and 
sell ing prices which are determined on much larger marKets in 
South Africa. Since wage employment opportunities provide 
many households with a cheaper means of procuring food and 
income than farming, labour is diverted from cr'op production. 
In short, most households have 1 ittle incentive to farm their 
arable land intensively and large areas are left fallow 
because land cannot be rented by those who would farm it. 
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This outcome I~ consistent with observations in KwaZulu and 
explains the preference which households exhibit for time-
saving rather than land-augmenting technology. It is 
concluded that changes in wage remittances, product and input 
prices, and institutional factors preventing land rental will 
have some influence on household resource allocation and 
welfare. 
responses 
The extent (and perhaps the direction) of output 
to changes in these factors will be influenced by 
their effect on household leisure consumption, farm wages and 
household liquidity, and by risk considerations, substitution 
in demand and production, resource constraints, technology 
options and indivisible labour inputs. 
An attempt was made to quantify aggregate crop production 
responses using a mathematical programming model. This 
aggregate model was constructed from four representative 
household programming models and captured some measure of the 
effects of income 
su bs tit uti on ( through 
seasonal production, 
risk, leisure preferences, input 
alternative technology 
and lumpy labour inputs 
options), 
(integer 
activities) on household resource allocation. Two household 
types were identified in a sample drawn from a region of high 
cropping potential (Region 1) using a clustering technique to 
separate sample households into groups with similar human 
resource proportions. A representative household was 
synthesized for each household type from the group means. 
Likewise, two representat i ve households were identified in a 
region of low cropping potent i al (Region 2). 
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In order to cluster the sample households according to their 
relative human resource endowments, 'offer' wage rates had to 
be estimated for all household worKers not wage employed. 
Sample selectivity bias which may arise when the offer wage 
model is estimated using OLS regression was avoided by 
including the 'intensity ratio' as an additional explanatory 
variable. Estimates of the intensity ratio were computed from 
the results of probit models analysing the decision to engage 
in off-farm employment. An interesting by-product of these 
procedures was the prediction that an extra year of formal 
school ing adds approximately eight per cent to the monthly 
wage of men and 11 per cent to the monthly wage of women. 
Several decision criteria were tested in the household 
programming models (including the maximin and minimax 
criteria and a 'sumex' util ity function) but the E,L 
criterion provided the best fit between predicted and 
observed activity levels. 'RisK aversion' coefficients were 
estimated independently for each representative household. 
These estimates were substituted into the aggregate model. 
Despite stringent assumptions employed in extrapolating from 
a 1 imited data base to a region covering most of rural 
Kwa2u 1 u, en terpr i se I eve 1 s pred i c ted by the mode I compar·ed 
favourably with census estimates. Responses predicted by the 
model compl ied with expectations and provided insight into 
other issues. The predicted 'frictionless' responses can be 
summarized as follows: 
(a) A ten per cent increase in retail and producer cereal 
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prices (maize is the most important food crop produced in 
KwaZulu) reduces average household welfare by two per 
cent. Cereal output rises by 8,6 per cent implying a 
long-run supply response elasticity of 0,86. The volume 
of cereals imported d.cl ines by less than three per cent 
and the degree of self-sufficiency in cereals increases 
by only 2,1 percentage points. Large areas of arable land 
remain uncultivated. These estimates support findings in 
other ~eveloping countries. 
(b) Input subsidies equivalent to a ten per cent reduction in 
non-labour production costs would cost R8,1 mill .ion rand 
but would only improve average household welfare by one 
per cent. This estimate is similar to those computed for 
several Asian countries. Cereal production increases by 
7,1 per cent implying a long-run supply response 
elasticity of 0,71. Expenditure on food imports decl ines 
by 1,2 per cent and the degree of self-sufficiency in 
food increases by less than 1,5 percentage points. Large 
areas of arable land remain uncultivated. 
(c) Increased off-farm unemployment, equal to a 13,5 per cent 
reduction in the number of /low/ income wage worKers, 
reduces average household welfare by 9,8 per cent. Mean 
welfare falls by 24,4 per cent amongst households worst 
affected (30 per cent of all households) by the given 
increase in unemployment. Total food production increases 
by one per cent and the area of fallow land decl ines by 
5,5 per cent in aggregate. The degree of food self-
147 
sufficiency worsens as the volume of food imported rises 
by almost seven per cent. 
<d) Proposals to relax quotas restricting the area of sugar-
cane 
by 
planted in KwaZulu will allow production to 
30000 hectares. Under these conditions, 
expand 
it is 
predicted that sugar-cane production will expand to its 
limit level <75000 Ha) and that mean household income 
will rise by three per cent in areas where the crop can 
be grown. Food production is hardly affected as the 
additional sugar-c~ne is produced on land that was 
previously fallow. Production of root crops increases as 
these crops offset income risK associated with sugar-
cane. The area of fallow land decl ines by 31,2 per cent 
in aggregate. It is anticipated that deregulation would 
generate significant income opportunities in local agri-
business as crop sales and expenditure on marKet inputs 
are estimated to increase by 53,4 and 25,7 per cent 
respectively. 
(e) A rental marKet for arable land <restricted to pairs of 
participating households in Region 1) improves the 
welfare of all participants and arable land is fully 
util ized. The value of cereals produced in Region 1 
increases by 21,8 per cent and cereal imports decl ine by 
11,1 per cent. The degree of food self-sufficiency rises 
by 5,6 percentage points. This analysis ignores potential 
gains resulting from size economies. It is anticipated 
that a rental marlet for land could create significant 
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income opportunities in agriculture and its service 
industries. 
The overutil ization of grazing resources can also be 
attributed to economic and institutional factors. When access 
to a common grazing resource is unrestricted, stocKing rates 
are determined largely by (a) the qual ity of the pasture and 
(b) the private cost of Keeping cattle relative to their 
perceived benefits. The available evid.nce indicates that 
access to communal grazing is not restricted in KwaZulu and a 
regression analysis of variables influencing aggregate herd 
size supported the notion that stocKing rates are sensitive 
to relative changes in the private cost and perceived 
benefits of Keeping cattle. Privatization of grazing land 
(even in the 1 imited sense of removing free access to land 
allocated to, but not cultivated by, other households) would 
internal ize the cost of resource degradation on land 
controlled by stocKowners. The private costs of Keeping 
cattle would also increase if stocKowners compete to rent 
land controll ed by non-stoc\(owners. Further·more, pr i vat i za-
tion will reduce the perceived benefits of owning cattle if 
land replaces stocK as the desired form of wealth. Although 
stocK reduction could also be achieved by imposing quotas and 
taxes on cattle (or by means of institutional rules where 
access to commonage is restricted to a group of stocKowners), 
only privatization will improve incentives to upgrade herd 
and pasture qual ity. Consequently, it is recommended that 
privatization of grazing land should be encouraged in areas 
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where it is more acceptabl e to househol ds. Rental income wi 11 
most 1 ikely transfer from (wealthier) stockowners to other 
(less fortunate) households and the social cost of 
overgrazing will fall. 
Pol icy recommendations aimed at improving the efficiency of 
arable land util ization and rural household welfare centre on 
ways of reducing average crop production costs. Raising 
producer prices in KwaZulu would have 1 ittle impact on food 
production <the model predicts that producer prices for 
cereals would have to increase by 50 per cent to induce an 
output response) and would require subsidization as consumers 
have ready access to (cheaper) food produced in South Africa. 
Existing programmes are generally aimed at lowering 
production costs but have had 1 ittle impact on crop 
production in KwaZulu because the potential benefits of these 
programmes are 1 imited by small farm sizes. The model 
predicts that the long-run supply response for cereals with 
respect to the cost of non-labour inputs is inelastic and 
that a one per cent change in production costs will change 
household income by only 0,1 per cent. A rental market for 
land would bring fallow land into production as some 
households are short of land. Furthermore, the resulting size 
economies would improve farmer incentives to crop the land 
more intensively. In this case, existing programmes would 
have a greater impact on farm output and farmers would be 
more incl ined to adopt new technology. A case for land rental 
can also be argued in terms of equity. Trading temporary use 
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rights would not result in a landless class and, since 
renting is voluntary, must improve household welfare. A 
rental marKet would not require land survey and registration 
of title but it would require that hou~eholds acKnowledge the 
boundaries of their tribal land allotments. To activate the 
marKet, the risK that potential lessors bear of losing their 
right to land would have to be el iminated. This calls for 
institutional change. 
In the long-term, consol idation of land in the hands of 
freehold farmers will improve efficiency in agriculture. A 
rental marKet will facil itate this process but the extent to 
which non-farming households depend upon rural land rights 
must be minimized. For example, households should be allowed 
to exchange their residential rights in rural areas for 
freehold residential rights in service centres. Time-saving 
services sought by households engaged primarily in wage 
employment (eg. reticulated water, electricity and improved 
roads) should be concentrated in service centres. This would 
lower the per capita cost of providing services and would 
also provide an incentive for non-farming households to 
relocate. It has been shown that famil ies residing in 
KwaZulu1s urban areas tend to be smaller than those residing 
in rural areas owing to higher levels of female participation 
in wage employment and a reduced need for child help. 
Urbanization and improved access to wage marK~ts could dampen 
population growth and promote farm consol idation. It is 
recommended that sKills training be given priority in 
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education programmes and that pol icies constraining growth in 
wage employment opportunities b. reviewed. 
The two principle conclusions drawn from this study are (a) 
that arable land would be farmed more efficiently in KwaZulu 
if land could be rented, and (b) that stocKowners would be 
less incl ined to overutil ize grazing and more incl ined to 
improve pasture and herd qual ity if grazing land were 
privately . owned (even in the 1 imited sense that arable land 
is privately controlled). 
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Bioclimatic group. in KwaZulu 
Table A.l Important featu~es of Natal~s blocl Imatic 9~oups. 
G~oup % of Mean annual Ave~age mean Majo~ d~yland 
ente~p~ises numbe~ KwaZulu ~ainfall (mm) temp. (·C) 
1 14,8 1000 22-23 Suga~-cane 
2 17,7 850-1300 18-20 Suga~-cane 
3 2,2 800-1600 16-18 Mai z~ 
4 5,9 800-1500 13-15 Mai ze 
6 5,1 800-1000 16-18 Mal ze 
Beef 
7 1 ,4 700-800 17-18 Beef 
8 12,6 715 16-18 Mai ze 
Beef 
9 10,7 700-850 21-22 Beef 
10 29,3 600-700 21-22 Beef 
1 1 0,3 320-600 18-23 Beef 
-----------------------~-----------------------------------
Sou~ce Depa~tment of C~op Science (1978); Tho~~ington-Smith 
et a 1 • (1978). 
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Data sources: Appendix C, Table C.3; Auerbach (1989); Bates 
(1988); Central Statisitical Services (1987); Directorate 
Agricultural Economic Trends (1974-1983 and 1989); 
Directorate Agricultural Production Economics (1985); Ilaco 
BV (1981); Frean (1988); Lyster (1987); Mel is (1988); Rogers 
(1982); Stewart (1989); Stewart and Lyne (1988). 
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T bl 8 1 1 R""'gl'on 1: Cereals (traditional) : Estimates of a e •• .... 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 











1974 1,33 303,80 404,84 74,60 ~~~ 
1975 . 1,41 281,17 395,38 65,14 ~' 
1976 0,44 308,92 136,86 -193,38 
1977 1,42 339,59 481,49 151,25 
1978 1,10 349,52 384,69 54,45 
1979 0,64 371,51 236,65 -93,59 
1980 0,71 375,00 264,71 -65,52 
1981 1,44 335,86 483,48 153,25 
1982 0,79 349,61 275,22 -55,02 











Note 1 C.V. = Percentage coefficient of variation of mean. 
Table 8.1.2 Region 1: Cereals (traditional) Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Particulars 
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (18 I<g) 















Sep t. - Nov. 
Dec. - Feb. 
March - May 








T ble 8 2 1 RegJ' on 1·. Cereals (potential): Estimates of a • • 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 











1974 5,37 303,80 1632,90 450,33 ~ 1'S; 
1975 5,73 281 ,17 1611,19 428,61 \J~ 
1976 0,74 308,92 228,48 -954,09 
"""-
1977 5,79 339,59 1967,30 784,72 L-\ <;0 }, \ 
1978 4,17 349,52 1457,63 275,06 ~'I; 
1979 1 ,75 371,51 651 ,12 -531,45 \\ 
1980 2,02 375,00 756,28 -426,30 
1981 5,92 335,86 1989,54 806,96 
1982 2,45 349,61 855,32 -327,25 
1983 1 ,97 342,73 676,00 -506,58 
Mean 3,59 335,77 1182,58 0,00 
C.V j 17,68 2,80 16,60 
~7--~~~~--~A-~-~-·(:;---;;; ~-------------------~,-----------
Table 8.2.2 Region 1: 
produc t i'on 
Cereals (potential): Estimated 
costs, excluding 'labour (1985). 
Pa.rticula.rs 
Contract ploughing 
Seed (20 Kg) 
Fertil izer (600 Kg 























Sep t. - Nov. 
Dec. - Feb. 
March - May 








Table 8.3.1 Region 1: Legumes (traditional): Estimates of 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and · deviations from mean revenue 
(1985=100). 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Year Yield Price Revenue Deviations 
(Kg/Ha) ( R/Kg) (R/Ha) (R/Ha) 
----------------------------- --------------------------------
1974 429 2,51 1078,29 211,94 
1975 484 2,42 1170,34 303,99 
1976 200 3,07 613,68 -252,66 
1977 476 2,74 1304,70 438,35 
1978 310 1 ,96 605,57 -260,78 
1979 402 2,00 804,25 -62,10 
1980 200 2,43 486,87 -379,48 
1981 419 2,75 1152,61 286,26 
1982 446 1 ,97 878,01 11 ,67 
1983 200 2,85 569,17 -297,18 . 
Mean 357 2,47 866,35 0,00 
C.V. 10,47 5,03 10,74 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.3.2 Region .1: Legumes (traditional): Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
Particulars 
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (70 Kg) 








Table 8.3.3 Region 1: Legumes (traditional): 
labour requirements. 


















Table B.4.1 Region 1: Legumes (potenti~l): Estimates of 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 
( 1985= 100) • 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Year Yield Price Revenue Deviations 
(Kg/Ha) (R/Kg) (R/Ha) (R/Ha) 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1974 1710 1 ,88 3212,36 1048,68 
1975 1986 1 ,81 3592,72 1429,24 
1976 100 2,30 229,52 -1934,16 
1977 1948 2,05 3992,82 1829,13 
1978 1105 1,46 1617,10 -546,58 
1979 1570 1 ,50 2351,47 187,79 
1980 200 1 ,82 363,60 -1800,08 
1981 1661 2,06 3418,16 1254,48 
1982 1797 1 ,47 2645,99 482,31 
1983 100 2,13 212,87 -1950,81 
Mean 1218 1 ,85 2163,68 0,00 
C.V. 20,43 5,03 21,47 
------------------------------------------------------~------
Table B.4.2 Region ,1: Legumes (potential): Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
Particulars 
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (50 Kg) 
Ferti 1 izer 













Sept. - Nov. 
Dec. - Feb. 
March - May 







T bl 8 =1 Reg/'on 1: Roots (traditional): Estimates of a e .-.1. 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 












1974 6,33 154,22 976,98 -22,28 
1975 1,25 244,94 307,00 -692,26 
1976 6,01 223,71 1344,64 345,38 
1977 6,35 192,38 1222,46 223,20 
1978 5,44 234,55 1276,99 277,73 
1979 2,87 147,24 423,00 -576,26 
1980 5,55 192,48 1067,35 68,09 
1981 4,48 184,00 824,36 :"'174,90 
1982 6,18 178,00 1100,84 101,58 
1983 5,52 262,73 1448,98 449,72 
Mean 5,00 201 ,42 999,26 0,00 
C.V. 10,68 6,06 12,05 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.5.2 Region 1: Roots (traditional): Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
Particulars 
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (1500 Kg) 



























T bl 8 6 1 Ragl'on 1: Roots (potential): Estimates of a e •• "'" 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 











1974 19,22 154,22 2963,43 355,04 
1975 . 0,00 244,94 0,00 -2608,39 
1976 17,62 223,71 3941 ,10 1332,72 
1977 19,33 192,38 3718,03 1109,64 
1978 14,69 234,55 3445,67 837,28 
1979 1 ,30 147,24 191,02 -2417,36 
1980 14,97 192,48 2880,55 272,16 
1981 9,68 184,00 1780,91 -827,48 
1982 18,39 178,00 3273,57 665,18 
1983 14,80 262,73 3889,59 1281,20 
Mean 13,00 201,42 2608,39 0,00 
C.V. 17,32 6,06 17,76 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.6.2 Region 1: ,Roots (potential): Estimated production 
costs, excluding labour (1985). 
Particulars 
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (2150 I<g) 
Fertil izer (660 I<g 2:3:4) 
Chemicals 
Total 












Sept. - Nov. 
Dec. - Feb. 
March - May 







T bl 8 7 1 Reg,· on 1: Sugar-cane: Estimates of detrended a e •• 
yield, deflated producer price, revenue and 











1974 29,82 37,46 1117,04 ,43,35 
1975 27,48 44,83 1231,88 158,19 
1976 32,94 38,77 1277,07 203,38 
1977 30,21 36,90 1114,61 40,92 
1978 36,00 35,66 1283,59 209,90 
1979 31,40 36,24 1137,90 64,21 
1980 19,84 42,40 841 ,12 "232,57 
1981 32,36 31,80 1029,05 -44,64 
1982 30,99 31,59 978,94 -94,75 
1983 18,98 38,24 . 725,70 -347,99 
Mean 29,00 37,39 1073,69 0,00 
C.V. 6,02 3,48 5,42 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.7.2 Region 1: Sugar-cane: Estimated annual production 
costs, ex~luding labour (1985). 
Particulars 
Machinery and transport services 
Seed 
Fer til i zer 
Chemi cal s 
Total 
R/Ha 


























Table B.8.1 Region 2: Cereals (traditional): Estimates of 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 











1974 0,04 303,80 12,53 -119,02 
1975 0,70 281 ,17 196,67 65,12 
1976 0,47 308,92 144,27 12,73 
1977 0,68 339,59 231,60 100,06 
1978 0,62 349,52 217,03 85,48 
1979 0,14 371,51 52,84 -78,70 
1980 0,00 375,00 0,00 -131,55 
1981 0,67 335,86 226,27 94,72 
1982 0,50 349,61 174,28 42,73 
. 1983 0,18 342,73 59,99 -71,56 
Mean 0,40 335,77 131,55 0,00 
C.V. 22,25 2,80 21,99 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Table B.8.2 Region 2: Cereals (traditional): Estimated 




Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (18 Kg) 
Kraal manure and fertil izer 
Total 





















Table 8.9.1 Region 2: Cereals (potential): Estimates of 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 











1974 0,14 303,80 43,85 -613,52 
1975 3,54 281 ,17 996,54 339,17 
1976 2,36 308,92 729,98 72,61 
1977 3,48 339,59 1180,50 523,13 
1978 3,16 349,52 1104,95 447,58 
1979 0,67 371,51 249,39 -407,98 
1980 0,00 375,00 0,00 -657,37 
1981 3,41 335,86 1143,85 486,48 
1982 2,47 349,61 864,41 207,04 
1983 0,76 342,73 260,24 -397,13 
Mean 2,00 335,77 657,32 0,00 
C.V. 22,97 2,80 22,71 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.9.2 Region .2: Cereals (potential): Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
-7------------------------------------------~-----------~----
Particulars 
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (20 kg) 














Sep t. - Nov. 
Dec. - Feb. 
Mar c h - t-lay 







Table B.I0.1 Region 2: Legumes (traditional): Estimates of 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 
( 1 985= 1 00) . 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Year Yield Price Revenue Deviations 
(I<g/Ha) ( R/I<g) ( R/Ha) ( R/Ha) 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1974 227 2,51 570,23 -31 ,17 
1975 339 2,42 819,29 217,89 
1976 324 3,07 993,15 391,74 
1977 302 2,74 828,73 227,33 
1978 270 1 ,96 528,99 -72,41 
1979 145 2,00 289,92 -311,48 
1980 65 2,43 158,85 -442,56 
1981 232 2,75 638,57 37,17 
1982 255 1 ,97 502,79 -98,61 
1983 240 2,85 683,51 82,11 
Mean 240 2,47 601 ,41 0,00 
C.V. 10,90 5,03 13,23 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table B.I0.2 Region . 2: Legumes (traditional): Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
. . . -------------------------------------------------------------
Particulars R/Ha 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Contract ploughing and discing 
Seed (70 I<g) 
























Table B.l1.1 Region 2: Legumes (potential): Estimates of 
detrended yield, deflated producer price, 
revenue and deviations from mean revenue 
(1985=100). 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Year Yield Price Revenue Deviations 
(Kg/Ha) ( R/Kg) (R/Ha) (R/Ha) 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1974 613 1 ,88 1150,60 -174,24 
1975 1177 1 ,81 2129,35 804,52 
1976 1 101 2,30 2526,00 1201 ,17 
1977 993 2,05 2035,71 710,87 
1978 831 1 , 46 1216,42 -108,42 
1979 197 1 ,50 295,35 -1029,48 
1980 0 1 ,82 0,00 -1324,83 
1981 643 2,06 1322,25 -2,58 
1982 760 1 ,47 1118,57 -206,27 
1983 683 2,13 1454,09 129,26 
Mean 700 1 ,85 1324,83 0,00 




Region · 2: Legumes (potential): Estimated 
production costs, excluding labour (1985). 
R/Ha 
Contract ploughing and discing 





Fer til i zer 
Chemi cal s 
Total 690 
-------------------------------------------------------------





Sept. - Nov. 
Dec. - Feb. 
March - May 













Roots (summer & autumn) 
Roots (winter & spring) 
Sugar-cane 
Re ta i 1 




















Tabl. C.l OLS r.gr.ssion equations .sti~at.d fral crop trial data. 
Explanatory' 
variablt 












































0, 01-\-J ~-6 
1,2044-· 




~ o )b~ " -"1,67 
Notes 1 Rain = rainfall (nn) ov.r the rtltvant growing period. 
2 Intercept values ~ere adjusted dow~ard to esti~at. ~aize and bean 
yields in Rtgion 2 wh.r. larktt inputs art appli'd at low.r Itv.ls. 
I I~plits significanc. at tht five per cent I.vel of probability. 
II J~plits significance at tht ont ptr c.nt ltvtl of probability. 
Source Auerbach (1989); Cairns (1989); CCWR (1989); Ilaco 9V (1981); 
Liebtnb.rg aDd Joub.rt (1986187); Hall.t (1988); Helis (1988); 
Helis and 6a~an (1981/82-1986187); Nortje (1988); Rogers 
(1982); St~art (1988). 
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2. HOUSElIOLO SI ZE AND t:MPUWMmr 
-
lIousE'hold 
Type of conmuter 
Place of 
Member Sex Age Occupation Dally Weekly Contract Permanent employment 














) , COST OF EUUCATICN 
Annual cost per high school scholar 11 
Annual cost per junior school SCholar~ 
4. fIlM/LV <JlHG/N 
lIuw many years has the family head resided in this ward rmH] 






1'hls inforllliltfon is confldenti~1 mlCi Is to be used for rf'sea,ch p.u-poscs 
by KwaZulu Government and Natal Unl vers.1 ty Stilft. No Il"me" are, cqul H .-d. 
Pension and 
Number of years Adults not Employed Monthly disability 




LAJXXJR USED IN 00lN f'(X)I) PRODlX:I'IOO -
Hired and 
Ilousehoid hommage Hours worked Days worked 
~Ilber labourE;!rs per day per week 
I Mille head 












1M there surficient lilbour for crop production 
Could labour be hired if necessiJry 
If not, ~lY? Prefer employment on white farms 
Oirficult to supervlRc 
Cannot afford to pay labour 
Crop 
iweeks worked Daily Share 
per year Waqe Rations YIN 
- -




TIP Is land cash leased from other farmers 
Is land cash leased to other farmers 
Is land sharecropped 
Is the arable area large enough 
Is more freehold land available 
Is more leasehold land available 
I 
Is more sharecropping possible " 
/ LIVESroCK 




















Pure crope Gl"own Froehold land 
















Alternative income sources SOUl"ce Annual income 
Leased land 
Field 4 Field 5 Field I Pield 2 
Sharecropped Estimated Total area under Gro.ss i ncorne in 








rotal pure crop araa 
Total pure velie table area 
Gross crop income 
Number of fruit trees 
ixttd crops 
Grovn Freehold land 
¥ / N I"i 0 ld I I I'i e ld 2 I I'i u ld ) I Fie Id 4 I Fie Id 5 
Ii ze and beans I I I I 
INPUTS 
Usage Price paid Quantity used in 
Y / N one year 
'ti liur LAN 2 ) 2 2 ) I UN 2 J 2 2 J I 




oal ploughing --------lal debt to ------- -------.r industry .r fer .. debt ---- ----.rin~ry aurvioo. 
.gement 5er-vi celi -------
Leaaed land Sharecropped 
Field I I I'ield 2 Fiuld I I Pioid 2 
I 1 
Place obtained ,"otal rand in 
one year 
--------
Total area under 
crop type 
Total mixed crop area 
Total maize mix area 
Total vegetable mix area 
Vould you like to grow more maize for conlOwuption Y / N 
lIould yuu like to gruw more maize fur "ul" Y / N 
Vhat are the major limil .. tiuns on incrtl .. ""d l'roducllun, 
1 • 
2. _________ _ 
J. _______________ _ 
4. ________________________________ __ 
5. ________________ ___ 
6. 
7. _________________ _ 
Vas t.here any surplus pruduct.ion ll&ut could nul lw "uld 
Crop Qu .. nlity unlluld 1I"690n not "old -00 
~ 
185 
10. L1l.F_\~IZA rr c' ~ 
1. '~uld the household like to move to an urb~n area . II / ~! 
If yeo : 
1.1 'ollt're 
1.1 'o'hy yOu ld the family like to move. 
1.3 'o'hy !las 'nt the family moved. 
It no ; 
1.4 Why does'nt the family vish to move. 
I I ~ i I?inancial reasons higher family income in urban area ) 
I / NI To be vith family ego to join husband) 
I / ~ Improved quality of life ( easier lifestyle,better tacilit l 
o 
~ 
Other reasons ( specify : ____________________________ ___ 
Legal reasons ( eg. no urban rights 
Pinancial reasons ( specify :, __________________________ _ 
Other reasons { specify 
rn
N Quali ty of lite ( prefer rUral lit .. tyle ) 
I / N To retain land rights 
/ N PiDancial reaaona { specify ____________ __ 
Other reasons { ' specity 












Whe .. led trailer 
Storage silo I trench 
Motorcycle 
( 
grazing rights I I N 
12. ALLOCATION Of TIME BY HEAD PEHALE 
to be assessed by 
surTl!y team ) 
Task Hours 




Yorking in the lands 
It the temale head had oue extra hour of time 




Would any family member be prepared to pa~- tor 
creche facilities. I r / y I How mueh "" .. i"'_"+ Ii 
